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Abstract 
 
 
Since the 1970s, a number of models have been developed that investigate the reasons 
why firms break the law. None of these, however, have focussed on why firms 
transgress laws specifically related to marketing, nor have they recognized the 
dynamic nature of the transgression process. Based on the extant literature, and a 
framework of motive, opportunity, and control, a model of transgressing the law was 
developed that formed the basis of empirical testing within a marketing context. 
Previous research has focussed on the factors that have led to a previous transgression 
and the factors that have impacted on intent to engage in questionable behaviour in 
the future. This model looks to link past and future behaviour by recognising the 
changes that occur in the firm as the result of a previous transgression being detected, 
and how these changes impact on the likelihood that future transgressions will occur. 
It is recognised that the commission of the transgression is not the end of the process, 
as experiences associated with committing the transgression, getting caught, and 
subsequent penalties will most likely influence decisions regarding future 
transgressions.  This model also introduces the concept of unintentional illegality 
through a lack of knowledge of the law. The model is empirically tested using a 
combination of secondary data and a survey of marketing managers from Australia. 
The results find evidence that the transgression of marketing law is a dynamic process 
and show that control mechanisms, in particular, are effective in reducing the 
incidence of transgression. 
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1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
This chapter introduces the topic area for this thesis. First, a brief overview of 
marketing law is provided, before the concepts of illegal corporate behaviour, 
business ethics, and marketing law are defined. Secondly, a background to previous 
research in this area is provided, followed by an outline of the research objectives, and 
the contributions this research to the literature. Finally the research question is 
outlined, followed by a description of the value of this research to academics, 
managers, government regulators, and the wider community. 
 
 
1.1. Overview 
 
Illegal corporate behaviour (often referred to as ‘corporate wrongdoing’) is one of the 
most common incidences of macro dysfunction. There is evidence to suggest that 
significant numbers of firms routinely transgress the law (Finney and Lesieur, 1982; 
ACCC, 2007). Such behaviour can have quite significant effects on both customers 
and other firms (McKendall and Wagner, 1997). Of all the business functions, 
marketing is considered by many as the most likely to be associated with illegal or 
unethical behaviour (Dunfee, 1999; O’Higgins and Kelleher, 2005). Day and 
Montgomery (1999) have noted that, while marketing has contributed much to society, 
some of the outcomes of marketing activities have been to the detriment of consumers 
and society in general. Misleading advertising may trick consumers into buying 
products that they may otherwise not have purchased had they been fully aware of 
their true prices and features. Anti-competitive conduct restricts the product choices 
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available to consumers, stifles innovation, and leads to higher prices (Guiltinan, 2002). 
In addition, defective products not only result in financial harm and inconvenience for 
the consumer, but in certain circumstances can also result in physical harm and injury 
(Szwajkowski, 1985; Ryan, 2003). 
 
The problem faced by consumers is that, as products have become more technical and 
complex, they have become increasingly reliant on marketers’ claims when making 
purchase decisions. This is because consumers often lack the resources and the ability 
to interpret these claims (O’Higgins and Kelleher, 2005). In today’s environment the 
onus is now placed on the seller, since the required standards of marketing practice 
have shifted away from ‘caveat emptor’ or buyer beware, whereby all the 
responsibility is placed on the consumer, to ‘caveat venditor’, or let the seller beware 
(Smith, 1995; Ryan, 2003). Laws such as the Trade Practices Act (1974) in Australia 
have been introduced in an attempt to redress the imbalance of power that has 
favoured sellers over buyers. Marketers now have a responsibility enshrined in 
legislation not to harm consumers. This legislation not only protects consumers but 
also affects law-abiding competitors. Such firms are placed at a competitive 
disadvantage to firms that attain better performance through illegal means. 
 
These issues lead to questions of: 1) why do firms engage in illegal behaviour, and 2) 
what are the most effective ways to prevent it (Smith et al, 2007)? The primary 
objectives of this research were to develop an understanding of the reasons firms 
transgress marketing law and of the transgression process. Such research provides a 
means to shape policy designed to reduce the number of transgressions and to 
minimise the related harm to consumers and law-abiding competitors alike.  
 3 
 
 
 
1.1.1. Extent and Costs of Illegal Corporate Behaviour 
 
The issue of illegal corporate behaviour has been of concern for some time. Some of 
the earliest evidence of illegal corporate behaviour came from the classic research by 
Clinard and Yeager (1980) and Finney and Lesieur (1982). Clinard and Yeager (1980) 
found that the 580 largest firms in the United States had an average of 4.8 
enforcement actions against them during 1975 and 1976. In 1979 it was estimated that 
the dollar losses from illegal corporate behaviour in the United States was over 2 
billion dollars. Thornburg (1990) later found that 20% of Fortune 500 firms had been 
penalised for serious breaches of federal law. In Australia, whilst there has been a 
growing recognition of the need to examine ethical issues more closely, firms 
regularly engage in unethical or illegal behaviour (Wood and Callaghan, 2003). In 
Australia, for the year 2004 there were 20 court cases resolved with a financial 
penalty. There were also 53 cases where a firm provided a written undertaking to 
cease behaviour that breached marketing related laws (ACCC, 2007). These cases 
involved a wide variety of firms, ranging from large firms with in-house legal 
departments, to small firms that have neither the time nor the resources to seek legal 
advice. 
 
1.1.2. Overview of the Literature, Research Gaps, and Contribution 
 
It was not until the 1970s that illegal corporate behaviour became a particular area of 
interest to the public, government agencies, and academic researchers (Clinard and 
Yeager, 1980). More recently, a number of researchers, from a range of disciplines, 
have attempted to discover the reasons why firms might transgress the law (Hill et al, 
 4 
 
 
 
1992). Marketing however has not been one of those disciplines. From a marketing 
perspective, the research focus has been on unethical behaviour as opposed to strictly 
illegal behaviour. Whilst both unethical and illegal behaviour are related they are not 
always the same. Behaviour that is unethical is not always illegal and, thus, not 
subject to regulatory enforcement (Nesteruk, 1999). Transgressing the law will result 
in more serious consequences to a firm than an act that is technically legal but 
considered unethical. A problem with unethical behaviour is that it can be subjective 
whether something is unethical or not. This research addressed these issues by 
attempting to determine the reasons why firms might transgress marketing laws and to 
identify the processes involved in the illegal marketing decision-making process.  
 
Finney and Lesieur (1982) recognised that models of illegal corporate behaviour do 
not stop with the commission of the transgression. This is because previous 
transgressions play an important role in decisions regarding future transgressions. 
With the exception of Baucus and Near (1991), this issue has not adequately been 
addressed by the extant literature. This research, therefore, explores the dynamic 
nature of the transgression process, by combining both the antecedents of 
transgressing the law (both in the past and likelihood in the future) with the 
consequences on firm behaviour resulting from these transgressions having been 
detected by regulatory agencies. 
 
Previous research has also failed to link unintentional illegality and knowledge of the 
law to models of illegal corporate behaviour. Not all transgressions will be a result of 
intentional acts. This research recognised that in some instances transgression of the 
law may be due to a lack of legal knowledge (Baucus, 1994; Peterson, 2001a). Such 
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research provides a significant opportunity for further study (Loe et al, 2000). Lastly, 
previous research into illegal corporate behaviour has focussed on firms from the 
United States. This research looked to overcome these limitations by investigating 
transgressions of marketing law within a non-North American context – namely 
Australia.  
 
 
1.2. Defining Ethics and Illegal Corporate Behaviour 
 
Previous research has tended to focus on the reasons why individuals engage in 
unethical behaviour, as opposed to the illegal behaviour of firms. Given that ethics is 
based on ‘morals’, it tends to reflect the behaviour of individuals within a firm, 
whereas illegal behaviour can be considered to be committed by the firm itself 
(Finney and Lesieur, 1982). Regardless, one cannot separate the issue of business 
ethics from the literature on illegal corporate behaviour. While the focus of this 
research was on illegal firm behaviour, both concepts were important in developing 
an understanding of why firms transgress the law. This is because specific legal issues 
are often intertwined with prominent ethical issues (Nesteruk, 1999).  
 
1.2.1. Definition of Business and Marketing Ethics 
 
Unethical behaviour is behaviour that breaches so called ‘moral norms’ and is 
concerned with the conflicts and duties that result from basic relationships between 
individuals (Gaski, 1999).  Such behaviour may or may not be illegal. Ethics was 
therefore defined as “an enquiry into the nature and grounds of morality where the 
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term morality is taken to mean judgements, standards, and rules of conduct” (Taylor, 
1975, cited in Lund, 2000, p. 331). Marketing ethics is a significant subset of business 
ethics and is concerned with moral issues relating specifically to marketing behaviour. 
Marketing ethics was therefore defined as: “Standards of conduct and moral 
judgement applied to marketing practice” (Gaski, 1999, p. 316). 
 
1.2.2. Definition of Illegal Corporate Behaviour 
 
The first empirical work in this area was that of Sutherland (1949). This was where 
the term ‘white-collar crime’ was coined, which Sutherland defined as “criminal acts 
committed by persons of the middle and upper socio economic class in connection 
with their occupations” (Sutherland 1949, cited in Clinard and Yeager, 1980, p. 18). 
Subsequently, this definition was found to be too restrictive, and references to the 
offenders’ ‘economic class’ are no longer seen as relevant. Clinard and Yeager (1980, 
p. 16) defined corporate crime as “…any act committed by corporations that is 
punishable under administrative, civil, or criminal law”. This definition extended 
corporate crime beyond the criminal law (the only means of redress for ‘ordinary’ 
crimes), to include civil actions and actions by specialist regulatory agencies, such as 
the Federal Trade Commission in the United States and the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) in Australia. 
  
Finney and Lesieur (1982) noted three key issues of corporate crime:  
 
1. Whether the organisation is the perpetrator or the victim, as, in many cases, 
transgressions are primarily aimed at other organisations.  
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2. Whether the transgressor is acting for personal gain or on behalf of the 
organisation. 
3. Whether the organisation is a private enterprise or government agency.  
 
According to issues 1 and 3, corporate crime occurs when the organisation is a non-
government agency and it is the perpetrator. Issue 2 is the key consideration in 
defining illegal corporate behaviour. An important question is whether organisations 
can commit crimes, or only individuals within organisations. Some definitions (i.e. 
Sutherland, 1949) include behaviour that benefits the individual committing the act 
(Smith et al, 2007). Most sociologists and criminologists also recognise that 
organisations are entities in their own right. This has long been recognised by the law. 
While it is individuals who make decisions and act upon them, they do so as ‘agents’ 
of the organisation. As agents, their behaviour is for the sake of the organisation 
rather than for themselves. This is because employees aim to meet the organisation’s 
objectives and operate within its constraints (Finney and Lesieur, 1982).  Therefore, 
this research was concerned with illegal activities that are designed to benefit the firm 
rather than the individual (i.e. not embezzling). This is consistent with the Kriesberg 
(1976), rational actor model, as well as other definitions, such as those by Clinard and 
Yeager (1980) and Smith et al (2007), all of whom recognised that transgressions are 
committed by organisations and not by individuals. 
 
Debate has also occurred over whether definitions of illegal corporate behaviour 
should be limited to strictly illegal acts. Some definitions encompass unethical 
behaviours, as defined in the previous section. The problem with including unethical 
acts in the definition of illegal corporate behaviour is that ethics can be highly 
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subjective, whereas with legal issues a clearer distinction exists between what is 
considered acceptable and what is not. 
 
Based on these considerations, for the purpose of this research, the definition of 
illegal corporate behaviour used was that proposed by Finney and Lesieur (1982). 
Adapted from Shover (1978), they defined illegal behaviour as: 
 
“Illegal acts of omission or commission by individuals during the course of 
work in legitimate organisations, which they intend to contribute to the 
achievement of operative goals of the organisation, some subunit within the 
organisation or their own job duties” (Finney and Lesieur, 1982, p. 264). 
 
1.2.3. Relationship Between Ethics and Illegal Corporate Behaviour 
 
Unethical and illegal behaviour are closely aligned, with legal issues forming a 
prominent part of the business ethics discourse (Nesteruk, 1999). If certain behaviour 
is illegal then it will also be unethical, although situations exist where behaviour that 
is technically legal may, nevertheless, be considered unethical. At one extreme, Gaski 
(1999) has argued that ethical guidelines are simply restatements of legal principles. 
This means that, if one follows the law then one is behaving ethically: “We are at a 
juncture possibly rare, in which the law and prevailing ethics are in close alignment” 
(Gaski, 1999, p. 326). Smith (2001), on the other hand, has argued that, while 
following the law is necessary for good conduct, it is not sufficient. This is because 
situations exist where firms must do more than simply follow the law. The law only 
provides minimal standards and firms must also be guided by ethics. Therefore, ethics 
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has a moral component, whereby an individual (and not the law) decides whether an 
action is acceptable or not. The ethics literature was most relevant to this research, 
since factors that influence unethical behaviour should also help to explain strictly 
illegal behaviour. Having defined business ethics and illegal corporate behaviour in a 
general sense, the next section will outline the laws that specifically govern marketing 
behaviour, which was the focus of this research. 
 
 
1.3. The Components of Marketing Law 
 
As with many actions within the commercial environment, marketing behaviour is 
bound by a regulatory framework. In Australia these laws are primarily covered by 
the Trade Practices Act (1974). These laws are often collectively referred to as 
consumer protection legislation or marketing law. Marketing law in general (and the 
legislation outlined above) can be divided into three main categories. These are: 1) 
anti-competitive legislation, 2) advertising law, and 3) product quality legislation.  
 
1.3.1. Anti-Competitive Legislation 
 
Anti-competitive legislation (often referred to as antitrust) represents a major 
component of marketing law, and is perhaps the most important. Antitrust is 
“…concerned with business conduct that distorts the mix of products and prices that 
a free market would make available to consumers” (Guiltinan, 2002, p. 260). Such 
conduct includes monopolistic behaviour and agreements between firms to limit 
competition (Guiltinan, 2002). When competition is lessened, consumers tend to have 
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fewer product choices and are forced to pay higher prices. Anti-competitive 
legislation is most concerned with the issue of price. In Australia, such violations are 
addressed by Part four of the Trade Practices Act (1974). The overriding goal of this 
legislation is to promote competition, “…based on the premise that societies’ 
resources are best allocated in a competitive market where rivalry between firms 
ensures maximum efficiency in the use of resources” (Van Roy, 1991, p. 6).  
 
1.3.2. Advertising Law 
 
Advertising law addresses the control of promotional activities: in particular, 
misleading, unfair, and comparative advertising. Misleading advertising occurs when 
promotional materials lead consumers to believe something about a product or service 
that is not true. To determine whether consumers have been misled, the advertising 
must be examined and interpreted to see what messages are being communicated to 
consumers. If these messages are found to be untrue, then it must be determined 
whether they deceive consumers into making different purchasing decisions than they 
would have made with accurate information (Petty, 1997). In Australia, misleading 
advertising is addressed by Part five of the Trade Practices Act (1974). All aspects of 
the promotion and sale of goods and services, from advertising and pricing, to sales 
techniques and finance agreements, are covered. The key aspect of Part five is to 
regulate behaviour that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive 
(Lysonski and Duffy, 1992). While laws regarding misleading advertising mainly deal 
with issues relating to promotional activities, they also affect some pricing behaviour, 
such as misleading information with regards to pricing, discounts, and sales. Whilst 
misleading advertising laws are primarily designed to protect consumers, these laws 
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also help to protect those businesses that comply with the law and are, as such, 
disadvantaged by those that do not. 
 
1.3.3. Product Quality Legislation 
 
Product quality legislation is primarily concerned with ensuring that both goods and 
services meet certain standards, match the description provided, and do what they are 
supposed to do. A seller can be liable if a product causes harm whilst being used for 
its intended purpose (Ryan, 2003). In Australia, these requirements are covered, along 
with misleading advertising, under Part five of the Trade Practices Act (1974). 
 
 
1.4. Marketing Law and the Four Ps 
 
Marketing law has traditionally been based upon the four Ps of the marketing mix: 
product, price, place, and promotion. Each law is categorised according to which of 
the four Ps applies. The main disadvantage of this approach is that some areas of law 
are difficult to classify. Whilst each law mainly focuses on a particular aspect of the 
marketing mix, there is still some degree of overlap. For example, while advertising 
law focuses on promotion, it also covers elements of price and distribution. Thus, the 
four Ps approach can at times represent an oversimplification. Another problem is that, 
in some jurisdictions, the four Ps transactional approach to marketing is losing its 
appeal in favour of a shift towards a more pronounced relationship approach. This 
means some authors consider that other means of defining marketing law may be 
preferable (Petty, 1999). Despite these concerns, alternative definitions can be more 
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complex, whereas a four Ps approach is straightforward and easily understood by 
marketers (Petty, 1999; Petty, 2000). As a result, this approach was used in this 
research. Issues of price primarily relate to anti-competitive legislation, although 
some aspects of pricing are also covered by advertising law. Issues of promotion are 
primarily addressed by advertising law, while product issues are primarily addressed 
by product quality legislation. Issues relating to place are covered by aspects of all 
three components of marketing law, though mainly by anti-competitive legislation. 
The specific laws that apply to each of the four Ps are summarised in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1: Overview of the Main Marketing Laws that Influence Each of the 
Four Ps  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Product 
 
• Part Five, Trade 
Practices Act (1974) 
Promotion 
 
• Part Five, Trade 
Practices Act (1974) 
Place 
 
• Part Four, Trade 
Practices Act (1974) 
 
 
Price 
 
• Part Four, Trade 
Practices Act (1974) 
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1.5. Research Gaps 
 
Since the 1970s, a number of sociological (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Finney and 
Lesieur, 1982), marketing (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Hunt and Vitell, 1986), and 
management (Baucus and Near, 1991; Baucus, 1994; McKendall et al, 2002) theories 
regarding the determinants of unethical and illegal firm behaviour have been 
developed. However, theories from each of these disciplines have tended to exist in 
isolation. Empirical testing of these theories has also been limited and many of the 
factors tested, such as individual characteristics, have not been constant predictors of 
unethical or illegal firm behaviour (Hill et al, 1992; McLaren, 2000; Smith et al, 
2007). Moreover, within the marketing discipline, the focus of previous research has 
been on unethical behaviour rather than strictly illegal behaviour. As has already been 
discussed, a major problem with focussing on unethical behaviour is that it is 
subjective as to whether something is unethical or not. It is much easier to determine 
whether a law has been transgressed. Day and Montgomery (1999) suggested that 
research in marketing, both theoretical and empirical, should look at issues such as 
intrusive marketing practices, deceptive advertising, and promotion. However, such 
research has not, to any great extent, been conducted from a legal standpoint. This 
lack of research is somewhat surprising given that of all the business functions 
marketing is often seen as one of the most likely to engage in questionable behaviour 
(O’Higgins and Kelleher, 2005).  
 
Within the ethics domain, earlier research tended to focus on the processes that 
individuals go through when engaging in unethical behaviour, starting with 
identifying the ethical issue through to engaging in the unethical act. The problem 
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with these process models is that they do not explain the reasons behind the 
occurrence of unethical behaviour. Recognising this problem, determinant models 
have been developed, sometimes in combination with process models (Ferrell and 
Gresham, 1985; Jones, 1991). These models have had a strong emphasis on 
characteristics of the individual such as demographics and moral beliefs rather than on 
organisational factors (McClaren, 2000). The effects of various organisational and 
environmental factors have been included in more recent theories, such as the 
behavioural model of Bommer et al (1987) and Jones’ moral intensity model (1991). 
These models recognised the importance of organisational and industry factors in 
unethical behaviour (Frederick, 1987; Badaracco and Webb, 1995; Baucus and Beck-
Dudley, 2005). It has been noted, therefore, that there is a need for research that 
empirically tests the determinants of illegal (rather than unethical) behaviour, from the 
perspective of the organisation and industry (McLaren, 2000). 
 
While there has been no research that has looked at strictly illegal marketing 
behaviour, studies investigating the antecedents of illegal corporate behaviour in other 
business disciplines have been a topic of interest within the management literature 
(Baucus and Near, 1991; McKendall and Wagner, 1997; McKendall et al, 2002). 
Unlike research in the ethics domain, since the early 1990s, research in management 
has resulted in the development of comprehensive models of the effects of 
organisational and environmental characteristics on illegal corporate behaviour. 
Similar to ethical research, however, many of the variables tested have not been 
consistent predictors of illegal behaviour, meaning there is still no clear indication as 
to its major antecedents. As the literature provides no clear picture of the factors that 
influence illegal behaviour, as suggested by Hill et al (1992), there is a need to 
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consider other factors and approaches. In light of this viewpoint, this research 
introduced the idea of a dynamic approach, and also the concept of knowledge, to the 
model of marketing law transgressions, which are described below (Finney and 
Lesieur, 1982; Baucus, 1994). 
 
It is likely that many, if not, most, transgressions of the law are calculated and 
deliberate. Firms take the risk that they will not be caught, or that the financial 
benefits accrued will far outweigh the costs of any fines and/or negative publicity 
(Baucus and Near, 1991). For other, often smaller, firms without access to legal 
services, however, transgressions may be unintended. Such firms may have little 
knowledge of their legal obligations to consumers across the marketing mix, causing 
them to unwittingly transgress the law (Baucus, 1994). Baucus (1994) was the first to 
consider unintentional illegal corporate behaviour as being separate from intentional 
behaviour, claiming:  
 
“We need to acknowledge the existence and importance of unintentional 
illegality so we can learn more about how to prevent it and respond effectively 
when it occurs. Managers may need to take different actions to prevent 
unintentional versus intentional wrongdoing, so research is required to identify 
these differences” (Baucus, 1994, p. 720). 
 
Unintentional illegality is closely linked to the concept of knowledge, in that firms 
may transgress the law simply because they lack knowledge of the law (Baucus, 
1994). Limited research has attempted to investigate the extent to which managers are 
knowledgeable of the law or ethical situations (Peterson, 1997; 2001a; 2001b; 2003; 
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Bowal and Wanke, 1998). Such research has failed to test how knowledge of the law 
impacts on illegal corporate behaviour. This failure represents a significant 
opportunity for research to determine whether a lack of knowledge of marketing law 
leads firms to unintentionally transgress (Loe et al, 2000).  
 
Finney and Lesieur (1982) proposed that models of illegal corporate behaviour do not 
stop with the commission of the transgression. This is because both previous 
transgressions and detection play an important role in a firm’s decision to transgress 
again in the future. Despite this contention, research into corporate illegality has 
tended to treat transgression of the law as a static process. That is, transgressions, 
either past or future, are viewed in isolation (e.g. McKendall and Wagner, 1997; 
McKendall et al, 1999; McKendall et al, 2002). Much of the research, especially 
relating to illegal corporate behaviour, has focussed on identifying the factors that 
may have led firms to transgress in the past (e.g. Baucus and Near, 1991; McKendall 
and Wagner, 1997; McKendall et al, 1999; McKendall et al, 2002). Other research, 
especially within the field of business ethics, has looked at intent to act unethically in 
the future (e.g. Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Sparks and Hunt, 1998; Weber and Gillespie, 
1998). No previous research has attempted to link past transgressions, the 
consequences to the firm of those transgressions having been detected, and future 
intent. Some research has investigated the consequences of a transgression being 
detected by regulatory agencies in terms of the effects on a firm’s share price and 
profitability, but has not been linked to subsequent firm behaviour (Baucus and 
Baucus, 1997). By investigating how the consequences of the detection of a previous 
transgression alter firm behaviour, or subsequently influence the likelihood of firms 
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transgressing the law in the future, considerable additional insights to the 
understanding of the transgression process could be gained.  
 
It has also been suggested that new methodologies should be considered for research 
pertaining to illegal corporate behaviour (Hill et al, 1992). Previous research on 
deterrence has tended to rely on firm ‘outcomes’, which fails to account for potential 
future behaviour and ignores the effect that perceptions and related actions can have 
on the likelihood of future transgression occurring (Smith et al, 2007).  Most of the 
previous research in this area has either been based on cross-sectional surveys (e.g. 
McKendall and Wagner, 1997) or longitudinal research using secondary data (e.g. 
Baucus and Near, 1991). Each of these methods is subject to limitations. Cross-
sectional research is subject to time-ordering concerns when dealing with past 
behaviour, since changes might have occurred between the transgression and when 
the survey was conducted (McKendall and Wagner, 1997). Longitudinal research, 
while effective in analysing past behaviour, cannot be used to measure potential 
future behaviour, and also requires appropriate data sources. There is a need to 
combine these approaches in an attempt to develop a methodology that can overcome 
the limitations of each technique, and also to investigate both previous transgressions 
and potential future behaviour. 
 
Lastly, previous research into corporate illegality has focussed on firms from North 
America. Other countries, naturally, have different legal and organisational 
environments. Hence, the drivers of illegal corporate behaviour may be different. It 
would be useful to determine whether models developed in a North American context 
apply in other jurisdictions/contexts, such as Australia. 
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1.6. Research Objectives 
 
Based on the gaps in the literature identified in the previous section, the primary 
objective of this research was to develop and test a model of marketing law 
transgression that recognises the dynamic nature of the transgression process. The 
dynamic process includes previous transgressions, the consequences of those 
transgressions having been detected, and the impact of these consequences on the 
likelihood of future transgressions occurring. The specific objectives relating to each 
of these components are described below. The objectives of this research were to 
determine: 
 
Previous transgressions 
1. The factors that led firms to transgress marketing law in the first instance. 
 
Consequences 
2. What impact transgression detection and punishment by regulatory 
agencies has on firm behaviour. 
 
Future Transgressions 
3. The factors that impact on the likelihood of a firm transgressing marketing 
law in the future. 
4. The impact that a lack of knowledge of marketing law has on the 
likelihood of a firm transgressing the law in the future. 
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1.7. Research Contributions 
 
 This research addressed the gaps described previously, resulting in a significant 
contribution to the existing literature. The contribution is four-fold, through: 
 
1. The development of a comprehensive conceptual model of illegal 
corporate behaviour that incorporates both the antecedents and 
consequences of illegal behaviour by viewing corporate transgression as a 
dynamic process. Whilst the dynamic nature of the transgression process 
was recognised in 1982 (Finney and Lesieur), subsequent models have 
tended to view the process as being static (Jones, 1991; Baucus, 1994; Mc 
Kendall and Wagner, 1997). This research considered a weakness of the 
extant theory to be the use of static models that do not recognise the role of 
repeat transgressions. The development of this dynamic model is 
considered to be an important contribution to the literature. This model 
drew upon literature from the sociology, management, marketing, and 
business ethics disciplines in order to combine the potential insights each 
discipline provides. 
 
2. Empirically testing a comprehensive, dynamic, conceptual model of illegal 
corporate behaviour. As noted previously, empirical testing of such models 
has not always identified consistent predictors of unethical and illegal 
behaviour (Loe et al, 2000). It is important that new models be developed 
and be empirically tested that take a different approach to explaining the 
transgression of marketing law. This was the first piece of research to fully 
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empirically test Finney and Lesieur’s (1982) proposition that models of 
illegal corporate behaviour do not stop with the commission of the 
transgression, because previous transgressions (and their detection) play an 
important role in decisions regarding future transgressions.  
 
This dynamic model also recognises the influence that poor legal 
knowledge, which may result in unintentional transgression, may have on 
the transgression process. Whilst most illegality is likely due to intentional 
acts, it needs to be acknowledged that, for many firms (especially smaller 
ones), transgressions may occur as a result of poor knowledge of the law 
(Baucus, 1994; Peterson, 2003). Whilst ignorance of the law is not 
considered an excuse for illegal conduct in the view of the courts, the 
existence of unintentional transgressions as a result of poor legal 
knowledge may suggest that education is a possible means to improve 
behaviour. This research considered the omission of legal knowledge from 
models of illegal corporate behaviour to be another major weakness of 
extant theory. This research was the first to empirically test the role that 
knowledge of the law has on transgressions, as proposed by Baucus 
(1994). 
 
3. Being the first research to test a model of illegal corporate behaviour from 
a marketing perspective. Marketers are faced with a range of laws that 
impact their marketing activities. Records show that such laws are broken 
on regular occasions (ACCC, 2007), yet no research has attempted to 
ascertain the reasons why marketers might break these laws in the first 
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place. Whilst research has been conducted in other areas of business law 
such as environmental law (Baucus and Near, 1991; McKendall and 
Wagner, 1997; Morris et al, 1999), it has not been conducted within the 
marketing domain. This research attempted to overcome this limitation, by 
recognising that the unique characteristics of the marketing discipline and 
practice may mean that the reasons for transgressing marketing law differ 
from those of other commercial laws.   
 
In addition, previous research in this area has been primarily situated in a 
North American or European context. Models of illegal corporate 
behaviour were adapted to illegal marketing behaviour in an Australian 
setting, in order to determine whether models of illegal corporate 
behaviour primarily developed in North America could apply to a different 
legal and cultural environment. 
 
4. The recognition that, in order to test the dynamic model, a combination of 
methodologies was required. This research was the first to combine 
techniques used to measure previous transgressions of the law (e.g. Baucus 
and Near, 1991; McKendall and Wagner, 1997) with techniques used to 
measure the consequences of transgression detection (e.g. Baucus and 
Baucus, 1997), and also future intent to transgress (e.g. Hunt and Vitell, 
1986; Sparks and Hunt, 1998; Weber and Gillespie, 1998).  
 
A combination of secondary and primary data was used to test the 
proposed model. This research recognised the limitations of cross-
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sectional studies using survey instruments, such as McKendall and Wagner 
(1997), in that conditions within the firm may change subsequent to the 
transgression detection and before data collection. Similarly, longitudinal 
studies also have limitations in that (especially in the case of Australia) the 
data required is not always available. In addition, longitudinal studies 
using secondary data cannot provide information on future behaviour. 
Such information can only be obtained through cross-sectional research 
using a survey instrument. Therefore, another major contribution of this 
research is the use of a combination of longitudinal analysis using 
secondary data and cross-sectional research using a survey instrument. 
This methodology allowed time-ordering concerns to be addressed, while 
allowing for the collection of information – such as future intent of 
transgression - that is not available from secondary sources.  
 
In addition, a hierarchical mixed model procedure was used to test the 
hypothesised relationships from the cross-sectional data. The benefit of 
this technique is that it recognises the heterogeneity that exists between 
respondents and the differences in their responses to scale items (Luke, 
2004). The mixed model allowed for the potential existence of social 
desirability bias to not only be acknowledged, but also controlled for. 
Social desirability bias occurs when participants respond in a manner that 
shows there actions to be more positive than they actually are (Fisher, 
1993; Chung and Monroe, 2003). Respondents were asked about their 
perceptions of their own as well as their competitors’ behaviours to 
ascertain any biases that might exist.   
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Another methodological contribution is the use of hazard models in the 
analysis of secondary data. Hazard models look at the risk of events (in 
this case transgression) occurring in a given year, given the existence of 
previous transgressions. This is a technique that has been used in the 
context of re-offending for ‘ordinary’ crime, but has not previously been 
used to investigate recidivism in a business law context (DeJong, 1997; 
Wilson, 2005). 
 
 
1.8. Research Question 
 
Based on the previous discussion, the primary research question was: 
 
What are the antecedents and consequences of transgressing marketing law? 
 
For this question to be addressed, current models within the ethical and illegal 
corporate behaviour literature formed the basis of a model of the antecedents of 
transgressing marketing law, with knowledge included as an additional factor. This 
model was expanded to demonstrate the dynamic nature of the transgression process. 
To achieve this, the potential consequences and subsequent changes in behaviour by a 
firm caught transgressing marketing law, and the potential impact these consequences 
might have had on the likelihood of engaging in future illegal behaviour, were 
recognised. This updated model was then tested using quantitative techniques with 
both primary and secondary data. This research was conducted across a wide range of 
Australian firms. Therefore, more specific sub-questions questions were: 
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1) What factors influence previous transgressions of marketing law? 
2) What changes occur in firms’ behaviour as a result of a transgression being 
detected by regulatory agencies? 
3) What factors might influence a firm’s likelihood of transgressing marketing law in 
the future? 
4) How might changes resulting from the detection of a previous transgression affect 
the likelihood of transgressing marketing law in the future? 
5) What impact does knowledge of marketing law have on the transgression process? 
 
 
1.9. Value of the Research 
 
This research is valuable to academic researchers, managers, regulatory agencies, and 
the general public. The value to each of these groups is outlined below. 
 
1.9.1. Value of the Research to Academics 
 
Despite the growing body of research looking at the factors that lead firms to behave 
illegally or unethically, empirical research has not yet identified constant predictors of 
illegal or unethical behaviour (Hill et al, 1992; Loe et al, 2000). The proposed 
research contributes to the extant literature, not only by investigating the antecedents 
of illegal corporate behaviour proposed in the literature in an Australian context, but 
also by investigating the dynamic nature of the transgression process, which has been 
inadequately addressed by previous research.  
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1.9.2. Value of the Research to Marketing Managers 
 
By understanding the factors that influence illegal behaviour, one is (in theory) in a 
better position to reduce its occurrence. This knowledge can provide managers with a 
means of determining whether their firm is ‘at risk’ of engaging in illegal marketing 
behaviour, and suggest ways in which the likelihood of engaging in such behaviour 
can be reduced (Smith et al, 2007). Some firms may intentionally transgress the law, 
since they know that, even if they get caught, the benefits will far outweigh any fine 
or negative publicity. However, for other firms, a large fine and negative publicity 
could have a severe negative impact on their business (Petty, 1997). This research can 
suggest ways that managers in such rims can reduce the likelihood of this occurring. 
 
1.9.3. Value of the Research to Regulatory Agencies 
 
This research can also provide regulatory agencies with valuable information to assist 
in targeting their enforcement activities to firms and industries most likely to 
transgress the law. A greater understanding of the role of knowledge in illegal 
marketing behaviour can also assist regulatory agencies in their educational 
programmes. The findings from this research could also suggest whether there is a 
requirement to improve knowledge at all, or whether regulatory agencies should focus 
more on enforcement activities. Developing a greater understanding of the 
consequences of illegal behaviour, in particular how firms may change their 
behaviour as a result of transgressions being detected, will lead to greater insights into 
the effectiveness of enforcement activities, and which methods might be the most 
effective in reducing the likelihood that such behaviour will reoccur. Such 
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information can help policy-makers determine the most appropriate sanctions that will 
minimise the risk of future transgressions occurring. 
 
1.9.4. Value of the Research to the Wider Community 
 
Ultimately, consumers should benefit from greater knowledge and enforcement of 
marketing law, since they are the ones who are misled by promotional material or 
who have to pay higher prices as a result of anticompetitive behaviour. The same 
applies to firms that work within the law, but are disadvantaged by the illegal actions 
of their competitors. 
 
 
1.10. Research Outline 
 
This chapter has provided an introduction to the topic of interest as well as the aim 
and importance of the proposed research. Chapter 2 provides a detailed overview of 
the literature encompassing a range of disciplines. The focus is on models that 
describe the factors that lead to unethical or illegal behaviour and the attempts to 
empirically test such models. Additionally, the limited research on knowledge of the 
law and the consequences of illegal behaviour within the marketing context is 
introduced. Chapter 3 describes the development of the proposed conceptual research 
model and associated hypotheses. Chapter 4 presents the methodology and results of 
the secondary data analysis using hazard models. Chapter 5 explains the general 
research design and the methodologies used to test the model for the quantitative 
survey, in addition to describing the measurement model. Chapter 6 describes the 
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results obtained from the quantitative survey, which are discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter 7. Chapter 8 describes the implications of the results for managers and 
regulatory agencies, while Chapter 9 presents the limitations of the research 
conducted and outlines possible avenues for future research. Lastly, Chapter 10 
provides some overall conclusions. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the background to the research model that is introduced in 
Chapter 3. In this chapter the extant literature is reviewed in order to illustrate: 1) the 
factors that impact on unethical and illegal corporate behaviour, 2) the role that 
unintentional behaviour plays on illegal corporate behaviour through insufficient 
knowledge of the law, 3) the consequences for a firm of a transgression being 
detected by regulatory agencies, and 4) the effect that these detections have on the 
likelihood of future transgressions occurring. As alluded to in Chapter 1 and 
demonstrated in Figure 2.1, the literature can be divided into two major components: 
illegal corporate behaviour and business ethics. Theories of both illegal and unethical 
behaviour by firms have been developed across a wide range of disciplines. These 
include: marketing, business ethics, management, and to a lesser extent sociology and 
law. As a result, a broad review of the literature from these different disciplines was 
required.  
 
Some of the earliest comprehensive theories of the factors that lead to illegal firm 
behaviour were developed by sociologists Clinard and Yeager (1980) and Finney and 
Lesieur (1982). These authors recognised that the transgression process is dynamic. 
Since then, the preponderance of published research in the area of corporate illegality 
has occurred within the management and organisational research literatures and has 
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tended to view the transgression process as being static, rather than dynamic (e.g. 
McKendall and Wagner, 1997; McKendall et al, 2002).  
 
Business ethics can claim to be a discipline in its own right and a large body of 
literature pertaining to ethical firm behaviour has developed over the last 30 years 
(Malhotra and Miller, 1998). Within the field there has been a large volume of 
relevant research, including that which addresses ethical issues specifically related to 
marketing. Additionally, both management and, in particular, marketing, have made 
significant contributions to the business ethics field.  
 
On the other hand, there is a dearth of research regarding the extent to which firms are 
knowledgeable of the law that affects them. If knowledge of the law is poor then the 
law may be transgressed unintentionally (Baucus, 1994). Bowal and Wanke (1998) 
attempted to address firms’ legal knowledge from a legal perspective as did Peterson 
(1997; 2001a; 2001b; 2003) from a management perspective. 
 
If, as suggested by Finney and Lesieur (1982), the transgression process is dynamic 
then the literature on the consequences to a firm of having its transgression detected 
by regulatory agencies should be considered. Empirically, however, only a small 
number of management studies have investigated these consequences and their effect 
on short-term profitability and share price (e.g. Baucus and Baucus, 1997). This 
research has not been linked to subsequent illegal behaviour. 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the diverse sources of literature considered relevant to this study: 
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Figure 2.1: Summary of the Disciplines Informing the Research 
 
 
 
While differing in many aspects, there is, nevertheless, a considerable degree of 
overlap between both illegal and unethical behaviours. Only the discipline of 
management has, to any great extent, focussed its attention on both areas of interest. 
Where theories that inform the literature have been explicitly mentioned, they tend to 
include control theory (McKendall and Wagner, 1997), learning theory (Hill et al, 
1992), and transaction cost economics (Morris et al, 1995).  
 
This chapter will firstly examine the development of research into unethical and 
illegal firm behaviours. Secondly, the role of marketing in unethical and illegal 
behaviour research is investigated. Thirdly, the major theories of antecedents of 
illegal and unethical behaviour are considered in more detail, followed by a summary 
of empirical work. Fourthly, the concepts of unintentional illegality and legal 
knowledge are introduced. The last section examines the consequences and 
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behavioural changes a firm experiences if a transgression of the law is detected by 
regulatory agencies. 
 
 
2.2. Development of Research into Illegal/Unethical Behaviour 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the relevant literature on both illegal and 
unethical firm behaviour.  
 
2.2.1. Unethical Firm Behaviour 
 
The literature on business ethics was most relevant to this research since unethical 
behaviour is closely related to strictly illegal behaviour (Gaski, 1999). Business ethics 
can be classified as a discipline in itself, although much of the ethics literature is 
found within the marketing and management disciplines. Until the mid 1980s, 
research into unethical behaviour was largely atheoretical. Few attempts had been 
made to explain the reasons behind unethical behaviour (Hunt and Vitell, 1986). As a 
response to these problems, the marketing discipline provided two major theoretical 
contributions to the ethics literature, through Ferrell and Gresham’s (1985) 
contingency framework and Hunt and Vitell’s (1986) general theory of marketing 
ethics. Since then, a considerable body of literature has developed, illustrating 
numerous ethical decision-making models in both marketing and management. These 
models identify important constructs for determining what factors have the greatest 
influence on ethical decision-making (Loe et al, 2000). However, there has been a 
lack of empirical testing of the factors that impact on unethical behaviour, 
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“substantially impeding the development of the field” (Ford and Richardson, 1994, p. 
205). 
 
2.2.2. Illegal Firm Behaviour 
 
In the 40 years that followed Sutherland (1949) first coining the term ‘white collar 
crime’, research into corporate illegality was irregular, both in quantity and direction. 
During this period, most research was conducted by those who specialised in criminal 
behaviour, such as criminologists and sociologists. During the 1970s, a number of 
articles and books appeared on this topic, including work on antitrust and advertising 
within marketing. This research recognised the importance of a multiple factor 
approach. Clinard and Yeager (1980) noted that different combinations of 
independent variables were able to predict varying types of corporate offences, 
suggesting that illegal corporate behaviour was a ‘multidimensional’ concept. By the 
mid 1980s, however, few researchers had “…attempted to integrate their work into 
the body of theory and empirical findings residing outside their own fields” 
(Szwajkowski, 1985, p. 558). A notable exception was Finney and Lesieur’s (1982) 
contingency theory of organisational crime, which recognised that criminal behaviour 
follows a temporal sequence. Firstly, there are the events that lead to the transgression, 
secondly, the actual transgression, and lastly, the consequences of the transgression (if 
it is detected). Their research examining corporate crime played a major role in 
guiding further research in the area, although the ‘temporal sequence’ aspect has 
never been fully explored. 
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Since then, much of the research on illegal firm behaviour has been situated within 
the management literature. Researchers have developed a number of models that 
propose a range of antecedent conditions that lead to illegal corporate behaviour, such 
as demographics, moral beliefs, firm performance, and firm size (e.g. Szwajkowski, 
1985; Baucus and Near, 1991; Baucus, 1994). Until the end of the 1980s, however, 
there had been limited empirical testing of these models, the major exception being 
Clinard and Yeager (1980). The level of empirical testing improved considerably in 
the 1990s, as evidenced by the work of Baucus and Near (1991), Hill et al (1992), 
McKendall and Wagner (1997), McKendall et al (1999) and McKendall et al (2002). 
These models will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.  
 
 
2.3. Marketing and Illegal/Unethical Behaviour 
 
It is logical to expect that managers of different business functions within an 
organisation will have different ethical and legal beliefs. The demands of the job, 
daily work experiences, and management expectations differ between managers 
within the same organisation (O’Higgins and Kelleher, 2005). According to Dunfee et 
al (1999, p. 19), “there have been many cases of unethical conduct in marketing; 
indeed marketing is viewed by some as the worst offender of the business functions”. 
Baumhart (1961) conducted one of the earliest studies into the unethical behaviour of 
firms. Based on a sample of 1,700 business practitioners, results showed that 82% of 
respondents were ‘concerned’ about behaviour related to the marketing function. 
These respondents believed that marketing provided the greatest number of 
opportunities for unethical behaviour to occur (Baumhart, 1961). These findings were 
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supported by O’Higgins and Kelleher (2005), who found that marketing managers 
were significantly more accepting of illegal or unethical conduct than human resource 
and finance managers. O’Higgins and Kelleher (2005) suggested that this is because 
marketing managers are often primarily concerned with revenue maximisation, and, 
therefore, consciously aware of their role in ensuring their firm gains a competitive 
edge. In addition, their performance is often measured by meeting quotas and sales 
expectations. Such pressure can lead to unethical or illegal behaviour (O’Higgins and 
Kelleher, 2005). It is also possible that fewer constraints are placed on marketers than 
in other professions, provided they continue to contribute to the firm’s financial 
performance (Wood and Callaghan, 2003; O’Higgins and Kelleher, 2005).   
 
The study of ethical behaviour in marketing has provided a significant contribution to 
the business ethics literature. A criticism of the earlier work in marketing ethics was 
that it was neither innovative nor systematic, and that the lack of a systematic 
approach to marketing ethics was due to a lack of overarching theory (Hunt and Vitell, 
1986). The mid 1980s saw the development of a theoretical and empirical foundation 
for future research in this area (Laczniak, 1993). In fact, the theories of marketing 
ethics proposed by Ferrell and Gresham (1985) and Hunt and Vitell (1986) are two of 
the cornerstone theories of business ethics. The next section reviews the major 
theories of business ethics.  
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2.4. Major Theories of Business Ethics 
 
Within the business ethics and marketing ethics literature, a number of theories (see 
Table 2.1) have been developed that attempt to explain how decisions are reached in 
ethically problematic situations (Srnka, 2004).  
 
Table 2.1: Summary of the Major Theories of Business Ethics 
 
Discipline Author(s) Year Description 
Marketing Ferrell and 
Gresham 
1985 Contingency framework: ethical decisions depend on the 
social and cultural environment, individual beliefs, 
significant others, and company culture. 
Marketing Hunt and Vitell 1986 Ethical decisions depend on the industry, culture, and 
organisation combined with deontological and teleological 
evaluations. 
Ethics Bommer et al 1987 Ethical decisions depend on individual attributes, personal 
environment, professional environment, work environment, 
legal environment, and social environment. 
Marketing 
 
Ferrell et al 1989 A synthesis of ethical decision models for marketing. 
Management Jones 1991 Integrates the above models with characteristics of the 
ethical issue itself. 
 
While many of these theories have been well received, none can be classified as 
providing definitive answers as to why unethical behaviour occurs (Malhotra and 
Miller, 1998). It can be argued that some of the reasons for this may include the 
fragmented nature of the research, lack of empirical testing and inconsistent results. 
Nevertheless, three theories have been widely acknowledged as the most complete 
approaches to ethical decision-making in marketing. These are: 1) A Contingency 
Theory for Understanding Unethical Decision-Making in Marketing, by Ferrell and 
Gresham (1985), 2) A Contingency Theory of Marketing Ethics, by Hunt and Vitell 
(1986), expanded in (1991), and 3) A Synthesis of Ethical Decision Models for 
Marketing, by Ferrell et al (1989). 
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The first ‘all encompassing’ theory of ethical decision-making was developed by 
Hunt and Vitell (1986). It proposed that the decision-maker follows a process when 
making an ethical decision. First, the decision-maker must recognise that the decision 
is of an ethical nature, and then they must recognise the available alternatives to 
resolve the ethical situation. At this point, all alternatives are evaluated based on 
teleological and deontological viewpoints. From the teleological viewpoint, the extent 
to which an alternative is ethical depends upon the outcomes or consequences of the 
decision. The idea is to select the outcome that results in the greatest good. 
Conversely, the deontological viewpoint focuses on the means behind a decision 
rather than the ends. Lastly, a final decision on which course of action to take 
(intention) is made and the behaviour occurs. Hunt and Vitell (1986) also noted that 
the whole process is influenced by the organisational culture of the firm, opportunity, 
and the characteristics of the individual concerned. 
 
While the Hunt and Vitell (1986) model addressed the factors that impact on the 
ethical decision-making process, to some extent, their primary focus was on the 
process itself. The problem with process models is that they do not tend to consider 
the reasons why unethical behaviour occurs. Understanding these reasons can be 
important, especially when trying to reduce the likelihood of illegal behaviour 
occurring. Other models have focussed on the determinants of unethical behaviour 
rather than the processes (Bommer et al, 1987; Hunt and Vitell, 1991; Malhotra and 
Miller, 1998). These models reflect the debate within business ethics over whether 
unethical decisions are the result of ‘bad apples’ or ‘bad barrels’ (Brass et al, 1998). 
From a ‘bad apples’ perspective, unethical behaviour is a result of an individual’s 
personal characteristics. Under this approach, it is suggested that organisations would 
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be best to attract individuals who meet a pre-determined profile of ‘desirable’ 
characteristics. It is also suggested that organisations should aim to improve 
employees’ moral character through training programmes. Conversely, from a ‘bad 
barrels’ perspective, factors from within the organisation and its environment are 
considered to influence ethical decision-making. This perspective promotes the use of 
organisational tools, such as rewards systems, company culture, and codes of 
compliance, as means of improving ethical behaviour. It has been argued that, on their 
own, neither the bad apples nor bad barrels approach adequately explains unethical 
behaviour (Brass et al, 1998). As a result, researchers such as Ferrell and Gresham 
(1985) and Trevino (1986) have attempted to combine the two approaches (Brass et al, 
1998). 
 
Ferrell and Gresham (1985) noted that, up until that point, there had been no clear 
consensus about unethical behaviour by marketers, suggesting that academics had 
limited their research to analysing certain marketing activities to see whether 
marketing practitioners believed they were ethical or not. Such research does not 
provide insight into why unethical behaviour occurs. In response, Ferrell and 
Gresham (1985) were the first to focus specifically on the determinants of unethical 
behaviour. Ferrell and Gresham (1985) developed a framework that included 
variables that might impact on unethical decisions within organisations. Using a 
contingency approach, they proposed that ethical decisions are influenced by the 
interaction of both individual characteristics and organisational factors. Individual 
characteristics included a person’s values and attitudes as well as intentions formed 
through education, experience, and interaction with others. Organisational factors 
included significant others (peers and superiors) and the existence of opportunities to 
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commit unethical behaviour. These opportunities included corporate policy and 
whether the firm provided professional codes of behaviour. 
 
Trevino (1986) also recognised that previous research had not adequately dealt with 
the interaction between individual characteristics and what the author referred to as 
situational variables, which are effectively organisational components representing 
the culture of the firm. Trevino (1986) developed an interactionist model, suggesting 
that ethical decision-making is based on the interaction between individual 
characteristics and these situational components. Trevino (1986) proposed that 
reaction to any ethical situation is determined by an individual’s stage of cognitive 
moral development in concert with characteristics such as ego strength, field 
dependence, and locus of control. These characteristics then further interact with 
situational components, such as referent others, authority, normative structure, and 
other job pressures.  
 
Subsequent to Trevino (1986), a number of models were developed that followed the 
interactionist approach, each proposing a range of individual characteristics and 
environmental factors that might explain unethical decision-making. The individual 
characteristics posited have all tended to include demographic variables (i.e. age, 
income, gender, and education) and an individual’s personality traits (i.e. motivations, 
and moral views). The environmental factors posited are the “socio-cultural 
circumstances under which decisions are made” (Singhapakdi and Vitell, 1990; 
Srnka, 2004, p.8) and encompass both the organisational and industry environments. 
As illustrated in Table 2.2, from within the organisation, Ferrell and Gresham (1985), 
Ferrell et al (1989), Hunt and Vitell (1991), and Malhotra and Miller (1998) all 
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recognised the role of formal and informal rules (i.e. codes of ethics) and firm culture 
in ethical decision-making. Additionally, Hunt and Vitell (1991), Brass et al (1998), 
and Malhotra and Miller (1998) highlighted the importance of behaviour by firms and 
individuals within the wider industry and profession on ethical decision-making 
within individual firms. Recognising what they perceived to be the dearth of 
determinants of unethical decision-making in the literature, Bommer et al (1987) 
proposed 23 environmental and individual factors that might impact on unethical 
decisions. Their categories included the work environment (corporate policy and 
culture), the government environment (legislation and regulatory agencies), and 
individual characteristics (goals, social status, moral level, and demographics).  
 
Table 2.2: Summary of Previous Research into the Effect of the Environment on 
Unethical Behaviour 
 
Environmental Factors Research 
External Environment   
Industry 
Hunt and Vitell (1991), Ferrell et al (1989), Malhotra 
and Miller (1998) 
Legal environment Bommer at al (1987) 
Internal Environment   
Relevant others (management and peers) Ferrell and Gresham (1985), Ferrell et al (1989). 
Organisational culture (rules, codes, and 
enforcement) 
Ferrell and Gresham (1985), Ferrell et al (1989), 
Malhotra and Miller (1998), Hunt and Vitell (1991) 
 
Researchers who follow the interactionist approach do not consider their models an 
alternative to process models, but rather a perspective that can be combined with other 
approaches. This was first undertaken by Ferrell et al (1989), who amalgamated both 
the process and determinant approaches of Ferrell and Gresham (1985) and Hunt and 
Vitell (1986). Theoretical components of the Trevino (1986) interactionist model 
were also incorporated. This resulted in a process model of ethical decision-making 
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that combined the individual’s internal decision-making process with external impacts 
from both the individual and environmental perspectives. 
 
From a management perspective, Jones (1991) integrated the previous ethical 
decision-making models of Ferrell and Gresham (1985), Hunt and Vitell (1986), and 
Trevino (1986) into what the author considered to be a consensus of the variables that 
influence ethical decision-making. Jones (1991) also introduced the concept of ‘moral 
intensity’ into his issue-contingent model. With moral intensity, the characteristics of 
the moral dilemma itself are considered to influence ethical decision-making within a 
firm. Such characteristics include the size of the consequences, the probability of 
effect, the concentration of effect, and temporal immediacy. Jones (1991) proposed 
that controlling for moral intensity would become an important component of the 
Hunt and Vitell (1986) and Trevino (1986) models.   
 
Figure 2.2 summarises Jones’s (1991) model of ethical decision-making, which 
integrated the work of Ferrell and Gresham (1985), Hunt and Vitell (1986), and 
Trevino (1986), as well as introduced the concept of issue contingencies (moral 
intensity).  This resulted in a model that describes both the determinants and processes 
involved in ethical decision-making. 
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Figure 2.2: Summary of Ethical Decision-Making Models  
         
                                                                                                                               
 
H/V= Hunt and Vitell, 1986 
T= Trevino, 1986 
F/G= Ferrell and Gresham, 1985 
J= Jones, 1991 
 
(Source: Jones, 1991, p. 370) 
 
According to the Jones (1991) model, the process leading to unethical behaviour 
occurs in stages. Firstly, from the environment (social, cultural, economic, and 
organisational factors), ethical issues emerge and are recognised (Ferrell and 
Gresham, 1985; Hunt and Vitell, 1986). Hunt and Vitell (1986) explicitly noted that 
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not all ethical issues are recognised, however this step remained implicit for Trevino 
(1986) and Ferrell and Gresham (1985). Secondly, Hunt and Vitell (1986) and 
Trevino (1986) recognised an ‘ethical judgement’ stage whereby a decision is made as 
to whether an action is ethical or not, a stage omitted by Ferrell and Gresham (1985). 
For Trevino (1986), ethical judgement is a result of cognitive moral development, 
whereas for Hunt and Vitell (1986) it is a result of teleological and deontological 
moral evaluations. Lastly, the unethical behaviour occurs. Hunt and Vitell (1986) also 
included a step whereby the decision-maker establishes intent before engaging in the 
behaviour. Ferrell and Gresham (1986) and Trevino (1986) proposed a direct 
relationship between ethical judgement and ethical behaviour. From the interactionist 
perspective, ethical judgements and the final decision to engage in unethical 
behaviour were considered to depend upon a range of external moderating variables, 
including significant others (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985), individual moderators 
(Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Trevino, 1986), situational moderators (Trevino, 1986), 
and opportunity (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985). Jones (1991) then proposed that 
characteristics of the ethical issue (moral intensity) impact on each of these stages. 
 
The main advantage of the Jones (1991) model is that it effectively fused together 
research that had been conducted up to that point - both in terms of the processes 
involved when engaging in unethical behaviour and the determinants of that 
behaviour. A limitation of the model, however, is that it is static, in that it does not 
consider the role of repeat transgression. Another feature of this model is the inclusion 
of individual characteristics. As will be discussed later, there has been a move 
towards research that investigates the influence of the organisation and industry 
environment on unethical behaviour, instead of the influence of individual 
characteristics. The extant model does not adequately consider the effect of these 
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variables as determinants of unethical behaviour. These limitations were inherent in 
many of the models developed at this time. The next section will investigate in more 
detail, the factors that have been proposed to influence unethical behaviour. 
 
 
2.5. Factors that Influence Unethical Behaviour 
 
Despite an initial lack of empirical testing, since the beginning of the 1990s there has 
been a noticeable increase in such research within the business ethics literature. Much 
research in this field has looked at intent to engage in unethical behaviour rather than 
actual behaviour (Weber and Gillespie, 1998). This research has attempted to 
determine the factors influencing unethical behaviour on the part of the individual, the 
firm, and its environment.  
 
2.5.1. Individual Factors 
 
Most attention has been placed on individual characteristics in the empirical research 
on factors that impact on ethical decision-making. These factors include age, gender, 
religion, nationality, personality, education, employment status, and moral values of 
the individual. A problem with this approach is that many of these variables have 
been inconsistent predictors of unethical behaviour (Ford and Richardson, 1994; Loe 
et al, 2000). Of the individual factors researched, the one most investigated has been 
gender, with most studies reporting either no difference between males and females or 
that females are more ethical than males (Loe et al, 2000). In terms of education, the 
results have again been mixed. Approximately half of the studies conducted have 
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found that education has no influence on unethical behaviour, whereas others have 
found that higher levels of education resulted in greater ethical ‘sensitivity’. Another 
area that has received particular attention has been the moral philosophy of 
individuals. Research has shown that there are some individual personality traits that 
influence one’s ethical behaviour (Ford and Richardson, 1994; Loe et al, 2000).  
 
One individual variable that has proved a more consistent predictor of unethical 
behaviour has been the role played by referent groups, which include both peer groups 
and top management. Ferrell and Gresham (1985) saw this as an integral part of their 
contingency framework. A number of studies have found that respondents believe 
they are more ethical than their peers (Ford and Richardson, 1994). Zey-Ferrell et al 
(1979) found that an individual’s perception of the beliefs of their peers was the best 
predictor of an individual’s own ethical behaviour. In subsequent work, Zey-Ferrell 
and Ferrell (1982) found that this relationship did not hold true in situations where an 
individual had less contact with their peers. Since then, there has been considerable 
support for the proposition that significant others play an important role in ethical 
decision-making (Loe et al, 2000). 
 
2.5.2. Environmental Factors (Organisational) 
 
While much of the focus of earlier research into ethical behaviour has been on the 
characteristics of individuals that lead to unethical decisions, several researchers have 
argued that the work environment and organisational factors have a greater influence 
(Frederick, 1987; Badaracco and Webb, 1995; Baucus and Beck-Dudley, 2005). It has 
been commonly argued that a firm’s organisational culture is the major determinant of 
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how employees behave (Soutar et al, 1994). The behaviour of superiors, in particular, 
plays a significant role in setting the ‘tone’ for behaviour within the organisation. Top 
management can act as models of desired behaviour or influence behaviour through 
punishment and reward. Likewise, .Soutar et al (1994) found that, in Australia, the 
behaviour of superiors was the most critical factor in ethical decision-making within 
the firm.  
 
Formal company policies have also been found to play an important role in ethical 
decision-making. Employees want standards of behaviour that are endorsed by the 
company. This should go beyond codes of practice to include training and regular 
audits (Soutar et al, 1994). Hegarty and Sims (1979) found that ethical behaviour 
improved when a company had a formal or written policy. In New Zealand, Alam 
(1993; 1999) showed that the commitment of top management, a written and 
published code of behaviour, and an efficient legal education system were the main 
factors in ensuring an ethical environment. However, it has been shown that it is not 
simply enough to have a code of ethics; it must also be seen to be adhered to, and not 
viewed as just a public relations exercise (Alam, 1993; Soutar et al, 1994). Kohut and 
Corriher (1994) found that simply knowing that the firm has a code of ethics has no 
significant impact on ethical decision-making. 
 
The impact of firm size on ethical decision-making has been studied to a much lesser 
extent. Again, results have been mixed (Ford and Richardson, 1994).  Browning and 
Zabriskie (1983) found respondents from larger firms were more willing to accept 
gifts and favours from suppliers. Vitell and Festervand (1987) concluded that smaller 
firms might be under greater pressure to behave in an unethical manner to stay 
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competitive with larger firms, although no statistical analyses were performed to 
verify this proposition. 
 
2.5.3. Environmental Factors (External) 
 
There has been limited research conducted into the impact of a firm’s external 
environment and industry on ethical behaviour. Research investigating the effects of 
the industry, e.g. Laczniak and Inderrieden (1987) and Akaah and Riordan (1989), 
found ‘type of industry’ had no impact on the amount of unethical behaviour within 
firms.  Previous research also investigated whether increased competition provides 
greater pressure to behave unethically in order to compete. Hegarty and Sims (1979) 
found that increased competitiveness leads to a decrease in ethical behaviour. 
Dubinsky and Ingram (1984), however, found no such relationship. 
 
Having looked at the theories of ethical or unethical behaviour and the results of 
empirical testing of some of these theories, the next section focuses on behaviour that 
is strictly illegal. Models of illegal corporate behaviour are presented, followed by a 
summary of the results from empirical testing of those models. 
 
 
2.6. Theories of Illegal Corporate Behaviour 
 
As opposed to theories of unethical behaviour, the differences of which were outlined 
previously, this section looks at the major theories of illegal corporate behaviour that 
have been developed in the extant literature. These theories are summarised in Table 
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2.3. Not surprisingly, there is a degree of overlap in the illegal corporate behaviour 
literature with the business ethics literature, given the close link between illegal and 
unethical behaviour (Nesteruk, 1999). The key difference in this section is that the 
literature deals only with actions that breach the law and ignores actions that, while 
technically legal, are regarded as unethical. 
 
Table 2.3: Potential Antecedents of Illegal Corporate Behaviour 
 
Discipline Author Year Proposed Antecedents of Illegal Behaviour 
Sociology Finney and Lesieur 1982 
Society and culture, Performance emphasis, Social 
controls  (internal and external), Prior violations 
Management Szwajkowski 1985 
Environment, Organisational structure,  Individual 
choice 
Management Baucus and Near 1991 Environment, Internal, Situational 
Management Baucus  1994 Pressure, Opportunity, Predisposition 
Management 
McKendall and 
Wagner 1997 Motive, Opportunity, Choice 
Management McKendall et al 1999 Motive, Opportunity, Control 
 
Until the early 1980s, research into illegal corporate behaviour occurred across a wide 
range of disciplines and few researchers sought to integrate their work with theory 
and empirical findings from outside their own field. Szwajkowski (1985) attempted to 
overcome these problems by combining the findings from different disciplines and 
applying them to the broader topic area of illegal corporate behaviour, revealing 
considerable convergence. Szwajkowski found that three distinct, but often 
interacting, elements appeared to form the building blocks of corporate crime theory: 
environment, relationship structure, and inner-directed choice processes 
(Szwajkowski, 1985). 
 
The concept of the environment is based largely on simple cost-benefit analysis. That 
means illegality will occur when the benefits of such behaviour outweigh the costs, as 
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determined by the probability and consequences of detection. Therefore, it is likely 
that illegality will tend to occur under conditions of economic pressure, resulting from 
poor performance by the firm or industry (Szwajkowski, 1985). 
 
Relationship structure can occur at three levels: 1) within the organisation, 2) within 
the industry, and 3) within legal controls. Within the organisation, the existence of 
hierarchical levels and departmental boundaries hamper the detection of illegal 
behaviour. At the industry level, highly concentrated industries with limited 
competition allow for greater collusion between members. Finally, a lack of legal 
controls creates a climate, whereby illegal behaviour is neither detected nor punished 
due to ineffective regulatory agencies. While the environmental category is common 
across most research, other studies have separated structure into organisational and 
situational components (e.g. Baucus and Near, 1991). 
 
With choice, the concept of intent is important and is based on the reasoning that “evil 
deeds are done by evil people” (Szwajkowski, 1985, p. 561). Choice is strongly 
linked to the concept of ‘moral development’ proposed by Hunt and Vitell (1986) in 
the marketing ethics literature. Choice represents the ‘bad apples’ approach described 
earlier, which suggests individuals’ characteristics impact on the decision to engage in 
unethical or illegal behaviour. 
 
Szwajkowski’s (1985) theory of illegal corporate behaviour formed the basis for 
future research in this area. However, as discussed in the next section, at this point 
research in illegal corporate behaviour tended to shift away from the characteristics of 
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individuals or ‘bad apples’ approach, towards a ‘bad barrels’ approach, which placed 
the focus on the organisation and its external environment.  
 
2.6.1. Organisation and the Environment versus the Individual 
 
Frederick (1987, p. 93) noted that the key to understanding the moral behaviour 
within an organisation is “not so much in direct observation of the decision-maker as 
in a firmer grasp of the decision-maker’s environment”. While it is recognised that a 
few ‘bad apples’ exist and some people are unethical by nature, there is a tendency to 
suggest that firms themselves influence or even encourage unethical behaviour by 
their employees (Baucus and Beck-Dudley, 2005). As a result of a series of interviews 
with managers, Badaracco and Webb (1995, p. 10) found that “a clear majority 
believed that organisational pressures – not character flaws – had led people in their 
organisations to behave unethically”. More recent theories of firm illegality have 
tended to focus on organisational and environmental factors, rather than on the moral 
beliefs and demographic characteristics of individuals (e.g. Baucus and Near, 1991; 
Hill et al, 1992; Baucus, 1994; McKendall and Wagner, 1997). Earlier research failed 
to discover any meaningful personal characteristics that consistently distinguished 
offenders from non-offenders. Instead, it was speculated that societal norms and 
organisational characteristics influence illegal behaviour rather than individual 
personality traits (Finney and Lesieur, 1982; McKendall and Wagner, 1997).  
 
Given that individual characteristics have not consistently predicted illegal behaviour 
and that other research has moved away from an individual approach, models that 
focus on the organisation and its environment may be better at predicting and 
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understanding illegal or unethical behaviour. Finney and Lesieur (1982) were strong 
proponents of the idea that illegal corporate behaviour could not be properly 
understood without using the organisation as the unit of analysis.  
 
Organisational theory can provide some insight into the illegal behaviour of firms. 
Size, structure, and culture can all lead to conditions that encourage illegal behaviour. 
Economic pressure has generally been proposed as the main organisational driver 
behind illegal behaviour (Finney and Lesieur, 1982; Baucus and Near, 1991). 
Organisations are strongly ‘goal oriented’; and, where barriers impeding the 
attainment of these goals exist, strains are created. Attempts to overcome these strains 
can lead to illegal action. The value organisations place on profit maximisation has 
long been promoted in economic theory. This theory suggests that one of an 
organisation’s primary goals (if not the primary goal) is to maximise profit. Therefore, 
poor profitability is usually the most commonly proposed factor behind organisational 
transgressions (Finney and Lesieur, 1982; Wood and Callaghan, 2003). However, as 
Clinard and Yeager (1980) noted, motivations for corporate crime often involve 
reasons other than profitability. Firms will usually have multiple goals, which can be 
pursued at different times, depending upon current social and economic conditions. 
For example, the firm may strive for a greater market-share in order to improve its 
competitive position within the industry. 
 
Another goal that a firm may have is growth. However as firms grow, decision-
making is increasingly delegated and dispersed (Clinard and Yeager, 1980). 
Additionally, the structure of firms becomes more complex. These complexities create 
problems of control, coordination, and communication, which may result in pressure 
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to commit illegal behaviour. Conversely, as firms get larger, their visibility increases. 
Increased visibility can result in the firm receiving greater scrutiny from regulatory 
agencies (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Finney and Lesieur, 1982). As a result, most 
models of illegal corporate behaviour hypothesise that firm size is a major 
determinant such behaviour. 
 
In addition to firm size, a firm’s organisational environment has been proposed as a 
determinant of illegal corporate behaviour. Organisational environment can be 
defined as the “shared perceptions or prevailing organisational norms for conducting 
workplace activity” (Cohen, 1995, p. 387). Building on the Szwajkowski (1985) 
model, Hill et al (1992) proposed that researchers have tended to follow a ‘learning 
theory’ approach, which states that the behaviour of firms is strongly influenced by 
the ‘prevailing norms’ within the organisation or industry. If the norms within an 
organisation stress the need for legal behaviour, then compliance with the law is likely 
to be high. Alternatively, if there is a culture that promotes the need for strong 
financial performance at any cost, then pressure for illegality increases. 
 
The ethical climate of an organisation is a subset of the organisational environment. 
More specifically, ethical climate can be defined as “shared perceptions or prevailing 
organisational norms for addressing issues with an ethical component” (Cohen, 
1995, p. 387). Early work by Kohlberg (1984, cited in Cohen, 1995) in a social setting 
provided an important basis for research in this area. Experiments were conducted in 
schools and prisons whereby it was found that changing organisational processes, 
such as introducing policies and procedures, improved moral judgement and reduced 
instances of cheating and stealing. Researchers ado
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identified a number of antecedent factors that influence organisational norms, in 
particular, the use of compliance codes and management’s commitment to legal 
behaviour.  
 
An ethical climate can also exist at the industry level. Firms within the same industry 
generally face the same limitations, constraints, and sources of uncertainty (Clinard 
and Yeager, 1980). As a result, members of that industry may develop similar 
attitudes and ideas. While firms are keen to increase their profitability and market-
share at the expense of other members, there is still the tendency to think in broader 
terms of the success of the industry rather than that of individual firms. Therefore, 
certain industries can develop a culture of illegal behaviour, as illegal practices 
become diffused throughout the industry. It has been proposed that this culture has a 
major impact on the decision to transgress the law (Clinard and Yeager, 1980). The 
level of competition within an industry is another commonly proposed determinant of 
illegal corporate behaviour (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Baucus and Near, 1991; 
Baucus, 1994). In situations where there is considerable interaction between firms, 
increased competitive uncertainty develops, which may then lead firms to transgress 
the law. As previously discussed, environmental and organisational factors have 
usurped individual characteristics as the basis of the more recent models of 
antecedents of illegal corporate behaviour.  The next section outlines these updated 
models of illegal corporate behaviour and describes the results of empirical testing of 
these models. 
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2.6.2. Updated Theories of Illegal Corporate Behaviour and Empirical Testing  
 
For a long time, there was a paucity of empirical research on the antecedents of illegal 
corporate behaviour. Empirical research tended to focus on only a small number of 
factors rather than the entire range of organisational and environmental variables. 
While Szwajkowski (1985) had developed a comprehensive model of the factors that 
influenced illegal corporate behaviour, integrating the findings from different 
disciplines, his proposed factors were not empirically tested. These problems have 
been somewhat rectified in recent times, with a range of work empirically testing a 
wide variety of potential antecedents of illegal corporate behaviour. However, these 
studies have not always provided a consistent picture (Hill et al, 1992; McKendall et 
al, 2002).  
 
The work of Baucus and Near (1991) represented a major step toward the 
development and testing of a comprehensive model of illegal corporate behaviour that 
integrated the theoretical contributions from a range of disciplines. Their proposed 
antecedent conditions were empirically tested using data from Fortune 500 firms in 
the United States. The focus was not on questionable or unethical behaviour, but on 
behaviours that managers knew or should have known to be illegal. Baucus and Near 
(1991) also ignored the role of an individual’s personality characteristics in favour of 
conditions pertaining to the firm and its environment. This research was also unique 
in that it used historical data to look at transgressions over time. In their model, the 
authors developed three antecedent classifications, environmental, internal, and 
situational, which were largely based on the factors proposed by Finney and Lesieur 
(1982). These are described in more detail below: 
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a) Environmental 
 
The measured variables Baucus and Near (1991) associated with the firm 
environment were scarcity, dynamism, and heterogeneity. They proposed that scarcity 
of resources increases uncertainty within the firm and that illegal behaviour may 
occur to overcome this uncertainty. They also proposed that firms operating in 
turbulent, dynamic, and rapidly changing environments are more likely to engage in 
illegal behaviour to overcome the difficulties associated with such environments. 
Finally, they proposed that firms operating in heterogeneous environments with high 
uncertainty and competitiveness are more likely to engage in illegal behaviour to 
reduce uncertainty and competition. This is because it is easier to deal effectively with 
a stable environment, where there is greater certainty (Baucus and Near, 1991). 
 
b) Internal (Organisational) 
 
Internal antecedents represent characteristics of individual firms. The internal 
antecedents proposed by Baucus and Near (1991) included firm performance, firm 
size, and organisational slack. When a firm is performing poorly, it may be pressured 
to find resources or cut costs in ways that might not be legal. As firms grow, 
decentralisation often occurs and this not only creates more units in which illegal 
behaviour can occur, but can lead to coordination and communication problems, 
resulting in greater uncertainty and potential illegal behaviour (Baucus and Near, 
1991).  
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c) Situational 
 
The situational antecedents proposed included prior violations, industry-type, and 
type of violation. With prior violations, Baucus and Near (1991) proposed that if a 
firm develops a history of illegal behaviour, then it may develop a culture of illegal 
behaviour that results in further violations. Industry-type was seen as an important 
factor because illegal behaviour is believed to be more prevalent in certain industries, 
due to either less focused or less strict legal enforcement. Certain industries also 
develop ‘behavioural norms’ that are shared by members. It was also proposed that 
certain types of legislation would be breached more than others. 
 
The results of the Baucus and Near’s (1991) study are summarised in Figure 2.3: 
 
Figure 2.3: Modified Model of the Illegal Corporate Behaviour Process 
 
Environmental Resources 
 
Environmental Dynamism 
 
Firm Size 
 
Industry                                                                    Illegal behaviour 
Behaviour 
 
Three or More Violations 
 
Type of Violation 
 
(Source: Baucus and Near, 1991) 
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Figure 2.3 demonstrates that of the environmental variables, Baucus and Near (1991) 
found that illegal behaviour is likely when resources are scarce, but even more likely 
when resources are very plentiful, providing mixed support for their hypothesis. 
Dynamism was found to have an impact on illegal behaviour, as firms that operate in 
highly dynamic and rapidly changing environments were found to be 51% more likely 
to engage in illegal behaviour than those that operate in less turbulent environments. 
Of the internal variables tested, a firm’s performance was found to have no impact on 
illegal behaviour.  In terms of firm size, it was found that large firms are more likely 
to engage in illegal behaviour than small ones. Lastly, with regards to the situational 
variables, having three or more prior violations was found to be a predictor of 
corporate illegality, as was operating in certain industry sectors, such as food, 
petroleum, and automobiles (Baucus and Near, 1991).  
 
Baucus and Near’s (1991) research had a number of important advantages over other 
research in this area. Firstly, it only focussed on illegal behaviour, rather than dealing 
with the uncertainty surrounding unethical behaviour. Secondly, it was 
comprehensive, incorporating a range of potential variables that might impact on 
illegal corporate behaviour. These were limited to factors from the firm itself and its 
environment, not individual characteristics. Thirdly, the fact that it looked at 
transgressions over a period of time and used existing data sources meant that 
accurate results could be obtained, since they were not relying on the recollection or 
perceptions of individuals. The only problem with this approach is that it does not 
predict how the firm might behave in the future, i.e. determine what are the possible 
future implications of detection of these previous transgressions? However, while not 
a dynamic model as such, it at least recognised the potential impact of previous 
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transgressions, although it did not consider changes to firm behaviour after these 
earlier transgressions were detected by regulatory agencies. 
 
The results also indicated (which the authors recognised) that there may be flaws in 
the theory underpinning the model. The findings suggested that the predominant view 
that pressure leads to illegality is only partially correct, and that there are also other 
factors involved. This led Baucus (1994) to propose an improved model of illegal 
corporate behaviour, combining the results of the Baucus and Near (1991) research 
with additional theory. Significantly, this model introduced the concept of 
unintentional illegality, a concept that has never been empirically tested in other 
corporate illegality research. While intentional behaviour may represent the majority 
of transgressions (Baucus, 1994), the failure to acknowledge unintentional 
transgressions is a weakness of literature in this area.  Baucus (1994) proposed three 
main explanations of corporate illegality. These were: a) pressure, b) opportunity, and 
c) predisposition. Although the model in its original form was never empirically 
tested, it formed the basis of McKendall and Wagner’s (1997) model of motive, 
opportunity, and choice, and subsequent McKendall et al’s (2002) model of motive, 
opportunity, and control. These are described in the next section. 
 
 
2.7. Motive, Opportunity, and Control 
 
McKendall and Wagner (1997) noted that, despite the increase in empirical research 
and the development of a few conceptual frameworks since the mid 1980s, 
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considerably more research into the area of illegal corporate behaviour was required 
before a well-articulated body of research could be established. 
 
McKendall and Wagner (1997) summarised the previously hypothesised constructs 
and processes as follows: 
 
“Corporations operate in an environment of goal directedness, competition, and 
performance pressures. Factors internal and external to each organisation 
combine to create a tension or motive to engage in illegal activities as a way of 
achieving organisational objectives and ensuring organisational survival. In the 
presence of motivation, additional factors, again both internal and external, 
operate to create the opportunity to engage in illegal activities. Whether motive 
and opportunity will actually influence intentional illegal behaviour depends on 
choice (control), which is shaped by the presence of effective controls that 
function to prevent corporate illegality” (McKendall and Wagner, 1997, p.625).  
 
Table 2.4 summarises the findings of previous research into illegal corporate 
behaviour from a motive, opportunity, and control perspective: 
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Table 2.4: Chronology of Major Research into Illegal Corporate Behaviour 
 
Study Category Hypothesis 
Staw and Szwajkowski 
1975) Motive 
Industry profit (-), Firm profit (-), Firm profit per industry 
(0) 
Asch and Seneca (1976) Motive 
Firm profit (-), Firm size (+), Industry concentration (+ 
and -) 
Clinard and Yeager (1980) Motive 
Firm profit (-), Industry profit (-), Firm growth rate (0),  
Firm labour intensity (+) 
 Opportunity Market power (-), Firm size (0), Diversification (0), 
Simpson (1986) Motive Firm profit (0), Industry profit (-), Stock price (+) 
Cochran and Nigh (1987) Motive Firm profit (-), Industry profit (0), Firm liquidity (0) 
 Opportunity Firm size (+), Firm diversification (0), Firm growth (+) 
Matthews (1987) Control Ethical codes (0) 
Dalton and Kesner (1988) Opportunity Firm size (+) 
Baucus and Near (1991) Motive Firm profit (0), Firm slack (0) 
 Opportunity 
Heterogeneous environment (0), Firm size (+), Dynamic 
environment (+), Industry (+) 
 Control Prior violations (+) 
Hill et al (1992) Motive Firm profit (0)  
 Opportunity Firm size (0/+), Decentralisation (0), Diversification (0) 
 Control Evaluation criteria (+), Incentive systems (0) 
McKendall and Wagner 
(1997) Motive Industry profit (0), Firm profit (0) 
 Opportunity 
Industry concentration (0), Firm size (0), Complexity (0),  
Decentralisation (0), Industry (+) 
 Control Ethical climate (0) 
McKendall et al (1999) Motive  Industry profitability (+), Firm profitability (+) 
 Opportunity Size (+), Corporate board structure (0) 
McKendall et al (2002) Motive Profits (+) 
 Opportunity Size (0), Industry (0) 
 Control Codes of ethics (0) 
 
(Source: McKendall and Wagner, 1997, p.630) 
 
These findings are described in more detail below. 
 
2.7.1. Motive 
 
Motive represents the reason or purpose for illegal behaviour, and is defined as the 
factors that incite organisations to commit illegal acts (McKendall et al, 2002). The 
motive most hypothesised by the literature to lead to illegal firm behaviour is 
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performance pressure. Lower profits create pressure to acquire resources and cut costs 
by illegal means (McKendall et al, 2002).  It has been suggested that this is due to 
expectations in society that emphasise profit as the primary goal of business. 
According to Vaughn (1983), in order for a firm to be respected in society it must be 
profitable. Such expectations create a competitive atmosphere within the firm, as 
individual units strive to outperform each other, providing further motivation for 
illegal behaviour (McKendall et al, 1999). At the same time, intense competition from 
within an industry motivates firms to engage in illegal behaviour as a means of 
gaining a competitive advantage. An environment characterised by high levels of 
competition creates pressure for illegal behaviour by restricting the legitimate means 
for acquiring resources or attaining desired levels of performance (Vaughn, 1983).  
  
2.7.2. Opportunity 
 
Opportunity is defined as the “favourable combination of circumstances that make a 
particular course of action possible” (McKendall et al, 1999, p. 203). Conditions of 
opportunity may exist either internally or externally. Opportunity for illegal conduct 
occurs when conditions allow the firm to transgress the law with relative ease and be 
confident that detection can be avoided. Therefore, research looking at conditions of 
opportunity should focus on factors that provide sufficient ease, anonymity, or 
rewards for corporate illegality (McKendall and Wagner, 1997). Firm size has been 
the most commonly studied opportunity variable.  
 
Opportunity can also be linked to learning theory. According to learning theory, 
“…the approach of managers to corporate wrongdoing is strongly influenced by the 
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prevailing norms within their company or industry” (Hill et al, 1992, p. 1056). 
Conditions of opportunity exist where organisational or industry norms stress the need 
for high levels of performance, but not the need for these to be achieved in an ethical 
or legal manner. Therefore, given the existence of motive, the opportunity exists if 
illegal behaviour is either condoned or expected. As a result, these organisational 
norms create an environment that is conducive to illegality (Hill et al, 1992). The 
same applies at the industry level. By operating in an industry environment where 
illegal behaviour is prevalent and encouraged, illegal behaviour is more likely to 
occur (Baucus and Near, 1991).  
 
2.7.3. Control 
 
If motive and opportunity both exist, then the choice to engage in illegal behaviour 
ultimately depends on the existence or absence of effective mechanisms of control.  
Control mechanisms can “establish expectations, raise the likelihood of detection, 
reward desired behaviour, and/or make punishment for transgressions more severe” 
(McKendall, 1999, p. 204). Issues of control form a part of the moral intensity 
component of Jones’ (1991) model. Two types of control mechanisms have been 
proposed in the literature. These are internal and external controls. 
 
a) Internal Controls 
 
A firm’s ‘ethical climate’ can be described as, “the prevailing perceptions of typical 
organisational practises and procedures that have an ethical content” (Victor and 
Cullen, 1988, p. 101). There has been widespread agreement that the establishment of 
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‘codes’ is an effective means of developing a positive ethical or legal environment 
and, as such, creating internal control mechanisms. Such codes should spell out the 
ethical and legal expectations of the firm as well as providing a means of detection 
and punishment (McKendall et al, 2002). In Australia, for example, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) strongly promote the use of such 
programmes as a means of developing a culture of compliance within a firm. A 
compliance programme is one tailored to the needs of the individual firm that explains 
to employees the procedures required to minimise the chances of transgression. Such 
programmes usually consist of employee education, checklists,  systems for handling 
complaints, and means of reviewing such systems to ensure they remain relevant, 
comprehensive, and cost effective (Wells, 1995; Commerce Commission, 1999). 
Researchers have suggested that ethical and legal issues should be built into the 
procedures for selection and performance evaluation of employees (McKendall et al, 
2002), although this seldom occurs (Alam, 1993). In a comprehensive study of the use 
of codes of compliance, Weaver et al (1999a) found that 98% of United States firms 
in the Fortune 1000 used some kind of formal document to address compliance issues, 
while 78% did so through a separate code of ethics/compliance document.  
 
Codes of ethics/compliance programmes in Australia are broadly similar to those in 
North America in terms of how they are constructed and content, although they do 
have some elements that differ. For example, Australian firms are less reliant upon 
internal and external watchdogs and their own legal representatives. This may be 
because there is less of a litigation culture in Australia (Wood, 2000). In Australia, it 
has been found that over 50% of firms communicate their codes to employees, offer 
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induction programmes, judge employees on their ethical conduct, and have sanctions 
for breaches of the code (Wood and Callaghan, 2003). 
 
Previous research has suggested that it is not enough to simply have codes of 
compliance; the codes must actually impact on firm behaviour, otherwise they simply 
act as a public relations exercise (Soutar et al, 1994; Wood and Callaghan, 2003). If 
the codes are largely ignored in day-to-day business, then they will not influence firm 
behaviour. Of most importance is the extent to which codes influence decision-
making, not simply whether the code exists (Kohut and Corriher, 1994; Wood and 
Callaghan, 2003). A number of studies have found the commitment of top managers 
to legal issues a crucial means of ensuring the effectiveness of ethical 
codes/compliance programmes in the United States (Kohut and Corriher, 1994; Lee 
and Yoshihara, 1997), New Zealand (Alam, 1993), and Australia (Soutar et al, 1994; 
Wood, 2000). Managers must act as role models and the need for ethical and legal 
behaviour should be continuously reinforced via policy statements, speeches, and 
other references. The key message is that top management needs to communicate 
ethical and moral issues to all employees constantly and consistently (Soutar et al, 
1994; Wood and Callaghan, 2003).  
 
Additionally, internal agents such as lawyers can also act as control mechanisms, 
whether they are employed in-house or consulted externally. If their advice is ignored, 
or if they are bypassed altogether, then the likelihood of transgression increases. 
Conversely, their role is not always positive, as firms may be able to utilise their 
specialist knowledge to facilitate transgressions and help avoid detection (Finney and 
Lesieur, 1982). 
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b) External Controls and Deterrence 
 
Issues of external control are based strongly on deterrence theory. Deterrence is the 
“process by which a society coerces individuals into conformity through legal 
sanctions” (Cole, 1989, p.108). Deterrence examines the relationship between 
sanctions and the likelihood of behaving in a legal manner. Under deterrence theory, 
“the greater the certainty and severity of punishment for a type of crime, the more 
individuals are deterred from that crime” (Cole, 1989, p. 108). That is, the chance of 
a transgression of the law occurring is lower when the probability of detection is 
higher and the likely punishment resulting from that crime is greater.  
 
Kriesberg’s (1976) rational actor model suggested a number of implications for 
external controls. This model suggested that regulatory agencies should look to 
influence firms’ behaviour by manipulating their corporate values and options. 
Kriesberg (1976) recognised that trying to influence a firm’s values is likely to be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible. These values are most likely ingrained in the 
corporate structure and management. However, it is believed that corporate options 
can be manipulated by having regulatory agencies criminalise and punish the decision 
to use certain options. Regulatory agencies can look to make the consequences of a 
firm engaging in an illegal option more severe i.e. increase the size of potential 
sanctions, or increase the probability that an illegal option will be detected.  
 
The concept of risk plays an important part in deterrence theory. Risk is “a 
characteristic of decisions that is defined here as the extent to which there is 
uncertainty about whether potentially significant and/or disappointing outcomes of 
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decisions will be realised” (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992, p. 10). Risk is most often 
associated with outcome uncertainty. Variability in potential outcomes is considered 
undesirable unless expected returns are high. Where outcomes cannot be controlled 
and are left to chance, the risk is far greater than in situations where the decision-
maker, at the very least, has some influence over potential outcomes (Sitkin and 
Pablo, 1992). When engaging in illegal behaviour, there is always a risk that the 
transgressor will get caught and punished. While this outcome can be controlled by 
the firm (e.g. attempts made to avoid detection), there is always the chance that the 
regulatory agencies will detect the transgression.  
 
A key determinant of firm behaviour is how it perceives risk. Risk perceptions can be 
defined as “a decision-maker’s assessment of the risk inherent in a situation” (Sitkin 
and Pablo, 1992, p. 11). The literature has related risk perceptions to how a decision-
maker labels a situation, estimates the extent to which the risk is controllable, and 
feels confident of those estimates. In terms of marketing law, risk perception is often 
closely linked to cost-benefit analysis. Managers weigh up the likely benefits (i.e. 
profits) of the illegal action against the potential costs (usually fines and negative 
publicity) (Szwajkowski, 1985). The impact of the costs will usually depend on the 
firm’s perception of its chances of detection and punishment by regulatory agencies. 
Therefore, if the regulatory environment becomes more uncertain, the attractiveness 
of illegal behaviour can be diminished. Such uncertainty can be created through 
higher penalties or increased surveillance and certainty of detection, which increases 
the risk involved with an illegal action (Ghosh and Crain, 1995). A number of studies 
have found a link between risk and unethical or illegal behaviour (Laczniak and 
Inderrieden, 1987; Fritzsche, 1988; Dabholkar and Kellaris, 1992; Cherry and 
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Fraedrich, 2002). External controls, therefore, should include vigilant regulatory 
agencies and substantial penalties for non-compliance (McKendall et al, 2002).  
 
c) Risk of Detection 
 
It has traditionally been difficult for regulators and researchers to understand why 
firms take the risk that a transgression will not be detected. The simple answer to this 
problem is to make it more likely that a transgression will be detected. It has been 
suggested that increasing the risk of detection is much more effective than increasing 
the severity of sanctions (Cole, 1989). As an example, police found that parking 
empty police cars in areas where speeding was a problem and the use of 
neighbourhood watch signs to be effective ways of reducing crime, since they give the 
perception that the likelihood of detection is higher. Therefore, increased investigative 
behaviour by regulatory agencies (or the threat of) is seen as an important external 
control over illegal corporate behaviour (Gellerman, 1986).  
 
d) Penalties 
 
There is evidence from the United States that risk perception is generally quite low. 
This is because transgressors are not “subjected to the full force of the law” (Clinard 
and Yeager, 1980, p. 123). In the United States, Clinard and Yeager (1980) found that 
43% of transgressors received warnings, with only 23% receiving fines. Of the fines 
and other penalties, most were relatively minor. For seriously breaching 
environmental laws in 1972, Chevron was fined one million dollars (a relatively high 
penalty), which based on their financial records at the time, represented .03 percent of 
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Chevron’s gross income. As Clinard and Yeager (1980) pointed out, this was the 
equivalent of a $10 parking ticket for someone earning $25,000 per annum. 
Therefore, to many firms, monetary penalties are simply a cost of doing business, 
with firms often gaining considerably more from the transgression financially than 
they might lose in fines. Even if the chances of getting caught are perceived to be 
reasonably high, the firm is unlikely to be overly concerned if the punitive 
consequences are minor (Clinard and Yeager, 1980).  
 
Some research has focused on how to develop an ‘optimal’ penalty. If a penalty is too 
low, levels of corporate crime might increase, whereas, if the penalty is too high, 
firms may be less likely to engage in legitimate actions for fear of punishment or may 
develop costly compliance procedures that are not required (Cohen, 1996). The 
Kriesberg (1976) rational actor model suggested that penalties should be directed at 
the organisation rather than individuals within it. In addition, the penalty should be 
based on the value that has led to the behaviour. If, for example, the transgression was 
in the interests of profit maximisation, then the penalty should reflect the company’s 
profits or relate to the profits gained from the transgression. This way, judges could 
have a range of punitive options, tailored to the circumstances of the particular 
transgressor.   
 
e) Penalty versus Income 
 
Strachan et al (1983) and Jarrel and Peltzman (1985) considered transgression to be 
simply  a function of the costs (penalties) of a transgression being punished, while 
Cole (1989) and Cohen (1996) considered it to be a function of risk and the 
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probability of detection. Bromiley and Marcus (1989) believed that another issue to 
consider is the income a firm can gain from engaging in illegal behaviour. Belief 
within a firm that an illegal act will enhance the company’s situation or status has a 
tendency to lead to transgressions (Bromiley and Marcus, 1989). This can be related 
to the concept of value, suggested by Kriesberg (1976), where firms make a conscious 
decision to transgress the law to enhance value, which tends to be profitability. 
 
2.7.4. Summary 
 
The work of McKendall and Wagner (1997), McKendall et al (1999) and McKendall 
et al (2002) and their theory of motive, opportunity, and control provided an 
important comprehensive framework of illegal corporate behaviour. It is strengthened, 
as Table 2.4 illustrates, by having been developed from a significant portion of 
research in the field. Unlike Baucus and Near (1991), whose research was conducted 
over time with secondary data, McKendall and her colleagues (1997; 1999; 2002) 
used cross-sectional surveys. Such an approach is necessary when historical data is 
not available, or if one is interested in managerial perceptions. However, a cross-
sectional survey opens the research to issues of time-ordering. Time-ordering occurs 
when conditions in the firm or its environment change between the time a 
transgression occurs and the survey is conducted. McKendall and Wagner (1997) 
recognised the potential for this to occur, so also asked respondents to note the 
changes in conditions over the course of a specific time period. As no differences 
were found, it was concluded that the study did not suffer from time-ordering effects. 
However, this does not take into account situations where a respondent was not at the 
firm at the earlier time, cannot remember, or does not know what changes have 
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occurred. It is, therefore, highly tenuous to claim that their results were not affected 
by time-ordering. There is a need for better measures of the time-ordering 
phenomenon.  
 
In addition to time-ordering concerns, another limitation of research into illegal 
corporate behaviour is that despite the suggested superiority of firm level factors (e.g. 
profitability, size, and industry), Based on a review of empirical findings, as Table 2.5 
illustrates, there is still no fully consistent picture of what influences transgressions of 
the law. Industry concentration and profit have proved to be the predictors that most 
often impact upon illegal behaviour, although in almost 30% of cases no relationship 
was found to exist.  
 
Table 2.5: Summary of the Empirical findings of Research into the Antecedents 
of Illegal Corporate Behaviour 
 
Antecedent 
Number of 
Studies 
Percent  
Significant 
Percent Not 
Significant 
Industry concentration 7 71% 29% 
Industry profit 7 71% 29% 
Firm profit 10 60% 40% 
Firm size 9 56% 44% 
Diversification 3 33% 67% 
Codes of ethics 4 25% 75% 
Industry 3 66% 34% 
Decentralisation 2 0% 100% 
 
It is, therefore, important look beyond current models described in the literature. To 
achieve this, literature on the role of unintentional illegality (ethical and legal 
knowledge) and the consequences of a transgression being detected are introduced in 
the next sections. 
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2.8. Unintentional Illegality and Knowledge of the Law 
 
The conditions of motive, opportunity, and control described in the previous section 
only represent intentional illegal behaviour: that is, situations where firms decide to 
engage in illegal behaviour to overcome a particular problem. This approach ignores 
the role of illegal behaviour that occurs unintentionally. Researchers have tended to 
combine intentional and unintentional illegality. Baucus (1994) was the first to 
properly distinguish between the two. Most corporate crime is considered to be 
intentional. That is, the transgressor knows that the act is illegal. However, many acts 
occur by omission, where the transgressor fails to recognise that an act might be in 
breach of the law and have serious consequences. In such circumstances, 
transgression does not occur as the result of a rational decision-making process, but 
rather as an unintended outcome of actions and decisions made by the firm. A basic 
example of an unintentional transgression would be members of a group of firms 
within one industry getting together over dinner at a conference and discussing 
pricing strategies. While this conversation might be considered harmless, regulatory 
authorities might see it as an example of price fixing: an action that carries quite 
severe penalties (Baucus, 1994). Intentional illegality would have occurred in this 
situation if the members of the industry, came together with the explicit intention of 
fixing prices to limit competition and raise profits.  
 
Unintentional illegality can be linked to the concept of legal knowledge. In many 
cases, unintentional transgression occurs simply because the firm had no knowledge 
the act was in violation of the law (Baucus, 1994). The role of legal knowledge in 
legal decision-making has received relatively little attention in the literature. It is in 
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the interests of the businessperson to have an understanding of the legal environment 
in which he or she operates (Bowal and Wanke, 1998). Managers with poor 
knowledge of the law expose themselves to potential prosecution and its associated 
ramifications. While it is unreasonable to expect that managers will have an extensive 
knowledge of all the law that applies to them, it is important they have a basic 
understanding of the key legislation. This is especially important for smaller firms, 
which may not be able to afford to regularly consult lawyers (Peterson, 2001a). 
Knowledge of ethical and legal situations will now be considered separately. 
 
2.8.1. Ethical Knowledge  
 
Research into ethical knowledge has tended to focus on the ethical perceptions of 
different groups of people, in particular students, but also managers. Such research 
has sought to determine the extent to which respondents perceive a certain situation to 
be ethically suspect and how these perceptions may differ between different types of 
respondents. The use of student samples in ethical knowledge research is a weakness 
of research in this area. Research into ethical knowledge has been conducted in a 
range of contexts. Dubinsky et al (1992) simply researched the ethical perceptions of 
sales personnel. Respondents were provided with 12 ethically ‘questionable’ 
behaviours. Results demonstrated that respondents were generally not aware of any 
problems with these behaviours, demonstrating knowledge of ethical issues to be 
poor. Other research has looked at comparisons between individuals or groups. There 
has been strong support for the proposition that individuals perceive their knowledge 
of ethical issues to be greater than others (Tyson, 1992; Morgan, 1993). 
Schlegelmilch and Robertson (1995) found cultural differences, in that managers from 
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the United States recognised more ethical issues than managers from the United 
Kingdom. Lastly, Wimalasiri et al (1996) found that ethical knowledge was not linked 
to gender and ethnicity.  
 
2.8.2. Legal Knowledge  
 
In terms of knowledge of the law, much of the earlier research was conducted in the 
social sciences. Bowal and Wanke (1998) were among the first to look at the 
knowledge of business law on the part of non-legal experts. Respondents were 
provided with 16 scenarios across a wide range of legal business issues, where they 
had to provide simple true/false answers. The average score was 47% correctly 
answered, which showed legal knowledge to be particularly poor. 
  
The best example of research into knowledge of business law is sited in the 
management literature. Peterson (1997; 2001a; 2001b; 2003) looked at the capability 
of brand managers, small retailers, service companies, middle managers in health 
maintenance organisations, and hotel/motel managers in discriminating between 
selected legal and illegal actions. The purpose was to determine familiarity with a 
number of influential laws. Respondents were provided with a list of scenarios and 
were required to rate these on a scale, anchored by the statements ‘obviously legal’ 
and ‘obviously illegal’. In most cases, respondents who failed to correctly identify the 
legal status of a scenario rated illegal behaviour as legal. This showed a bias towards 
lacking in-depth knowledge of the legislation. In each case, respondents were, on 
average, able to identify the legal status of over 50% of the scenarios, however, there 
were a number of areas where knowledge was found to be lacking. The main areas of 
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concern related to pricing and anti-competitive violations, such as predatory pricing 
and market-sharing. All six cases in which the majority of brand managers were 
unable to identify the legal status of the scenario related to anti-competitive conduct, 
with five specifically relating to the pricing function. This is of considerable concern 
given that pricing is usually an integral part of the marketing strategy used by brand 
managers and because the authorities take such violations extremely seriously. 
Penalties for non-compliance with anti-competitive legislation are particularly severe. 
The next section will focus on the determinants of ethical and legal knowledge. 
 
2.8.3. Determinants of Legal Knowledge 
 
A small number of studies have looked at the characteristics or factors that influence 
ethical or legal knowledge. Most of this research is described in the ethics literature, 
which has analysed the influences on whether an action is considered to be ethical or 
not. Little research exists that looks specifically at knowledge of the law.  
 
a) Ethical Knowledge 
 
Initially, individuals must recognise an ethical issue before they can consider whether 
it is ethical or not. Individuals vary in their sensitivity to ethical issues and the 
personal, situational, and cultural factors that are likely to influence their sensitivity 
(Barnett and Valentine, 2004):  “Ethical decision-making is a process that begins 
with an individuals recognition that a given action or situation has ethical content 
and continues as individuals evaluate the action’s ethicality, form behavioural 
intentions, and engage in actual behaviour” (Barnett and Valentine, 2004, p. 338). 
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Within the ethics literature, the impact of ethical codes, individual ideologies, 
demographic characteristics, and organisational characteristics on knowledge of 
ethical issues have all been investigated. As in the area of corporate illegality, the 
research findings could be best described as fragmented and mixed (Giacobbe and 
Segal, 2000). In a review of the literature, McClaren (2000) found gender had only a 
minimal influence on ethical perceptions, as did level of education, and age. In their 
study of the ethical perceptions of sales-people, Dubinsky et al (1992) looked at the 
influence of demographic characteristics (age, education, gender, and job tenure) on 
ethical knowledge. Only age was found to have an impact on the ethical perceptions 
of the respondents. Schlegelmilch and Robertson (1995) found that both industry 
sector and country of origin influenced the ethical perceptions of managers, 
suggesting that legal knowledge can vary across different counties and industries.  
 
Some studies have looked at the role played by company culture, codes of 
compliance, and risk in terms of ethical knowledge. This is an area of particular 
importance since such programmes seek to reduce the likelihood of transgression by 
improving knowledge. Dubinsky et al (1992) found that sales personnel wanted a 
policy to help guide their decisions, yet many firms did not provide one. In 
organisations where codes of ethics are enforced, individuals perceive transgressions 
to be more severe than in companies without codes (Singhapakdi and Vitell, 1991). 
Risk has not only been found to impact on actual legal behaviour but has also been 
found to impact on whether managers perceive an action as being ethical or not. A 
study by Fritzsche and Becker (1983) found that ethical judgments are linked to the 
severity of the consequences. Laczniak and Inderrieden (1987), Dabholkar and 
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Kellaris (1992), and Cherry and Fraedrich (2002) all found risk to impact the 
perceptions managers had on the ethicality of various ethical situations. 
 
b) Legal Knowledge 
 
In terms of the factors that influence knowledge of the law, firm size is the only 
variable to have been studied. Peterson (1997) found that managers of larger 
hotels/motels had a greater knowledge of the law than managers in smaller 
hotels/motels. Peterson (2001a) also found that brand managers in larger firms had a 
greater knowledge of the law, as did managers employed by larger health 
maintenance organisations (Peterson, 2003). It was suggested that managers of larger 
firms are aware that they are likely to be more attractive targets of regulatory agencies 
that have limited enforcement funds. Therefore, such firms will take steps to 
understand their legal obligations to further avoid prosecution. Additionally, 
managers in smaller firms often have a broader range of responsibilities than those in 
larger firms who can specialise, making it more difficult to learn the relevant laws 
(Peterson, 1997). Whilst this indicates the aspects of the law that are understood by 
managers, and also suggests how knowledge differs between different groups of 
people, a major limitation of this research is that it has not attempted to link 
knowledge of the law to actual firm behaviour. 
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2.9. Time-Ordering and the Consequences of Transgressing the Law 
 
As previously noted, cross-sectional research, such as that conducted by McKendall 
and Wagner (1997) and McKendall et al (2002), is subject to time-ordering bias. 
Antecedent characteristics are measured at the time a survey is conducted, generally 
after the transgression has occurred. This means there is a danger that conditions 
either internal or external to the firm may have changed since the transgression 
occurred. McKendall and Wagner (1997) found that any changes in structure, 
decision-making, and ethical climate occurring over the period captured by their 
survey had no significant effects on their results.  However, the findings of Gazley et 
al (2005) indicated that temporal issues could be very important. Gazley et al (2005) 
found that the control antecedents (perceived risk of detection and use of a 
compliance programme) change as a result of a transgression having been detected. In 
other words, a firm’s perception of the risk of having a transgression detected by 
regulatory agencies increases and a compliance programme is more likely to be 
introduced as a result of a previous transgression having been detected. These changes 
may then determine whether further transgressions will occur, given the ongoing 
existence of conditions of motive, opportunity, and control. Wells (1995), LeClair et 
al (1997) and McKendall et al (2002) all suggested that, in many circumstances, 
compliance programmes are only introduced after a transgression has occurred and 
not before. These findings suggest that the static models proposed in the literature do 
not adequately explain the dynamic processes involved.   
  
Previous research has found that multiple transgressions occur. For example, Clinard 
and Yeager (1980) found that 42% of manufacturing firms had committed multiple 
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transgressions and that a small percentage of firms accounted for a highly 
disproportionate number of all transgressions. This may be partly due to the fact that, 
once a firm has transgressed, regulatory agencies will focus their attentions on that 
firm, increasing the chances that further transgressions will be detected. Alternatively, 
it could be a result of the culture of the organisation that encourages or allows 
continual illegal behaviour to occur. With the exception of Baucus and Near (1991), 
this issue has not yet been adequately addressed in the literature. 
 
Finney and Lesieur (1982) noted that a likely reason for repeated transgressions is 
weak societal reaction. This may be due to ignorance by the public or under-staffing 
and under-funding of regulatory agencies. At the same time, however, organisations 
play an active role in attempting to ‘weaken or subvert’ external controls. 
Organisations aim to influence policy and regulatory agencies. More powerful 
organisations are better at influencing legislative processes and defending actions 
taken against them. Additionally, organisations can attempt to indirectly influence 
public knowledge through the media (Finney and Lesieur, 1982). 
 
While there is a sound body of literature encompassing the antecedents of illegal 
corporate behaviour, little has been written on the consequences of a firm having been 
caught engaging in illegal marketing behaviour. Almost all the studies conducted after 
a transgression has been detected have focussed on financial consequences, such as 
effect on stock price (Wier, 1983) and financial performance (Bromiley and Marcus, 
1989; Marcus and Goodman, 1991; Baucus and Baucus, 1997). In terms of stock 
price, Randall and Newman (1979, cited in Baucus and Baucus, 1997) found stock 
market performance dropped on average 2% following the announcement of penalties 
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for illegal mergers and acquisitions. Randall and Newman (1979, cited in Baucus and 
Baucus, 1997) also found a decline in stock prices immediately following 
prosecutions for violations of anti-competitive legislation. However, these were only 
short term effects. In terms of financial performance, Bromiley and Marcus (1989) 
found few negative consequences in the short term after the announcement of dubious 
behaviour. Interestingly, some firms even reported greater than usual growth. 
Weinberger and Romeo (1989) also investigated the consequences of illegal 
behaviour on financial performance and found that prosecution due to product defects 
led to a decrease in market-share and profits immediately after the incident. The most 
comprehensive study of the impact of illegal corporate behaviour on financial 
performance was conducted by Baucus and Baucus (1997). In an extension of the 
Baucus and Near (1991) research, the authors looked at the long-term financial 
consequences of the firms studied in the earlier research. They found that convicted 
firms experienced lower returns on assets, reduced sales growth, and lower income 
over the five years subsequent to a conviction compared to non-convicted firms.   
 
None of this research, however, has linked these ‘consequences’ to subsequent firm 
behaviour, so it cannot be ascertained whether such outcomes have changed the 
likelihood of subsequent transgressions occurring. For example, does reduced 
profitability or a lower share-price reduce the likelihood of subsequent transgressions? 
Linking behavioural consequences to future behaviour would allow for the dynamic 
transgression process, as suggested by Finney and Lesieur (1982) to be better tested. 
The testing of the dynamic process requires the combination of approaches. The work 
of Baucus and Near (1991), Baucus and Baucus (1997), McKendall and Wagner 
(1997), and McKendall et al (2002) form the basis of understanding initial 
 79 
 
 
 
transgressions and how behaviour changes subsequent to that transgression being 
detected and punished. In isolation, however, this work is not sufficient to understand 
the full transgression process. Business ethics research, which looks at potential future 
behaviour (e.g. Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Weber and Gillespie, 1998), can form the basis 
of looking at the effects of previous transgression detection on firm behaviour and 
subsequently the likelihood of future transgressions occurring, filling this gap.  
 
 
2.10. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on both unethical behaviour and illegal 
behaviour by firms. First, important theories of the determinants of unethical actions 
were reviewed, beginning with the decision process models developed by Ferrell and 
Gresham (1985) and Hunt and Vitell (1986), before moving onto the interactionist 
models proposed by Trevino (1986) and Jones (1991). Empirical testing of these 
models has produced mixed results, with demographic variables, moral beliefs, 
organisation culture, and organisation size all found to impact on ethical decision-
making by some studies. Following the review of the ethics literature, the major 
theories of illegal corporate behaviour were reviewed. Szwajkowski’s (1985) theory 
of organisational illegality was the first to integrate research across different 
disciplines, followed by Baucus and Near (1991) who were the first to empirically test 
an integrated comprehensive model of the factors that lead to firms transgressing the 
law. This led to a review of the more recent theory of transgressing business law, 
McKendall et al’s (2002) model of motive, opportunity, and control. Firm 
performance, firm size, competition, industry characteristics, firm culture, and the use 
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of compliance programmes have all been found to influence illegal corporate 
behaviour, yet none of these variables has proved to be a constant predictor. The 
concept of unintentional illegality was then introduced. Unintentional illegality 
recognises that not all transgressions are the result of deliberate acts, and that in some 
instances occur due to poor legal knowledge. Previous research in this area has shown 
legal knowledge to be poor. Finally, the limited research on the consequences of a 
transgression having been detected was reviewed, which showed illegal behaviour can 
have a negative influence on later profitability but this research did not investigate 
changes in firm behaviour.  
 
The models of illegal corporate behaviour reviewed in this chapter, in particular, the 
model of motive, opportunity and, control will form the basis of the conceptual model 
developed in Chapter 3. Both unintentional illegality and consequence of a 
transgression are also added to the model. Models of unethical behaviour were also 
used to inform the model.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Background and Model Development 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Having reviewed the literature in Chapter 2, this chapter describes the development of 
the conceptual model (see Figure 3.10). After a brief overview, the hypotheses 
relating to the factors that have caused a firm to transgress in the past are described. 
These are divided into conditions of motive, opportunity, and control. Secondly, 
hypotheses relating to the consequences of a previous transgression having been 
detected and punished by regulatory agencies are developed in terms of changes to 
firms’ perceptions of risk and the use and comprehensiveness of compliance 
programmes. Thirdly, these consequences are linked to the factors that might 
influence firms to transgress the law in the future. The concept of legal knowledge is 
then introduced to the model before, finally, a description and overview of how the 
entire model works are provided. 
  
 
3.2. Overview 
 
It is apparent from the literature discussed in Chapter 2 that models of illegal 
corporate behaviour need to be comprehensive (Baucus and Near, 1991), yet there 
have been relatively few such models in this literature. This has created difficulties for 
researchers in identifying the factors that lead firms to transgress the law and 
specifying the antecedent conditions (Baucus and Near, 1991).  Given recent research 
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that suggests that the characteristics of a decision-maker’s environment are more 
influential than those of the individual decision-maker (Frederick, 1987; Baucus and 
Beck-Dudley, 2005), the proposed model follows a ‘bad barrels’ approach focussing 
on the effects factors from a decision-maker’s firm and industry have on illegal 
marketing behaviour. Despite the apparent lack of consistent predictors, research 
investigating why firms transgress the law does, at least, provide an indication as to 
the conditions existing within a firm and its environment that can lead to 
transgressions of marketing law. Such work was used to develop an initial set of 
hypotheses, positing the factors that have caused firms to transgress the law in the 
past. In particular, the framework devised by McKendall and Wagner (1997) and 
expanded by McKendall et al (1999) and McKendall et al (2002) formed the 
foundations for this section of the model, whereby the factors that potentially lead to a 
transgression of the law were separated into conditions of motive, opportunity, and 
control. 
 
Previous research into illegal corporate behaviour has tended to look at transgressions 
that have occurred in the past (i.e. Baucus and Near, 1991; McKendall and Wagner, 
1997), while other research in the business ethics field has looked at potential future 
behaviour (Weber and Gillespie, 1998). Both approaches have been used within the 
illegal corporate behaviour and business ethics literature, but have not, as yet, been 
combined. The model developed and tested in this thesis research recognises that the 
antecedents of previous transgressions form only part of an overall dynamic 
transgression process, as noted by Finney and Lesieur (1982) and Baucus and Near 
(1991). This model thus goes beyond a static approach, in acknowledgement of the 
fact that multiple transgressions occur. This was achieved by investigating the 
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potential consequences to a firm of a transgression having been detected and punished 
by regulatory agencies. The motive, opportunity, and control framework was then 
used to determine how these consequences, in combination with other factors, impact 
on the likelihood that future transgressions will occur. This resulted in a dynamic 
model of marketing law transgressions, which in addition, extended previous research 
in the area by including knowledge of the law as a potential factor in transgressing the 
law. 
 
 
3.3. Antecedents of Previous Illegal Corporate Behaviour 
 
There is consensus in the literature that the three pre-conditions for illegal corporate 
behaviour are motive, opportunity, and absence of control (McKendall et al, 2002). 
Because this is the most recent theory underpinning the factors that cause firms to 
transgress the law, this framework formed the basis of the antecedent section of the 
conceptual model used in this research. It was assumed that these factors would apply 
as equally to marketing laws as they do to other commercial laws. 
 
3.3.1. Motive 
 
Motives are processes that incite action. They are the “reasons that prompt 
individuals and groups in corporations to engage in illegal behaviour” (McKendall et 
al, 1999, p. 203). The most commonly tested motive variable in the literature has been 
firm profitability. While profitability is the most commonly researched motive, it is 
recognised that other motives for illegal behaviour exist. For example, a firm may try 
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to attain a greater market-share, or be constrained by intense competition (Clinard and 
Yeager, 1980). McCaghy (1976) claimed profit pressure to be the single most 
compelling factor behind deviance by industry, as low profitability creates economic 
pressures that motivate firms to engage in illegal behaviour. Although Baucus and 
Near (1991), Hill et al (1992), and McKendall and Wagner (1997) found no 
relationship between firm performance and illegal corporate behaviour, a larger 
number of studies have demonstrated such a relationship does exist (Staw and 
Szwajkowski, 1975; Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Cochran and Nigh, 1987; McKendall 
et al, 1999; McKendall et al, 2002). Given that recent models continue to hypothesise 
a relationship between performance and illegal corporate behaviour (McKendall et al, 
1999), based on the stronger evidence in favour of such a relationship existing, it is 
hypothesised that: 
 
H1a: Firms with lower profitability are more likely to have transgressed marketing 
law than firms with higher profitability. 
 
H1b: Firms with a lower market-share are more likely to have transgressed 
marketing law than firms with a higher market-share.  
 
Closely linked to firms’ performance is competitive position. Intense competition 
creates pressure on firms to engage in illegal behaviour (McKendall et al, 1999). 
Kennedy and Lawton (1993) noted that, in the service sector, intensification of 
competition significantly increased the temptation to make ethical compromises. In 
environments where there are high levels of competition, increased pressure creates a 
need for illegal behaviour, because legitimate means of acquiring resources and 
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obtaining desired levels of performance may be less achievable (Vaughn, 1983). 
Conversely, Schneider and Johnson (1992) found that greater competition actually led 
to greater levels of ethical behaviour, suggesting that unethical firms tended to be 
weaker and thus get eliminated by market forces. Nevertheless, Baucus and Near 
(1991) and Hoffman et al (1991) found evidence relating questionable firm behaviour 
to competitive markets. Likewise, Badaracco and Webb (1995) found that many 
managers perceive intense competition to be the ‘starting point’ for unethical 
behaviour. This is because “clients, customers, and competitors demanded even lower 
costs, higher quality and faster action” (Badaracco and Webb, 1995, p. 11). These 
pressures then flow through the remainder of the organisation. Based on these 
findings it is hypothesised that: 
 
H1c: Firms in more competitive industries are more likely to have transgressed 
marketing law than firms in less competitive industries. 
 
The hypothesised relationships between motive and a previous transgression of 
marketing law are summarised in Figure 3.1: 
 
Figure 3.1: Proposed Relationships between Motive and Previous Transgression 
of Marketing Law 
                                                                
 
 
Motive  
 
• Lower Profitability  
• Lower Market-share  
• Higher Competition  
Previous 
Transgression of 
Marketing Law + 
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3.3.2. Opportunity 
 
On its own, motive is not always sufficient for illegality to occur, as opportunity must 
also be present: “Opportunity makes an illegal behavioural option available to an 
organisation by generating conditions conducive to violating the law and impeding 
detection and/or significant punishment” (McKendall et al, 2002, p. 368). The size of 
the firm is the most commonly researched opportunity variable. Larger firms may be 
less concerned with the consequences of getting caught since they are more likely to 
have the capacity to absorb the costs of legal fees and fines than smaller firms 
(McKendall et al, 2002).  In addition, since larger firms have more employees and are 
more complex, the opportunities for illegality to occur as a result of communication 
and coordination breakdowns are higher (Baucus, 1994). Larger firms are also more 
visible to regulatory agencies, making them more vulnerable to detection (McKendall 
et al, 1999). The majority of previous research has demonstrated a relationship 
between firm size and illegal corporate behaviour (Cochran and Nigh, 1987; Dalton 
and Kesner, 1988; Baucus and Near, 1991; McKendall et al, 1999). Therefore, it is 
hypothesised that: 
 
H2a: Larger firms are more likely to have transgressed marketing law than smaller 
firms. 
 
Conditions of opportunity are closely linked to learning theory. Learning theory states 
that attitudes towards illegal corporate behaviour are based on the ‘prevailing norms’ 
within the company or industry (Szwajkowski, 1985). In certain industry sectors, 
there is less enforcement, therefore illegal behaviour is more prevalent. If the industry 
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culture (behavioural norms shared by firms in that industry) encourages illegal 
behaviour, then there is greater opportunity for illegal behaviour to occur (Baucus and 
Near, 1991). Clinard and Yeager (1980), Simpson (1986), and Baucus and Near 
(1991) found relationships between industry sector and illegal corporate behaviour. 
Therefore it is hypothesised that: 
 
H2b: Firms operating within certain industry sectors are more likely to have 
transgressed marketing law than firms in other industry sectors. 
 
Also related to learning theory, the extent to which it is believed that illegal behaviour 
occurs within an industry can also lead to illegal corporate behaviour. Certain industry 
cultures may condone illegal behaviour (Baucus and Near, 1991). The belief that 
‘other firms are doing it’ can be seen as a justification for such behaviour. Soutar et al 
(1994) found that many managers feel that, if others are breaking the law, then the 
only way to compete is to behave in the same manner. If a firm sees their competitors 
attaining high levels of performance as a result of illegal behaviour, it may be much 
harder for them to follow an entirely legal course of action (Baucus and Near, 1991). 
Therefore it is hypothesised that: 
 
H2c: The more that firms perceive that others in their industry are transgressing 
marketing law, the more likely that they are to have transgressed marketing law 
themselves. 
 
The proposed relationships between the conditions of opportunity and previous 
transgression of marketing law are summarised in Figure 3.2: 
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Figure 3.2: Proposed Relationships between Opportunity and Previous 
Transgression of Marketing Law 
 
 
 
3.3.3. Control 
 
Finally, the decision to engage in illegal behaviour depends on the existence of, or 
lack of, effective controls. Drawing upon transaction cost economics, it is assumed 
that illegal corporate behaviour results from firms engaging in opportunistic 
behaviour in the absence of organisational controls to prevent it (Morris et al, 1995). 
Control systems aim to “stabilise behaviour allowing stable expectations to be 
formed by each member of the group as to the behaviour of other members under 
specified conditions” (Weaver et al, 1999b, p. 42).  
 
Controls that exist internally within firms, such as compliance programmes and codes 
of behaviour, are designed to develop a culture of compliance. The literature shows 
considerable agreement regarding the value of such programmes in promoting 
compliance of the law as an important ‘operating philosophy’ (McKendall et al, 2002). 
However, there has been much less research on whether these recommended practices 
actually do have any effect on firms’ behaviour (McKendall et al, 2002). It is 
generally assumed that the existence of a compliance programme reduces the 
likelihood that a transgression will occur (Wells, 1995; McKendall and Wagner, 
 Opportunity  
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1997). However, as Gazley et al (2005) found, the existence and comprehensiveness 
of a compliance programme is subject to time ordering effects when conducting cross-
sectional research. Gazley et al (2005) found that firms that had been previously 
caught transgressing marketing law were more likely to have a comprehensive 
compliance programme, in contrast to what might be expected from the literature. The 
authors speculated that this was because firms were introducing compliance 
programmes after they had been caught transgressing, either voluntarily, or as a result 
of enforcement action by regulatory agencies. Based on this, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H3a: Firms that have a more comprehensive compliance programme are more likely 
to have been caught transgressing marketing law than firms that have a less 
comprehensive compliance programme. 
 
Controls may also exist externally to the firm, and include the effectiveness of 
regulatory agencies. Deterrence research “emphasises the process by which a society 
coerces individuals into conformity through legal sanctions” (Cole, 1989, p. 108). 
Deterrence theory also posits that “the greater the certainty and severity of 
punishment for a type of crime, the more individuals are deterred from that crime” 
(Cole, 1989, p. 108). Previous research has shown that, as the perceived risk of 
detection increases, respondents are less likely to behave unethically (Laczniak and 
Inderrieden, 1987; Fritzsche, 1988; Dabholkar and Kellaris, 1992; Cherry and 
Fraedrich, 2002). However, similar to the use of a compliance programme, risk is also 
considered to be subject to time ordering effects when conducting cross-sectional 
research. Gazley et al (2005) found that firms previously caught transgressing 
marketing law were currently more likely to have higher perceptions of risk than 
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those that had not. Again it was speculated that this was because, after being caught 
transgressing, firms would naturally increase their perceptions of the likelihood that 
they would be caught again. Based on this, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H3b: Firms that have higher perceptions of the risk that a transgression of marketing 
law will be detected by regulatory agencies are more likely to have previously been 
caught transgressing marketing law than firms with lower perceptions of risk. 
 
The proposed relationships between control variables and previous transgression of 
marketing law are summarised in Figure 3.3: 
 
Figure 3.3: Proposed Relationships between Control and Previous Transgression 
of Marketing Law 
 
 
                                                                
In summary (see Figure 3.4), it is proposed that the following variables influence the 
occurrence of previous marketing law transgressions: 1) Motive: profitability, market-
share, and competition. 2) Opportunity: firm size, industry type, and perceptions of 
the incidence of transgressions by other firms in the industry. 3) Control: risk of 
detection and the use and comprehensiveness of a compliance programme. These 
variables combined represent the main factors found to have influenced previous 
illegal behaviour in the extant literature.  
Control 
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Figure 3.4: The Antecedents of Previous Transgression of Marketing Law 
     
 
 
Hill et al (1992) noted that empirical work on the antecedents of illegal corporate 
behaviour had not provided a consistent picture of the hypothesised relationships. The 
authors suggested that this might be due to poor methodology, bad data, or inadequate 
measures. Alternatively, they suggested that errors might exist in the theory itself. In 
an attempt to overcome these problems, the next section expands the model by 
exploring the dynamic nature of the transgression process via the consequences of a 
transgression having been detected by regulatory agencies. 
                     
                                                                                        
3.4. Consequences of Transgressing Marketing Law 
 
McKendall and Wagner (1997) recognised the existence of temporal issues in cross-
sectional studies of illegal corporate behaviour, specifically the danger that both the 
internal and external conditions of a firm can change in the period after a 
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transgression has occurred. Despite this, McKendall and Wagner (1997) found such 
issues had no effect on their results. Gazley et al (2005), however, found that two 
control antecedents (the perceived risk of detection and the existence and 
comprehensiveness of a compliance programme) changed after a transgression had 
been detected. They found that firms that had been caught transgressing marketing 
law had higher perceptions of risk than those that had not, and were more likely to 
have a more comprehensive compliance programme in place at the time of being 
surveyed. With risk, it is intuitive that the very fact a firm has been caught should 
increase perceptions that they might be caught again in the future. In terms of 
compliance, LeClair et al (1997) noted that many organisations only recognise the 
need for codes of compliance after a transgression has been detected. Likewise, 
McKendall et al (2002) found evidence that smaller firms that transgressed the law 
tended not to have compliance programmes in place prior to their transgression being 
detected. In addition, the various sanctions handed out by the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the courts in Australia (as in other countries) 
often require that a compliance programme be introduced. These findings suggest that 
the static models proposed in the literature do not adequately explain the processes 
involved. Therefore, as shown in Figure 3.5, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H4a: Firms caught transgressing marketing law are more likely to develop a higher 
perception of the risk of detection by regulatory agencies than firms that have not 
been caught transgressing. 
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H4b: Firms caught transgressing marketing law are more likely to introduce a more 
comprehensive compliance programme than firms that have not been caught 
transgressing. 
 
Figure 3.5: Consequences for a Firm Previously Caught Transgressing 
Marketing Law 
                                                  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Moreover, Weaver et al (1999b) determined that knowledge of the penalties (and 
associated risk of getting caught) specified in the United States Sentencing 
Commissions guidelines encouraged firms to implement more comprehensive 
compliance programmes than had previously been the case.  Similarly, Gazley et al 
(2005) found a relationship between perceived risk of detection and the use of a 
compliance programme. This suggests that, once a firm is caught transgressing the 
law, their perception of the chances of getting caught increases, making illegal 
behaviour a less attractive option in the future, potentially leading to the introduction 
of a compliance programme (see Figure 3.6). 
 
H5: The greater the perceived risk of being caught transgressing marketing law by 
regulatory agencies, the more comprehensive a firm’s compliance programme will be. 
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Figure 3.6: Proposed Relationship between Perceived Risk of Detection and 
Compliance Programme 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
    
 
These new perceptions of risk and the introduction or development of a compliance 
programme should then influence the likelihood of further transgressions occurring. 
Having accounted for the factors that caused illegal behaviour to occur in the past and 
the possible consequences of these actions, the next phase of the dynamic model is to 
look at factors that might influence the likelihood of marketing law transgressions 
recurring in the future, together with the influence of experiences associated with the 
detection of previous transgressions. These issues are covered in the next section. 
                                            
 
3.5. Future Behaviour 
 
To this point, the model has focussed on identifying the factors that caused a firm to 
transgress in the past and the resulting changes in firm behaviour in terms of 
perceived risk of detection and the use of a compliance programme. As noted 
previously, models dealing with previous transgressions are likely to be adversely 
influenced by time-ordering effects. One way to overcome these issues, and fully 
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develop a dynamic model is to look at intent to engage in future behaviour. This 
technique has been widely used in business ethics research (Weber and Gillespie, 
1998). Each of the conditions of motive, opportunity, and control hypothesised to 
influence a previous transgression were assumed in this research to apply equally to 
the potential of a future transgression occurring. In addition, this methodology 
allowed for additional deterrence variables to be introduced into the model. Therefore, 
as will be summarised in Figure 3.7, additional hypotheses can be proposed. 
 
3.5.1. Motive 
 
It is expected that conditions of motive (profitability, market-share, and competition) 
will impact on future behaviour, for the same reasons as outlined in the section on 
previous transgressions. They are summarised again below and are illustrated in 
Figure 3.7. A number of studies have demonstrated a negative relationship between 
firm performance and transgression (Staw and Szwajkowski, 1975; Clinard and 
Yeager, 1980; Cochran and Nigh, 1987; McKendall et al, 1999; McKendall et al, 
2002). Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H6a:  Firms with lower profitability are more likely to consider transgressing 
marketing law in the future than firms with higher profitability. 
 
H6b: Firms with a lower market-share are more likely to consider transgressing 
marketing law in the future than firms with a higher market-share.  
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Kennedy and Lawton (1993) and McKendall et al (1999) suggested that more intense 
competition creates more pressure on firms to engage in illegal behaviour. In addition, 
Baucus and Near (1991) and Hoffman et al (1991) found evidence that questionable 
firm behaviour is related to competitive markets. Therefore it is hypothesised that: 
 
H6c: Firms in more competitive industries are more likely to consider transgressing 
marketing law in the future than firms in less competitive industries. 
 
3.5.2. Opportunity 
 
It is expected that conditions of opportunity (firm size, industry type, and perceptions 
of industry behaviour) will impact on future behaviour, for the same reasons as those 
outlined in the section on previous transgressions. In addition, the number of previous 
transgressions a firm has committed is added as an opportunity variable. These 
variables are outlined below and illustrated in Figure 3.7. Firm size has been the most 
commonly researched opportunity variable, with most previous research revealing a 
relationship between firm size and illegal corporate behaviour (e.g. Cochran and 
Nigh, 1987; Dalton and Kesner, 1988; Baucus and Near, 1991; McKendall et al, 
1999). Based on these findings, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H7a: Larger firms are more likely to consider transgressing marketing law in the 
future than smaller firms. 
 
In certain industry sectors, illegal behaviour is more prevalent and enforcement less 
strict. Clinard and Yeager (1980), Simpson (1986), and Baucus and Near (1991) all 
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found a relationship between industry sector and illegal corporate behaviour. 
Therefore it is hypothesised that: 
 
H7b: Firms operating within certain industry sectors are more likely to consider 
transgressing marketing law in the future than firms in other industry sectors. 
 
Behaviour by other firms in an industry can also create opportunity for illegal 
behaviour. Soutar et al (1994) found that perceptions of the extent to which other 
industry members transgress the law impacts on the likelihood that a firm will 
transgress themselves. Based on these findings, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H7c: The more firms perceive that others in their industry are transgressing 
marketing law, the more likely that they will consider future marketing law 
transgressions themselves. 
 
Where a culture of illegal behaviour exists, a firm is likely to have engaged in a 
number of previous transgressions and, where there is a history of previous 
transgressions, it is likely that the firm will continue to transgress (Clinard and Yeager, 
1980; Finney and Lesieur, 1982). Baucus and Near (1991) found that having 
committed three or more previous transgressions was a significant predictor of 
continued illegal behaviour. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H7d: The more previous transgressions a firm has had detected, the more likely the 
firm will consider future marketing law transgressions.  
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3.5.3. Control 
 
While the investigation of the impact of conditions of control on the occurrence of a 
previous transgression is complicated by time-ordering effects, no such problem 
exists when investigating control’s impact on future behaviour. Therefore, in terms of 
future behaviour, it is anticipated that control factors will have the effect of reducing 
the likelihood of transgressions occurring, as suggested by the general literature 
(McKendall et al, 1999; McKendall et al, 2002). In addition, investigating future 
behaviour allows for the role of deterrence to be expanded to include the potential 
rewards and sanctions that might result from transgressions of marketing law and their 
detection (see Figure 3.7). 
 
a) Internal Control 
 
The literature shows considerable agreement about the value of utilising compliance 
programmes to promote adherence to the law as an important ‘operating philosophy’. 
However, there has been much less research on whether these recommended practices 
actually have any effect on firm behaviour (McKendall et al, 2002). Among studies 
that have looked at this relationship, results have been mixed. Matthews (1987, cited 
in McKendall and Wagner, 1997), found no relationship, whereas McKendall and 
Wagner (1997) found some interactions. Despite the uncertainty, a compliance 
programme is strongly advocated by regulatory agencies, such as the ACCC, as an 
important means of reducing the likelihood of further transgressions occurring. Thus, 
it is hypothesised that: 
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H8a: Firms that have more comprehensive compliance programmes are less likely to 
consider transgressing marketing law in the future than firms that have less 
comprehensive compliance programmes. 
 
b) External Control 
 
Drawing upon deterrence theory, it is posited that the certainty (likelihood of a 
transgression being detected) and severity (size of the potential consequences) of 
punishment will impact on the likelihood of a future transgression occurring 
(Szwajkowski, 1985; Cole, 1989). It is also posited that the potential rewards (gains 
from the illegal act) will have an impact. According to deterrence theory, it is also 
posited that individuals act in a rational manner based on free will. Deterrence occurs 
when, as the result of a sanction, either an individual (manager or firm) or the general 
population desists from transgressing in the future (Smith et al, 2007). As a result, in 
addition to the risk of detection, three new control variables, grounded in the theory of 
deterrence, are introduced: 1) potential fines, 2) potential negative publicity, and 3) 
likely rewards (Bromiley and Marcus, 1989; Cole, 1989; Cohen, 1996). These 
variables could not be included in the model of factors influencing previous 
transgression, due to the difficulties in determining historical managerial perceptions. 
 
A number of studies have found that, as the risk of detection increases, respondents 
are less likely to behave unethically (Laczniak and Inderrieden, 1987; Fritzsche, 1988; 
Dabholkar and Kellaris, 1992; Cherry and Fraedrich, 2002). Cohen (1996) also argued 
that transgressions of the law are less likely when the risk of detection is higher. Cole 
(1989) found that, from a consumer’s point of view, the risk of getting caught had a 
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greater impact than potential sanctions on reducing the likelihood that fraud would 
occur. These lead to the following hypothesis:  
 
H8b: Firms that have higher perceptions of the risk that a transgression of marketing 
law will be detected by regulatory agencies are less likely to consider transgressing 
marketing law in the future than firms with lower perceptions of risk. 
 
The impact of deterrence theory in terms of risk has already been considered.  While 
risk of detection forms one aspect of deterrence theory, potential sanctions are another 
aspect. That is, firms are deterred from transgressing by a combination of the risk of 
detection (as per H8b) and the severity of resulting punishment (Szwajkowski, 1985; 
Cole, 1989). Two of the major types of punishment that can affect a firm are fines and 
negative publicity. Fines are usually implemented by the courts and tend to be based 
on the level of harm, severity of the offence, or resulting gain from that particular 
action (Cohen, 1996). McDermott and Newhams (1971) and Laczniak and 
Inderrieden (1987) found that the potential punishment (or threat of) led to a reduced 
likelihood of an illegality occurring. Hegarty and Sims (1979) also found that the 
threat of punishment countered the effect of any potential rewards from the illegal 
behaviour. Negative publicity occurs as a result of the public hearing about a 
particular transgression, often through the media, which may make them less inclined 
to deal with that firm. Finney and Lesieur (1982) suggested that many transgressions 
occur due to the lack of negative publicity about firms’ illegal acts. Anecdotal 
evidence from the ACCC suggested that, given the inability to impose adequate fines, 
it was the potential for negative publicity that was of greatest deterrence for 
transgressors. Based on this, it is hypothesised that: 
 101 
 
 
 
 
H8c: The larger the potential fine that might result from a marketing law 
transgression being detected, the less likely a firm will consider transgressing 
marketing law in the future. 
 
H8d: Where the potential for adverse publicity that might result from a marketing law 
transgression exists, the less likely a firm will consider transgressing marketing law 
in the future. 
 
Theories of deterrence are concerned with removing the gain from a crime (Cohen, 
1996). Much of the previous research conducted in this area has suggested that the 
price of getting caught is the sole determinant of a decision to transgress the law. 
Rational choice models based in criminology suggest that the deterrent effect of any 
sanctions must be weighed against the potential rewards. It is assumed under 
deterrence theory that “persons will choose to be lawful if the pain associated with 
offending is greater than the pleasure it will bring” (Smith et al, 2007, p. 635).  On 
the other hand, the role of expected rewards in that decision should also be 
recognised, in that they are often calculable and need to be greater than the potential 
losses from any sanctions received (Bromiley and Marcus, 1989). Hegarty and Sims 
(1979) found that the likelihood of an unethical action occurring increased when the 
potential rewards were greater. As a result, it is expected that the larger the potential 
reward from an illegal act, the more likely the intent to engage in that particular 
activity. Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
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H8e: The greater the potential rewards that might result from a transgression of 
marketing law, the more likely that a firm will consider transgressing marketing law 
in the future. 
 
Figure 3.7 summaries the antecedents of future marketing law transgression that have 
been outlined in section 3.5: 
 
Figure 3.7: The Antecedents of Future Transgression 
                                                              
                                                                 
 
This model of transgressing marketing law also recognises that previous 
transgressions play an important role in decisions regarding future transgressions. it is 
expected that firms’ experiences regarding previous transgressions will impact on the 
likelihood of future transgressions occurring. Changes to perceptions of risk and the 
introduction of more comprehensive compliance programmes have already been 
identified as two major consequences of a transgression having been detected. Thus, 
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in order to test the link between past and future transgressions, the impact of whether 
a previous transgression has been committed or not was tested in relation to 
perceptions of risk, the existence and comprehensiveness of a compliance programme, 
and future marketing behaviour. 
 
Perceived risk has already been hypothesised as an antecedent of having previously 
transgressed the law as well as of future behaviour. It is likely that this relationship 
between perceived risk and future behaviour is influenced by whether the firm has 
previously been caught transgressing or not. Having re-evaluated the perceived risk 
subsequent to detection, a firm may still decide either that further transgression is 
viable and, therefore, re-offend, or that it is too risky and cease the behaviour. It 
would be expected that the hypothesised relationship between risk and future 
behaviour would be affected by whether a firm had previously transgressed. Therefore, 
the interaction effect between risk and the detection of a previous transgression on 
future behaviour was investigated, and it is hypothesised that (see Figure 3.8): 
 
H9: Firms with higher perceptions of risk that have previously been caught 
transgressing marketing law are less likely to consider transgressing marketing law 
in the future than those firms with higher perceptions of risk that have not previously 
been caught transgressing. 
 
As discussed previously, there is no consensus over whether having a compliance 
programme actually has any effect on firm behaviour (McKendall et al, 2002). So, 
even if a firm introduces or upgrades a compliance programme as a result of a 
transgression having been detected, the literature is inconclusive as to whether this 
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would prevent future transgressions. Despite this uncertainty, because compliance 
programmes are designed to prevent illegal behaviour and firms are often expected to 
introduce a compliance programme after a transgression has been detected (LeClair et 
al, 1997), it is expected that previously being caught transgressing will impact on the 
relationship between the existence and comprehensiveness of a compliance 
programme and future behaviour. Therefore, the interaction effect between 
compliance and the detection of a previous transgression on future behaviour was 
investigated, and it is hypothesised that (see Figure 3.8): 
 
H10: Firms with a more comprehensive compliance programme that have previously 
been caught transgressing marketing law are less likely to consider transgressing 
marketing law in the future than those firms with a more comprehensive compliance 
programme that have not been caught  transgressing. 
 
Figure 3.8 summarises the proposed relationships between whether a firm has 
previously been caught transgressing marketing law, perceived risk of detection, 
compliance programme, and future transgressions of marketing law: 
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Figure 3.8: Proposed Relationships between Previously Caught Transgressing 
Marketing Law, Perceived Risk of Detection, Compliance Programme, and 
Future Behaviour 
 
  
 
 
3.6. Linking Knowledge to the Model of Marketing Law Transgression 
 
The theory behind motive, opportunity, and control in illegal corporate behaviour was 
only designed to reflect intentional illegal behaviour, whereas Baucus (1994) 
recognised the importance of unintentional illegal behaviour, which occurs through 
acts of omission rather than commission. Marketing managers are not always aware 
of which marketing activities are unethical (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985): “Ethical 
issues are ever present in uncertain conditions where multiple stakeholders, interests 
and values are in conflict and laws are unclear” (Trevino, 1986, p. 601). Knowledge 
of the law is an important concept in unintentional illegality. There is evidence to 
suggest that, for many, particularly smaller firms, there is inadequate knowledge of 
business law (Peterson, 1997; 2001a; 2003), which in turn, may lead to unintentional 
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illegal behaviour. Given that ignorance of the law is considered no excuse by the legal 
system, such firms are just as liable as those that intentionally break the law. Loe et al 
(2000) noted that, since previous research has failed to investigate the impact that 
knowledge of the law has on illegal corporate behaviour, a significant opportunity for 
study exists. Therefore, the concept of knowledge was linked to future behaviour (see 
Figure 3.9), leading to the hypothesis that: 
 
H11: Firms with higher levels of marketing law knowledge are less likely to consider 
transgressing marketing law in the future than firms with lesser knowledge. 
 
Knowledge does not exist in isolation, but is most likely influenced by other factors 
and previous experiences of the firm. Whilst the literature is largely undecided as to 
the existence of a direct relationship between compliance programmes and 
transgression, there is wide agreement that the establishment of codes and 
programmes of compliance are effective means of developing a positive ethical 
environment (McKendall et al, 2002).  The main purpose of a compliance programme 
is to raise knowledge of legal issues throughout a firm through policies, training, and 
education (Wells, 1995). This should, in turn, reduce the likelihood of a transgression 
occurring. Of particular relevance, Soutar et al (1994) found that the existence of 
formal programmes had a positive effect on the ethical culture of Australian firms. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H12: Firms with a more comprehensive compliance programme will display higher 
levels of marketing law knowledge than firms that have a less comprehensive 
compliance programme. 
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External control variables such as effective regulatory enforcement have been 
described as important environmental conditions that can influence knowledge of 
ethical situations (Weaver et al, 1999b). It is likely that, where a firm perceives the 
chances of getting caught to be high, or where regulatory agencies have a strong 
presence in the industry, firms will develop a greater legal knowledge to ensure that 
marketing law is not transgressed, either accidentally or intentionally. Conversely, 
where such perceived risk or presence of regulatory agencies does not exist, there is 
less motivation or need to obtain greater knowledge. Fritzsche and Becker (1983) 
found that, as the consequences of an action became more severe, ethical perceptions 
became more ‘positive’. Laczniak and Inderrieden (1987) and Dabholkar and Kellaris 
(1992) found that, as outcomes became more negative, ethical perceptions improved. 
Therefore, as shown in Figure 3.9, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H13: Firms with higher perceptions of risk of transgression detection will display 
higher levels of marketing law knowledge than firms with lower perceptions of risk of 
transgression detection. 
 
As summarised in Figure 3.9, it is proposed that, in addition to directly affecting 
future behaviour, both the perception of risk of detection and the existence of a 
compliance programme can influence a firm’s knowledge of the law. When firms 
have higher levels of knowledge, the chance of future transgressions is reduced. 
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Figure 3.9: Proposed Relationships between Knowledge and Future 
Transgression 
                                
  
 
Combining all the components of the model (previous transgressions, consequences, 
future transgressions, and knowledge) results in the development of a comprehensive 
and dynamic model of the antecedents and consequences of being caught 
transgressing marketing law. This model is shown and discussed in the next section. 
 
 
3.7. Model Overview 
 
This chapter has outlined the conceptual development of the research model (see 
Figure 3.10). Precisely how the model works depends upon whether the transgression 
(past or future) is intentional or unintentional. If the transgression is intentional then it 
occurs as a result of certain conditions of motive, opportunity, or control (for specific 
components, see Figure 3.11). If the regulatory agencies detect the transgression, the 
firm will either be punished or reprimanded and let off with a warning. This leads the 
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firm to re-evaluate its perceptions of the risk of detection and, in particular, whether it 
is worth engaging in further transgressions, given the ongoing conditions of motive, 
opportunity, and control. If the firm decides it is worth the risk, then further 
transgressions may occur. If the firm decides it is not worth the risk, then they may 
introduce a compliance programme, or look to improve its knowledge of the dangers 
of transgressing marketing law through other means. Regardless of which method is 
used, the likelihood of future transgressions should be reduced.  
 
Figure 3.10: Process Model of Transgressing Marketing Law 
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If the transgression is unintentional, it may be due to a lack of knowledge of the law 
(for specific components see Figure 3.11), or to other conditions of motive, 
opportunity, or control. If the transgression is detected, the firm will be punished or 
let off with a warning. This should significantly increase perceptions of risk, which 
should result in increased knowledge of the legislation, especially if a compliance 
programme is then introduced. As a result, further transgressions should be less likely.  
 
The right-hand side of the conceptual model recognises that transgressing and getting 
caught are not the same thing and that, if regulatory agencies do not detect the 
transgression, then the behaviour is likely to continue. Since it cannot be measured, 
this is not specified in any of the hypotheses. Nevertheless, Clinard and Yeager 
(1980) suggested that there is no evidence to suggest that undetected transgressions 
differ in any way from those that are.  Likewise, knowledge is also included as an 
antecedent of a previous transgression in the conceptual model. In the same way as 
greater knowledge of the law should reduce the likelihood of illegal future marketing 
behaviour occurring, it is expected that knowledge should have reduced the likelihood 
of a previous transgression occurring (Baucus, 1994; Peterson, 2001a). Measurement 
issues mean that the level of knowledge that existed in a firm prior to a transgression 
cannot be determined. These issues are further discussed when the measurement 
model is introduced in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 3.11: Component Model of Transgressing Marketing Law 
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3.8. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, a comprehensive dynamic model of transgressing marketing law has 
been developed. This model was largely based on McKendall et al’s (2002) theory of 
motive, opportunity, and control, as well as including elements from Baucus and Near 
(1991), Baucus (1994) and a range of research conducted in the illegal corporate 
behaviour and business ethics fields. This research suggested a range of potential 
antecedents of illegal firm behaviour, for both the past and future. Motive variables 
include profitability, market-share, and competition. Opportunity variables include 
firm size, industry behaviour, and industry sector. Control variables include potential 
risk, sanction, and reward. In addition to these antecedents the potential consequences 
that follow a transgression being detected and punished by regulatory agencies were 
considered, based on the work of Gazley et al (2005). The work of Baucus (1994) and 
Peterson (1997; 2001a; 2001b; 2003) informed the knowledge component of the 
model. The next step is to test the model empirically. Chapter 4 presents the 
methodology and results of the secondary data analysis, while Chapters 5 and 6 
outline the methodology and results of the primary data analysis. 
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Chapter 4: Secondary Data: Methodology and Analysis 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The choice of the research paradigm in which one chooses to operate depends on a 
number of factors, including the researcher’s world view, nature of the problem, 
research question(s), research objectives, and the potential audience (Creswell, 1994). 
Previous research on illegal corporate behaviour has been almost exclusively 
quantitative in nature (i.e. Baucus and Near, 1991; Hill et al, 1992; McKendall and 
Wagner, 1997; McKendall et al, 1999; McKendall et al, 2002). This is possibly due to 
the sensitive nature of the topic, with respondents preferring anonymity and 
confidentiality. Moreover, a body of literature exists on the antecedents of illegal 
corporate behaviour, with theories that can form the basis of objective testing of these 
antecedents. Therefore, from this perspective, quantitative research was appropriate. 
 
Hill et al (1992) believed that the inconsistent previous results from illegal corporate 
behaviour research were partly due to methodological problems, leading to the call for 
alternative methods. With the exception of McKendall and Wagner (1997), previous 
research has tended to use either secondary data or a survey instrument to collect the 
required data, rather than both. This current research utilised a combination of both 
approaches, similar to McKendall and Wagner (1997), in order to exploit their 
combined benefits. This chapter describes the methodology and results obtained of the 
secondary data phase of this research, while Chapters 5 and 6 describe the 
methodology and results of the primary data phase. 
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Secondary data can “provide valuable insights and lay the foundation for collecting 
primary data” (Malhotra, 1999, p. 113). In particular, it can help with defining the 
research problem, developing an approach to the problem, and developing the 
research design. Secondary data may also help answer certain research questions and 
assist in the interpretation of primary data (Malhotra, 1999).  The secondary data 
phase of this research achieved both of these goals. Because the primary data phase of 
this research was cross-sectional, it was inadequate for dealing with changes over 
time. Therefore, secondary data were used to develop an initial understanding of the 
extent to which multiple transgressions have occurred in Australia. This assisted in 
developing an understanding of the dynamic nature of the model, which informed the 
primary data research phase. In addition, while the major purpose of this section was 
not hypothesis testing, rather to explore the phenomenon of repeat transgression, 
where data from the primary research phase were either insufficient or unavailable, 
the secondary data helped evaluate hypotheses relating to firm size, industry sector, 
and the effect of the number of previous transgression on future transgressions.  
  
Data pertaining to the rates of re-offending by firms were collected from the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). The patterns of all 
repeat offences from 1993 to 2006 were investigated, analysing the rate of re-
offending by firms listed in these documents using life tables and Cox proportional 
hazard models. Hazard models are an important modelling technique, providing 
insights into the entire historical process of the area of interest (Tang et al, 2004). 
These techniques have traditionally been used in medical research to determine 
mortality rates, but in recent times have been increasingly used in marketing (Gupta, 
1991; Leszcyc, 1992) and recidivism analysis (DeJong, 1997; Wilson, 2005). The 
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purpose of this analysis was to determine the risk of future offending, given the 
occurrence of a previous transgression and other antecedent conditions within the 
time period of investigation. By using this technique, the extent of re-offending could 
be determined, as well as some of the factors that might influence the risk of future 
transgression. The first part of this chapter provides background information on event 
history analysis, in particular, hazard models. Secondly, it outlines the methodology 
used. Lastly, the results of the analysis are detailed, starting with basic life table data 
followed by the Cox regression hazard model analysis that determined the influence 
of covariates on the multiple transgression data. 
 
 
4.2. Event History Analysis 
 
Event history data detail the number, timing, and sequence of events, when 
individuals change from one state to another (Mayer and Tuma, 1989; Leszcyc, 
1992). In this research, for example, the change of state consisted of shifting from 
having not re-offended to re-offending. Additionally, event history data can contain 
covariates that are thought to influence the nature and timing of changes in state. 
These covariates often represent characteristics of the individuals or units being 
studied (Mayer and Tuma, 1989). The methods used to test such data are referred to 
as event history analysis. Such analyses can be simply descriptive of the change 
process, and are illustrated using life tables. This research, however, also looked to 
explore the differences in event history between different types of firms (i.e. the 
impact of the covariates). When conducting event history analysis, both the time 
domains and the state space must be defined. The time domain, for example, could be 
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age, historical time, or duration in a particular state. The state space refers to the 
outcome being studied. In this research the time domain was the time taken in years 
for a firm to re-offend during the period of observation (1993-2006), with re-
offending as the state space.  
 
Most models of event history are defined by the transition rate. The transition rate 
measures the “probability per unit of time that an event or transition occurs in an 
infinitesimal interval of time among those at risk during the particular time interval in 
question” (Mayer and Tuma, 1989, p.11). For this research, the transition rate 
represented the chance that a firm would re-offend within the time period in question. 
Such models are also concerned with the impact of time and covariates on that rate. 
This involved examining how the length of time since the first offence occurred 
impacted on the likelihood that a firm would re-offend and in what ways the 
covariates affect this likelihood. These transition probabilities can be analysed using 
hazard models, commonly used in biology, sociology, engineering, and economics 
(Leszcyc, 1992), which are described in the next section. 
 
4.2.1. Hazard Models 
 
In its simplest form, event history analysis is a study of the time taken for a single 
event to occur for a group of homogeneous individuals (often referred to as survival 
analysis). The term survival analysis comes from medical research, whereby 
researchers would look at the time until the death of a patient after they have been 
given an experimental treatment, the event is often referred to as the ‘failure event’. 
The time period of interest is referred to as the survival time or hazard rate (Leszcyc, 
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1992). Hazard models have also been applied to a wide range of other subject areas, 
including demographic research (i.e. time in employment, time until divorce) 
(Allison, 1995), research into business failures (Shumway, 2001; Parker et al, 2002), 
and time until a company exits a market (Leszcyc, 1992). Most relevant to this 
research, hazard models have been used in studies of marketing (i.e. repeat purchase 
behaviour) and recidivism (time until a re-offence occurs) (Leszcyc, 1992; DeJong, 
1997; Wilson, 2005). 
 
4.2.2. Hazard Models and Recidivism 
 
Hazard models have become an increasingly popular tool in analysing rates of re-
offending or recidivism. Previous research in this area has focussed on ‘ordinary’ 
crime by individuals, such as theft or murder, as opposed to corporate crime, although 
the basic theory remains the same. Such research measured the time until the failure 
event as the duration before an offender is rearrested or returned to prison after being 
arrested in the first instance or released from prison. Hazard models have also been 
used to test the impact of individual characteristics on the likelihood of re-offending, 
such as age, gender, education, and severity of punishment (Allison, 1995; DeJong, 
1997; Wilson, 2005).  
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4.3. Cox Proportional Hazard Model: Covariates and Censoring 
 
Hazard model and survival analysis techniques are also effective in addressing the 
way in which firms evolve over time, as well as studying the effects of multiple, 
continuous, or categorical attributes (covariates) on the event in question. In the case 
of this research, the focus was to study the effect on the hazard rate of the type of 
sanction, industry sector, number of previous transgressions, and whether the firm 
was public or private. When investigating the impact of covariates on the hazard rate, 
one useful method is to estimate a Cox proportional hazard model, which is able to 
isolate the influence of specific covariates. The Cox model determines the likelihood 
that a re-offence will occur in the next instant, based on its non-occurrence until that 
point in time. The values for the covariates being studied are then compared to a 
baseline hazard, the rate when all covariates are set to zero. 
 
A major advantage of the Cox model is its ability to handle observations that are 
censored. Many of the firms that offend once within the period of observation do not 
re-offend. That is not to say that a firm will not re-offend in the future, outside the 
period of observation. These cases are referred to as censored observations (Wilson, 
2005). Random censoring may also occur in situations where a firm has gone out of 
business or been acquired, or where data is unavailable. In static models, such firms 
are considered not to have re-offended. However, with the Cox model, all information 
beyond the 13 year period of this study was censored. Even though there will be 
members of the population that have not re-offended by the end of the time period of 
interest, the Cox model recognises that there is still a probability they will do so at 
some point in the future (Wilson, 2005). This removes any sampling bias that might 
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result from not taking censored variables into account (Shumway, 2001; Parker et al, 
2002). 
 
4.3.1. Repeated Events 
 
Because many survival analyses have focused on human morbidity, procedures have 
tended to be directed towards individuals experiencing an event only once. However, 
in many other situations within the social sciences and marketing, events occur more 
than once. An example in marketing would be repeat purchase behaviour (Leszcyc, 
1992). The same applies to recidivism. That is, within the period of observation of 
this research, some firms will have re-offended more than once. There are two ways 
in which repeated events can be considered. Firstly, a separate analysis can be done 
for each year. In that case, an analysis could be done annually from the time of the 
first offence until the first re-offence. Then, for the firms that re-offended again, an 
analysis would be done for each year between the first and second re-offences. This 
would continue until the number of firms becomes too small to perform a reliable 
analysis. One problem with this approach is that it can be inefficient and time 
consuming, as it involves multiple analyses, making it difficult to create an overall 
picture of events. Additionally, because there are more numbers to interpret, the 
opportunity for ambiguity is greater. This leads to the second method of analysing 
repeated events, which overcomes the problems outlined above. Here, each time 
period is treated as a separate event. So, for a firm that has re-offended twice, the time 
between when the first offence occurs and when it first re-offends is treated as one 
event and the time from the first re-offence to the second re-offence is treated as 
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another. These are all ‘pooled’ together and only one model is estimated for the entire 
data set (Allison, 1995). This is the method used for this research.  
 
4.3.2. Methodology: Data Entered into the Model 
 
All enforcement actions by the ACCC and court cases that resulted in a formal 
sanction have been reported in publications, with data available from 1993 to 2006. 
The information contained in these publications outlined: 1) the name of the firm, 2) 
the year in which the transgression occurred, 3) the type of action that the firm faced, 
and 4) the type of penalty received. For this research, the ‘failure event’ was defined 
as a firm receiving an official sanction from the ACCC or the courts, having already 
received a sanction for a previous offence within the time period being investigated 
(1993 – 2006). The time domain was the number of years from the time an offence 
was officially announced by the ACCC in the case of undertakings and settlements, 
and when a judgement was released in the event of court cases. A potential limitation 
is that this information depends upon the time taken by the ACCC to release the 
information and the time taken for a case to appear before the courts, which may vary 
between cases. The assumption was made that any behavioural changes would only 
occur after the final verdict was released. 
 
As noted above, in cases where firms re-offended more than once, the period between 
each event was treated separately. In cases where firms offended only once within the 
period of the observation, the record was censored. For firms that did re-offend, the 
record for the time period from their last offence to the end of the study was also 
censored. In all censored cases, regardless of how many offences a firm had 
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previously committed, the probability of re-offending still exists in the future; it had 
simply not occurred by the end of the period of observation, 2006.  
 
The covariates that could be tested were limited by the information available in the 
data sets. Because many of the firms included in the model were not publicly listed, it 
was not possible to gather detailed information regarding their characteristics. Based 
on the available information, the covariates tested were: 1) type of previous sanctions, 
2) whether the company was public or not, 3) industry sector, and 4) the number of 
previous offences. The type of sanction received can help determine the effectiveness, 
or otherwise, of various control measures, as more severe sanctions should reduce the 
hazard rate. It is generally believed that the greater the severity of a punishment, the 
more likely the subject to refrain from re-offending (DeJong, 1997; Wilson, 2005). In 
terms of public companies, because, in Australia such companies are often larger, 
inferences can be made as to the potential impact of firm size and provide a test of 
H7a (larger firms are more likely to consider transgressing marketing law in the 
future than smaller firms). Industry sector can indicate whether firms in certain 
industries are more likely to re-offend than others, as has been suggested in the 
literature (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Baucus and Near, 1991). This also helped test 
H7b (firms operating within certain industry sectors are more likely to consider 
transgressing marketing law in the future than firms in other industry sectors). Lastly, 
the number of previous transgressions, which can give an indication of the risk of 
another transgression occurring, as suggested by Baucus and Near (1991), was used to 
test H7d (the more previous transgressions a firm has had detected, the more likely 
the firm will consider future marketing law transgressions). 
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As described above, time to re-offend was the dependent variable, while type of 
punishment, type of company, industry type, and the number of previous 
transgressions were the independent variables (or covariates). The type of punishment 
was a categorical variable, based on whether a firm received 1) a conviction from the 
courts, or 2) had to provide a written undertaking to cease engaging in illegal 
behaviour. Whether a firm was a public company or not was represented by a simple 
dichotomous dummy variable, with 1 representing ‘yes’ and 0 representing ‘no’. All 
firms in the experiment that were listed on the Australian stock exchange were 
considered to be public companies, those firms not listed were considered to be 
private. In terms of industry, firms were divided into four broad categories: retail, 
manufacturing, services, and importer/wholesaler. Where the industry could not be 
determined, the data was classified as missing and removed from the analysis. Lastly, 
the number of previous offences was treated as a continuous variable, ranging from 0 
on the first offence, to 1 on the second offence, and so forth.  
 
 
4.4. Results 
 
This section outlines the results obtained from the hazard model analysis of Australian 
firms that were found guilty by the courts, or provided a written undertaking to cease 
illegal behaviour, for breaching parts four and five of the Trade Practices Act (1974). 
In addition to helping address hypotheses pertaining to firm size, industry sector, and 
number of previous transgressions (H7a, H7b and H7d), it provides a better 
understanding of the extent to which re-offending occurs and also clarifies some of 
the factors that could influence the transgression process.  
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4.4.1. Life Tables 
 
A life table provides a basic analysis of the distribution of time between two events, 
which was useful to examine the extent of firm re-offending and the likelihood that 
this would occur in a given year following a first offence. As noted earlier, in some 
cases, the second event does not occur (i.e. a firm does not re-offend) and these events 
are censored, which is why traditional analyses such as regression are not always 
appropriate. The life table subdivides the period of observation into separate time 
intervals. For each time interval, all individuals that remained in the study until that 
period commenced were used to determine the likelihood that a terminal event (re-
offence) would occur in that interval. The probabilities calculated for each interval 
were combined to determine the overall probability that a terminal event would occur 
at different points in time (SPSS, 2006).  In the case of this research, the period of 
observation was the 13 years between 1993 and 2006. Firms entered the study if they 
had been caught transgressing during that time. However, if they did not transgress 
again, the observation was censored. If the firm transgressed a second time (re-
offended) within that period, a terminal event was deemed to have occurred. That 
particular firm then re-entered the study as a separate event. If another offence did not 
occur, the data was censored. The overall time period was divided into one year 
intervals. For each year after an initial transgression, the number of firms that had not 
transgressed again (the terminal event), which were still in the study, were used to 
calculate the probability that a firm would re-offend in that year. 
 
When using life tables, it is assumed that the probability of an event occurring is only 
dependent upon time after the initial event, i.e., the chance of a firm re-offending is 
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based upon the time taken since the first offence, and the probabilities are presumed 
to be stable in relation to absolute time. Therefore, firms that entered the study at 
different times should behave in a similar manner (e.g. a firm that first offended in 
1997 was assumed to behave in a similar manner to a firm that entered the study in 
2004). It was also assumed that there were no systematic differences between 
censored and non-censored cases. 
 
Reference to Table 4.1 shows that the first column outlines the number of firms that 
entered each interval, i.e. the number of firms that had not transgressed or been 
censored before that year. There were 714 firms that entered the study (the number 
that transgressed at least once between 1993 and 2006), but, by the beginning of the 
twelfth year, only 54 firms remained in the study, because firms had either re-
offended by this time or been censored. In the second column, ‘the number withdrawn 
during this interval’ shows the cases that were censored during that particular interval. 
These were firms that did not engage in a repeat transgression prior to the end of the 
study time period of 2006. It should be noted that because, firms entered the study in 
different years, throughout the time period of interest (1993 to 2006), the number of 
years before a case was censored was not constant. For example, a firm that first 
transgressed in 2005 but did not transgress again before 2006 was censored after one 
year, while a firm that first transgressed in 1996 but did not transgress again before 
2006 was censored after 10 years.  For these censored cases, the outcome was 
unknown, since it was uncertain if they transgressed or will transgress again at some 
point after the study was completed. The way that SPSS handles censored cases is to 
treat each one as a half case, so, for the third year time interval, instead of 464 firms 
entering the next time interval, there were 464-(0.5 x 37) or 445 firms. These figures 
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are listed in the ‘number exposed to risk’ column. The column entitled ‘number of 
terminal events’ represents the number of firms that engaged in a repeat offence 
within the time interval (SPSS, 2006). Thus, for example, 28 firms re-offended one 
year following a previous transgression. 
 
Table 4.1: Life Table Results of Repeat Offending by Australian Firms 
 
Survival Variable:  Time (Years) 
 
Interval 
Start 
Time 
Number 
Entering 
This 
Interval 
Number 
Withdrawn 
During 
Interval 
Number 
Exposed 
to Risk 
Number 
of 
Terminal 
Events 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
Surviving at 
End 
Hazard 
Rate 
0 714 59 684.5 0 1 0 
1 655 84 613 28 .954 .047 
2 543 70 508 9 .938 .018 
3 464 37 445.5 8 .921 .018 
4 419 37 400.5 9 .9 .023 
5 373 56 345 6 .884 .018 
6 311 56 283 1 .881 .004 
7 254 44 232 3 .87 .013 
8 207 29 192 1 .865  .005 
9 177 42 155 1 .86 .007 
10 132 54 105 1 .851 .01 
11 77 23 65.5 0 .851 0 
12+ 54 52 28 2 .791  * 
 
The hazard rate represents the likelihood of a firm re-offending within that time 
period. The results show that the greatest amount of re-offending occurred one year 
subsequent to the first offence (5%), followed by the fourth year (2.3%), then the 
second and third years (1.8% each). The cumulative proportion surviving represents 
an estimate of the probability of a firm reaching the end of a particular time period 
without re-offending. For example, there is a 95% chance of a firm not re-offending 
after the first year, dropping to a 79% chance after eight years.  
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Figure 4.1 illustrates how the survival rate decreases over time as more firms 
transgress or a censored. The chance of not offending drops most steeply after the first 
year, before easing slightly up until six years, before easing further subsequent to that.  
 
Figure 4.1: Survival Function of Repeat Offending by Australian Firms 
 
 
 
4.4.2. Cox Proportional Hazard Model Results 
 
In addition to the life tables, adding predictor variables to determine covariates’ 
impact on the time until a re-offence occurs was also of interest. The Cox regression 
method was the most appropriate method for achieving this, since it handles censored 
cases and can provide estimated coefficients for all covariates included in the model. 
It was assumed that all observations were independent, and that the hazard ratio was 
proportionate across time. In Cox regression, the hazard function is used to estimate 
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the risk that a terminal event (in this case, re-offending) will occur. This is the 
potential for a re-offence to occur per time unit in a particular year, given that the firm 
has not re-offended up to that point. Predictor variables were then added to the model 
and expressed in terms of the hazard function (SPSS, 2006).   
 
Table 4.2: Parameter Estimates between Covariates and Time until Re-offence 
for Australian Firms 
 
Covariate Estimate Std. Error 
Number of Previous 
Transgressions  0.409** 0.124 
Public/Private 
-1.545** 0.342 
Industry (Manufacturer) Base Case    
Industry 
(Retail)  0.563 0.411 
Industry 
(Service)  0.515 0.363 
Industry 
(Importer) -0.186 0.495 
Type of Previous Sanction 
-0.083 0.288 
 
As seen in Table 4.2, the only two variables to reach significance were the number of 
previous offences and whether the firm was public or private. The hazard rate was 
significantly higher for public firms than private firms, suggesting that the chance of a 
public firm re-offending is greater than for private firms. Given that public firms tend 
to be larger this provides weak support for H7a. 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the difference in hazard rate between public and private firms: 
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Figure 4.2: Hazard Function for Public and Private Firms 
 
 
 
In addition, a positive relationship was found to exist between the number of previous 
offences that had been detected by regulatory agencies and the risk of re-offending. 
This suggests that firms with a higher number of previous convictions are more at risk 
of re-offending in a given year, which supports H7d. No relationship was found to 
exist between the type of sanction a firm had previously received and the risk of re-
offending. Interestingly, nor was any relationship found to exist between industry 
sector and the risk of re-offending, thus there is no support for H7b. This hypothesis is 
further investigated in the primary data analysis. 
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4.5. Discussion of Secondary Analysis Results 
 
The results indicate that only two variables, namely the number of previous 
transgressions detected by regulatory agencies and whether a firm is public or private, 
had an impact on the hazard rate. The relationship pertaining to the number of 
previous transgressions supports the findings of Baucus and Near (1991), who 
suggested that, in certain firms, a culture of transgression develops, causing repeated 
transgressions to occur (Baucus and Near, 1991). The danger for such firms is that, as 
the number of transgressions increases, such behaviour is seen as ‘the way things are 
done’ and becomes acceptable. To overcome such problems the issue of internal 
compliance in particular becomes important. This could perhaps be dealt with through 
the use some sort of compliance programme. However, as reported by Soutar et al 
(1994), unless management actively engages in attempts to change the company 
culture, such programmes will most likely not be effective. This might result in the 
occurrence of future transgressions. 
 
The relationship between hazard rate and whether a firm is publicly listed or not 
suggests that size of the firm may have an impact. Generally, Australian publicly 
listed companies are larger, more established firms. Such firms may be more likely to 
have developed a culture of transgression. As a result, as has been previously 
proposed and demonstrated in the literature (Cochran and Nigh, 1987; Dalton and 
Kesner, 1988; Baucus and Near, 1991; McKendall et al, 1999), these findings suggest 
that larger firms are more likely to transgress multiple times. The primary data 
analysis in Chapter 6 looks at this relationship in more depth. 
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Surprisingly, industry sector was found to have no has no influence on the hazard rate. 
This may simply be because the industry categories were too broad, meaning it is 
possible some specific industry differences were not apparent. This result may also 
support the findings of Laczniak and Inderrieden (1987) and Akaah and Riordan 
(1989), that transgressing marketing law transcends industry type. Lastly, it is 
interesting that the type of previous sanction was found to have no influence on the 
hazard rate. This suggests sanctions are not necessarily having the desired effect. 
Whether a firm is convicted by the courts or receives a warning does not appear to 
affect the rate of re-offending. This result suggests that current deterrence measures 
may not be effective. However, this analysis only looks at the differences between 
two relatively broad types of sanctions. The primary data phase of this research looks 
further at the role of deterrence, as well as at a wider range of potential sanctions. 
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a description of the methods used in the analysis of the 
secondary data. It has provided a background to the use of event history analysis, in 
particular, the use of hazard models to analyse repeat events over time. In addition, 
the particular hazard model used in this research (the Cox regression method) has 
been described along with a discussion of the impact of censored data. The variables 
used in the model (whether the firm was public or private, industry sector, and 
number of previous transgressions), were then outlined. The second part of this 
chapter described the results from the data analysis of rates of re-offending by 
Australian firms between 1993 and 2006. The results showed that, when a re-offence 
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does occur, it tends to be reasonably soon after the initial offence. In addition, the risk 
of a re-offence occurring is influenced both by whether a company is publicly listed 
or private, and by the number of detections of previous offences on the part of a firm. 
These results will be discussed further in Chapter 7. While the secondary data analysis 
helped test some hypotheses (H7a, H7b, and H7c), the main focus was on exploring 
the phenomenon of repeat transgression. Having established its existence, the next 
chapter describes the methodology used for the collection of primary data to test the 
hypotheses. 
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Chapter 5: Primary Research Methodology 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Having developed the research model in Chapter 3 and discussed the secondary data 
phase in the previous chapter, the purpose of this chapter is to outline the methods 
used to test, refine, and validate the model for the primary data collection phase. 
Some previous research, such as that by Baucus and Near (1991), has been based 
entirely on secondary data. There are three main reasons why such an approach was 
not utilised for this research. First, this thesis was focussed on a wide range of firms, 
including private firms that are not publicly-listed, for which secondary data were not 
readily available. Secondly, many of the organisation-level covariates, such as the 
extent and comprehensiveness of a compliance programme and perceptions of risk, 
could not be determined through the available secondary sources. Thirdly, secondary 
data can only be used for investigating previous transgressions; it cannot predict 
future behaviour. Therefore, consistent with the viewpoint advanced by McKendall 
and Wagner (1997), a combination of secondary and primary data were collected to 
obtain the required information.  
 
In line with the work of McKendall and Wagner (1997) and McKendall et al (2002), 
the primary data collection phase of this research was mostly cross-sectional, rather 
than longitudinal. A longitudinal approach is most effective when secondary data 
across time is readily available (i.e. Baucus and Near, 1991), but, as discussed above, 
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such data was not available for this research.  As a result, a cross-sectional survey was 
deemed appropriate.  
 
In this chapter, a brief overview of the data collection methods and sample sets used 
for the different components of the model are first provided, followed by a description 
of how the survey was administered. The measurement model is then introduced, with 
a detailed description of how the variables in the model were measured. Next the 
questionnaire design and the data collection procedures are outlined. Lastly, a 
response analysis from both the pre-test and main survey is provided. 
  
 
5.2. Overview and Target Population 
 
The primary data collection phase could be divided into three main components: 1) 
previous transgressions, 2) the consequences of the detection of previous 
transgressions, and 3) the likelihood of engaging in future transgressions of marketing 
law. 
 
5.2.1. Previous Transgressions and Consequences 
 
As per Baucus and Near (1991), firms were divided into two groups: those deemed to 
have previously transgressed marketing law and those deemed to have not. As a 
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1) The head of marketing in firms that had been caught by the ACCC for 
transgressing Part four (anti-competitive) and/or Part five (misleading 
advertising/ product quality) of the Australian Trade Practices Act (1974), as 
determined by enforcement publications, between 1993 and 2006.  
 
2) The head of marketing in firms that had not been caught by the ACCC for 
transgressing the laws described above, as determined by enforcement 
publications, between 1993 and 2006. 
 
A key word is ‘caught’, since it could not be determined whether a firm had actually 
transgressed if the transgression had not been detected. 
 
Because the focus of this research was marketing-related law, it was deemed 
important that the respondent should be the person who makes marketing decisions 
for the firm. In most cases this was the marketing manager or, in some cases, the sales 
manager. However, this research also involved surveying many smaller firms that did 
not have a dedicated marketing manager, in these cases, the research was directed at 
the person responsible for the marketing function. 
 
The Kriesberg (1976) rational actor model formed the basis of measurement. Under 
this rational actor model, illegal behaviour is treated as if it was made by one single 
entity – the firm. Therefore, “…the entity itself is the decision-maker, the decision- 
making process is activated by corporate problems, framed by corporate alternatives, 
and guided by corporate values” (Kriesberg, 1976, p. 1101). While it was recognised 
that individuals exist, they were combined into a unitary decision-making process. 
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Therefore, while individual managers responded to the questions in the survey, they 
were deemed to be operating and responding on behalf of the firm, rather than 
themselves. 
 
Each group received an identical survey instrument and were asked questions that 
determined the organisational and environmental characteristics of their firm and 
industry. By looking at the differences between the two groups, it was possible to 
determine which variables influenced previous detected transgressions. In addition, 
because this research viewed the phenomenon of interest to be a dynamic process, it 
built on the existing literature by using the data collected in this phase to determine 
how firms’ behaviour changed subsequent to a transgression being detected by 
regulatory agencies. However, there are some limitations with this method. Most 
importantly, there is the issue of time-ordering of the dependent and independent 
variables, as noted by McKendall and Wagner (1997). Thus, the data collected in this 
phase were also used to investigate potential future behaviour. 
 
5.2.2. Future Behaviour 
 
To further test the dynamic nature of the model, data were also collected on potential 
future transgressions of the Trade Practices Act (1974). The collection of data for this 
aspect of the model was based on research conducted in the field of business ethics 
(Weber and Gillespie, 1998). Both target populations outlined in the previous section 
(those previously caught transgressing marketing law and those who had not) were 
exposed to legal and illegal scenarios and asked to rate the likelihood that their 
competitors would consider engaging in the described activities, depending upon 
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various combinations of risk, reward, and likely penalties (external control variables). 
Future behaviour was also linked with motive, opportunity, control, and knowledge 
variables. In order to measure knowledge, respondents were asked to assess the 
legality of a range of legal marketing scenarios, in addition to those provided to 
measure future behaviour, based on Peterson (2001a).  
 
A future behaviour elicitation approach has the advantage of overcoming the 
problems associated with simply measuring previous transgressions outlined above; 
issues of time-ordering do not influence the data, since both the independent and 
dependent variables are measured at the same time. This method is not without its 
own limitations, however, as it only measures intent and not actual behaviour (Weber 
and Gillespie, 1998).  There are also issues of social desirability bias, whereby people 
may attempt to appear “more altruistic and society-oriented than they actually are” 
(Chung and Monroe, 2003, p. 291). These issues are discussed in more detail later in 
the chapter. 
 
 
5.3. Sample Selection 
 
This section describes how the samples from each target population were derived. 
 
5.3.1. Previous Transgressors 
 
Court reports provided details of all cases that have come before the judiciary for 
breaches Parts four and five of the Trade Practices Act (1974). Based on these records, 
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all firms that had been convicted by the courts between 1993 and 2006 were included 
in the sample. A court case is, however, only one form of redress available to 
regulatory agencies. Many firms are not taken to court but instead required to provide 
a written undertaking to cease the behaviour, and/or provide reparation. McKendall 
and Wagner (1997) have noted that a limitation of previous research is that it has 
generally only included court cases.  Accordingly, this thesis also drew primary data 
from the ACCC, which publishes a list of all firms that have provided an undertaking 
during a particular year. This data was readily available from 1993 until 2006 (ACCC, 
2007). All firms included in this database were included in the sample.  Firms that had 
gone out of business or experienced a change of ownership were removed from the 
dataset, resulting in a sample of 234 firms.  
 
5.3.2. Non-previous Transgressors 
 
Another 800 firms across all states, firm sizes, and industry sectors derived from the 
REACH Australian Business Database were also included in the sample. These firms 
had not been sanctioned by the ACCC or the courts for breaches of the Trade 
Practices Act (1974) between 1993 and 2006. The REACH database was selected 
since it contained a wide range of names and addresses of marketing managers from a 
variety of firm types across Australia. A stratified sampling procedure was used to 
ensure a representative sample of 800 firms across all states, relative to the population 
size. This number was chosen in order to get the total sample size close to 1000. No 
restrictions were placed on firm size or industry sector to ensure responses were 
received from a wide variety of firms. Any firm on that list that also appeared on the 
list of firms caught transgressing between 1993 and 2006 was removed.  
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5.4. Method of Administration 
 
As outlined in the previous section, the sample included a range of firms from a wide 
geographic area. The cost and time that would be required for personal (face to face) 
or telephone interviews of such a large number of respondents put these methods 
beyond the realms of this study.  Therefore, a mail survey was deemed the best means, 
since a great deal of information can be collected from widely scattered populations at 
low cost (Jobber and O’Reilly, 1996). This technique also allows the respondent to 
complete the instrument on his or her own time, and not feel pressured (Jobber and 
O’Reilly, 1996). Given that this research dealt with an area that could be described as 
sensitive (i.e. illegal behaviour), it was deemed important that the survey be 
conducted anonymously (Aaker et al, 2007), which, ruled out the use of an email or 
online survey, since that can be used to identify respondents.  It was hoped that the 
anonymity that a mail survey provides would not only encourage response, but also 
reduce the bias in response. Poorly conducted mail surveys are often characterised by 
low response rates. This can limit the range of analytical techniques that can be used, 
and also result in non-response bias (Jobber and O’Reilly, 1996), which occurs when 
those who do respond differ in some way from those who do not. If a mail survey is 
conducted well, however, response rates of 60% can be obtained (Gendall, 2000; Finn 
et al, 2004; Gendall, 2005).  In order to overcome issues associated with response 
rates, various methods, in addition to maintaining anonymity, were employed, as 
discussed later in this chapter. Having discussed issues of sampling, the next section 
will outline variable measurement. 
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5.5. Measurement of the Variables 
 
In this section, the measurement model is introduced, with an explanation of how it 
differs from the conceptual model introduced in Chapter 3. This is followed by a 
detailed description of how the variables in the model were measured. 
 
5.5.1. Measurement Overview 
 
Figure 5.1 provides the measurement model, which differs slightly from the 
conceptual model introduced in Chapter 3. This is either due to the inability to 
measure and test certain variables in the conceptual model, or the way that certain 
variables were measured: 
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Figure 5.1: Measurement Model 
 
 
 
The conceptual model represented the overall transgression process, whilst the 
measurement model excludes the aspects of the conceptual model that could not be 
measured. The dependent variable ‘previous transgression of marketing law’ in the 
conceptual model is labelled ‘caught transgressing marketing law’ in the measurement 
model, due to the fact that researchers can only identify transgressions that have been 
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detected and reported by regulatory agencies. The inability to measure transgressions 
that occur, but are not detected by regulatory agencies, also means that the right hand 
side of the conceptual model (see Figure 3.10) is not included in the measurement 
model. In addition, the dependent variable ‘future transgression’ is labelled as 
‘behavioural intent’ in the measurement model, since the measure of future behaviour 
used only reflects intent to engage in a certain behaviour and not actual behaviour. 
This is further described in the next section. 
 
The knowledge variable is not included in the measurement model as an antecedent of 
a previously detected transgression of marketing law. This is because it is considered 
to be subject to time-ordering effects. A firm’s current level of knowledge may differ 
from what it was prior to a transgression, since experiences associated with having 
previously been caught transgressing may lead to increased legal knowledge. The 
conceptual model recognises that knowledge may affect past transgressions; however, 
measurement issues mean it was not possible to determine whether this effect occurs. 
 
The remainder of this section describes how the variables used in the model were 
measured. Table 5.1 summarises the variables included in the model (for more 
specific measurement details, see Appendix 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 142 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Variables Included in the Model 
 
Type Label Description 
Dependent 
Variables Caught Transgressing 
Whether a firm has previously been 
caught transgressing marketing law 
  Behavioural Intent 
Likelihood of engaging in potentially illegal  
future marketing behaviour 
Design Small Fine Existence of a small fine 
Variables Large Fine Existence of a large fine 
  Publicity Potential for adverse publicity 
  Reward Potential rewards  
Covariates Profitability Profits in relation to competitors 
  Market-share Market-share in relation to competitors 
  Level of Competition level of industry competition 
  
Number of 
Competitors Number of (direct) competitors within an industry 
  Size Firm size (number of fulltime employees) 
  Industry Sector Industry sector 
  
Industry 
Transgression 
Perceived level of transgression by other 
 firms in the industry 
  
Risk of Detection 
(ACCC) 
Perceived likelihood a transgression will be 
detected by  
the ACCC 
  
Risk of Detection 
(Competitor) 
Perceived likelihood a competitor will report a 
transgression 
  Compliance 
Existence and comprehensiveness of a  
compliance programme 
  Knowledge Knowledge of marketing law 
 
 
5.5.2. Measurement of the Dependent Variables 
 
This research was concerned with the factors that influenced an initial transgression of 
marketing law, and those that might lead to intent to engage in future illegal 
marketing behaviour. Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, the two main dependent 
variables of interest were 1) Whether the firm had been caught transgressing 
marketing law by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) in 
the past, and 2) intent to engage in future illegal marketing behaviour. There were 
other secondary dependent variables such as perceived risk of detection, compliance 
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programme, and knowledge; however, as these variables were both mediating and 
independent variables, they will be described in the corresponding section. 
 
a) Previous Transgressions of Marketing Law 
 
As with previous research into corporate illegality, the measure of previous 
transgression only reflects transgressions that have been detected and reported by 
regulatory agencies; therefore, the variable is referred to as caught transgressing 
marketing law. It could be expected that a number of transgressions occurred that 
remained undetected by regulatory agencies. Clinard and Yeager (1980) suggested 
that this could cause the number of transgressions to be understated by between 25% 
and 33%. Clinard and Yeager (1980) posited that no evidence existed to suggest that 
those transgressions not detected in any way differ from those that had.  
 
It was also recognised in this research that firms deemed not to have been caught 
transgressing marketing law may have transgressed at some point prior to 1993 (when 
the data set commenced). The fact that a firm has not been caught transgressing 
marketing law within the last 13 years suggests that the firm can effectively be classed 
as a non-transgressor. It was assumed that, because the conditions and culture existing 
at the time of any earlier transgression would likely have changed, events associated 
with that transgression will have been forgotten. 
 
As discussed previously, consistent with Baucus and Near (1991), potential 
respondents were divided into two groups: those firms that had been caught 
transgressing marketing law and those firms that had not. A firm that appeared in 
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court records, or that had provided a written undertaking, for having breached Parts 
four or five of the Trade Practices Act (1974), between 1993 and 2006 was deemed to 
have been caught transgressing marketing law. Having previously been caught 
transgressing marketing law was therefore treated as a dichotomous variable. Firms 
had either been caught transgressing marketing law within the time period of interest, 
or had not. However, while the variable was dichotomous, there was an expectation 
that the underlying construct being studied was continuous (this will be discussed 
further in Chapter 6).  
 
b) Future Behaviour (Behavioural Intent) 
 
In order to test a dynamic model, in addition to determining whether a firm had 
previously been caught transgressing marketing law, it was also necessary to measure 
intent to engage in future illegal marketing behaviour.  
 
It is very difficult to observe or measure the actual decisions or actions that lead to 
ethical conflicts. This is an issue that has long influenced business ethics research. 
Measuring future behaviour is, in effect, measuring intention to behave in a particular 
manner. As a result, intent has been extensively used in ethics research (Weber and 
Gillespie, 1998). According to the theory of planned behaviour, there are three 
relevant variables: belief, intention, and behaviour. Intent is considered to be the 
“immediate determinant of behaviour” (Weber and Gillespie, 1998, p. 449). Intent 
has not always been found to be a constant predictor of behaviour (Sutton, 1998; 
Armitage and Conner, 2001). Ajzen (1988), however, has shown that a strong link 
exists between intention and action, while Hunt and Vitell (1986) and Sparks and 
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Hunt (1998) believe that intention is a good predictor of actual ethical behaviour.  
Therefore, the stronger the intent to engage in a particular action, the greater the 
likelihood the behaviour will occur (Weber and Gillespie, 1998). Despite these mixed 
findings, this research followed the approach of previous ethical studies (e.g. Sparks 
and Hunt, 1998; Weber and Gillespie, 1998; Cohen et al, 2001; Chung and Monroe, 
2003) in assuming that intent is an appropriate predictor of behaviour. 
 
The sensitivity inherent in questions regarding legal and moral behaviour can 
complicate such research (Trevino, 1986). Thus, in most cases, such data has been 
gathered through the use of self-report questionnaires (Morris et al, 1995). 
Researchers have tended to provide respondents with scenarios that represent various 
ethical and legal dilemmas (Baumhart, 1961; Fritzsche and Becker, 1983; Morris et al, 
1995). Scenarios have previously been successfully utilised in research investigating 
ethical behaviour by firms (e.g. Chonko and Hunt, 1985; Singhapakdi and Vitell, 
1991; Singhapakdi and Vitell, 1992; Sparks and Hunt, 1998), and were also adopted 
in this research to measure the potential for illegal future behaviour. The advantage of 
this approach is that scenarios provide a context and a common frame of reference 
that is the same for all respondents when responding to survey items (Dubinsky et al, 
1992; Kohut and Corriher, 1994). Questions relating to a situation elicit responses that 
closely resemble how a respondent would utilise their knowledge in a real life 
situation (Dickinson and Shaver, 1982). Hunt and Vitell (1986) suggested that 
behavioural intentions can be measured by asking the respondent to express the 
likelihood of performing the described behaviours. The ability to measure potential 
future behaviour is one of the major advantages of using a survey instrument with 
scenarios. 
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Examples of previous scenarios used in the literature were not appropriate since they 
did not specifically apply to the Trade Practices Act (1974). As a result, it was 
necessary to develop them de novo. This was accomplished with the assistance of 
information from the ACCC. Respondents were provided with four scenarios: two 
were legal and the other two were illegal (See Appendix 2). One legal and one illegal 
scenario related to Part four (anti-competitive provisions) of the Trade Practices Act 
(1974), while the other legal and illegal scenarios related to Part five (misleading 
advertising and product quality) of the Trade Practices Act (1974). In terms of Part 
four, the first scenario dealt with price-fixing and the other with copycat pricing 
behaviour.  In terms of Part five, the first scenario dealt with the use of fine print in 
promotions and the other with the use of puffery.  
 
Respondents were first asked to rate their perception of the legality of the scenario on 
a five point scale anchored by ‘obviously legal’ and ‘obviously illegal’, as per 
Peterson (2001a). This forced respondents to make a judgement regarding potential 
firm behaviour, based on their knowledge of the law and how confident they were in 
that assessment. This measurement was important since firm behaviour should depend 
on the perception of legality, regardless of whether it is right or wrong. Additionally, 
this allowed for the impact of unintentional and intentional behaviour to be separated 
out. For example, a respondent who knows a scenario is illegal, and intends to engage 
in that behaviour, can be deemed to be intending to breach the law, whereas a 
respondent who believes an illegal scenario is legal, and intends to engage in that 
behaviour, can be deemed to be likely to transgress the law unintentionally. What was 
being measured was intent to engage in a certain marketing behaviour, based on 
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respondents’ assessment of the legality of the scenario. Therefore the variable was 
labelled behavioural intent. 
 
Behavioural intent was measured using the widely used approach in business ethics of 
asking respondents to rate the likelihood that they (or in this case ‘their competitors’) 
would engage in the behaviour described in the scenario on a seven point scale 
(Cohen et al, 1993; Cohen et al, 2001; Chung and Monroe, 2003). A third-person or 
‘other people’ approach was used, since sensitive information was being elicited 
(Aaker et al, 2007). This is a projective technique whereby respondents are asked to 
respond based on their perspectives of how another person or group of people might 
act. Under projection theory, when the target is projected to a ‘typical other’, 
responses tend to reflect self behaviour: “It is expected that respondents project their 
unconscious biases into ambiguous response situations and reveal their own 
attitudes” (Fisher, 1993, p. 304). Respondents were, therefore, asked about the 
likelihood that ‘their competitors’ would engage in the action in the hope this would 
provide a more realistic response about the likelihood that a firm would engage in 
such behaviour itself. Third-person techniques were also utilised to reduce the 
occurrence of social desirability bias (discussed in the next section). For each scenario, 
behavioural intent was measured for different combinations of potential rewards, fines, 
and publicity.  
 
c) Social Desirability Bias 
 
The potential existence of social desirability bias considered to be prevalent in self-
reporting survey research was also recognised (Cohen et al, 1993). Social desirability 
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bias is the “…tendency of individuals to underestimate the likelihood they would 
perform socially undesirable actions and to admit to socially desirable ones” (Chung 
and Monroe, 2003, p. 291). In effect, this bias can be measured as the difference 
between how individuals intend to behave and their perception of how others would 
behave in the same situation. Previous research (e.g. Randall and Fernandes, 1991; 
Chung and Monroe, 2003) has shown that individuals tend to believe they are more 
ethical than their peers. This is because individuals want to appear more altruistic and 
honest than they actually are (Chung and Monroe, 2003). Ensuring confidentiality or 
anonymity is considered one of the best ways of reducing the likelihood of social 
desirability bias (Randall and Fernandes, 1991; Chung and Monroe, 2003). This 
research was totally anonymous, which was clearly explained to potential respondents, 
along with assurances that none of the findings could be linked back to them in any 
way. However, Randall and Fernandes (1991) found that such steps do not completely 
eliminate the occurrence of social desirability bias, whereas third- person techniques 
have been successfully used (Fisher, 1993). This is another reason why a third person 
approach was used to measure behavioural intent. However, as this still may not be 
entirely effective, it was important that the existence of such bias be measured (Jo, 
2000). 
 
Despite the fact that self-report data has been used in 90% of empirical journal articles 
in ethics, only one of the 96 articles published between 1960 and 1991 attempted to 
measure the bias. Chung and Monroe (2003) suggested that research should attempt to 
measure the existence of any social desirability bias. In order to test for this, in 
addition to rating their competitor’s likely behaviour, half the respondents were asked 
to rate the likelihood that they would also engage in the same behaviour (Cohen et al, 
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1993; 2001; Chung and Monroe, 2003). This allowed for the variance in behavioural 
intent, due to social desirability bias, to be taken into account when the analysis was 
conducted. It is possible that the difference between competitor and own firm 
behaviour may reflect differences due to reasons other than social desirability. For 
example, it may be that competitors are actually more inclined to engage in illegal 
behaviour, or that firms genuinely believe their competitors are more likely to 
transgress. Regardless of the reason, however, the error was still accounted for in this 
analysis. 
 
5.5.3. Measurement of the Independent Variables 
 
Having discussed the measurement of the dependent variables, in this section the 
measurement of the independent variables is outlined, starting with those variables 
manipulated in the vignettes, followed by the other antecedent conditions tested. 
 
a) Manipulated Variables 
 
For each of the scenarios, pertaining to the influence of control variables on future 
behaviour, described in Section 5.5.2, respondents were presented with a series of 
vignettes using six different combinations of the size of fine, potential publicity, and 
potential rewards that could result from getting caught transgressing marketing law. 
The purpose of this approach was to determine the impact that the deterrence control 
variables of punishment and reward have on future illegal marketing behaviour. As is 
seen in Table 5.2, this was an orthogonal rather than a perfect design, meaning that 
some data was lost. This was deemed necessary in order to simplify the questionnaire, 
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since a perfect design would have made the survey too long and too complicated, 
which may have adversely impacted response rates and data quality (Karren and 
Woodard-Barringer, 2002). 
 
Table 5.2: Combinations of Fine, Reward, and Publicity 
 
Vignette Fine Reward Publicity 
1 Low Low   
2 High High   
3 High Low   
4 Low High   
5 None Low Adverse 
6 None High None 
 
Two major types of negative outcomes that might result from a transgression being 
detected and punished are the imposition of a fine and the generation of negative 
publicity (Petty, 2000). The two potential fine sizes provided were: low = $50,000 
and high = $100,000 for the scenarios pertaining Part four of the Trade Practices Act 
(1974) (anti-competitive conduct) and low = $5,000 and high = $20,000 for the 
scenarios pertaining to Part five of the Trade Practices Act (1974) (misleading 
advertising).  These figures were based on Australian court data regarding the size of 
fines levied over a period of 10 years, in combination with expert opinion. The 
options also recognised the difference in severity between breaches of Part four and 
Part five, since fines are generally higher for a breach of anti-competitive provisions. 
The two types of publicity provided to respondents were ‘adverse publicity’ and ‘no 
publicity’.  
 
In order to gather a relative measure of the rewards that could result from a particular 
activity, an increase in annual revenue of a certain percentage was used. The types of 
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rewards provided to respondents were low = 2% of annual revenue and high = 15% of 
annual revenue. A percentage was used to indicate reward to allow for the fact that 
dollar amounts might have differing impacts on different firms. For example, a 
$10,000 reward would most likely have limited impact on a large multinational 
corporation yet might be seen as a sizeable benefit by a small firm. Respondents were 
asked to rate the likelihood that they would engage in a particular action for various 
combinations of the above. 
 
b) Other Antecedent Conditions 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, information was also gathered on the existence of 
conditions of motive, opportunity, and control within the firm and its industry. These 
variables were performance (profitability and market-share), competition (level and 
number), firm size, industry sector, perceptions of incidents of industry transgression, 
perceptions of the risk of detection, the existence and comprehensiveness of a 
compliance programme, and knowledge of marketing law.  
 
Firm performance was measured by asking respondents to state profitability and 
market-share in relationship to their main competitors. As with Morris et al (1995), a 
relative measure of profitability was chosen since an actual amount could mean 
different things to different firms. For example, a $1,000,000 profit might be 
considered sizeable for a small firm but small for a large multinational corporation. It 
was expected that intent to engage in illegal future behaviour would depend on 
performance relative to what the individual firm would consider to be a good or bad 
result, meaning actual performance figures would not provide a valid comparison. 
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Respondents were asked to rate both profitability and market-share on a five point 
scale, anchored by ‘much more than my competitors’ and ‘much less than my 
competitors’. Pre-testing suggested that some (mainly smaller) firms were largely 
unaware of their performance relative to their competitors. To prevent guessing, and 
potentially biasing the results, a ‘don’t know’ option was also provided (Aaker et al, 
2007).  
 
Two measures of competition were used. One measured a firm’s number of direct 
competitors and the other measured the perceived level of competition within the 
industry. The number of competitors is a more objective measure, and respondents 
were provided with six categories from which to choose. However, the number of 
competitors does not necessarily indicate the level of competition since some markets 
with only a few competitors might be highly competitive whereas other markets with 
more competitors may not strongly compete or are considered to be weak competitors 
(Szwajkowski, 1985). As a result, the perceived level of competition was also 
measured; this is a more subjective measure since it depends on the respondent’s 
opinion. As with profitability and market-share, it was believed that respondents 
would make decisions based on their perceptions of the competitiveness of their 
industry. The level of competition was rated on a five point scale anchored by 
‘extremely competitive’ and ‘extremely uncompetitive’. 
 
As a measure of firm size, respondents were asked to state the number of employees 
(full time equivalent) working for their firm within Australia. Number of employees 
was chosen over other measures such as sales and assets since it is the measure most 
commonly used in organisational studies (Baucus and Near, 1991). Firms were 
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provided with grouped categories from which to choose, in case they were not aware 
of the exact number of employees in their firm. These were 1 to 5, 6 to 20, 21 to 50, 
51 to 100, 101 to 500, and 501 plus.  In order to measure industry sector, firms were 
provided with seven industry classifications from which to choose: retailer, 
manufacturer, construction, transport operator, service provider, importer/wholesaler, 
and other. To measure perceptions of incidents of industry transgression, respondents 
were asked to rate their perceived likelihood that firms within their industry would 
transgress marketing law. This was recorded on a five point scale anchored by ‘highly 
likely’ and ‘highly unlikely’. 
 
Based on Cole (1989), the perceived risk of detection was measured by the extent to 
which the respondent believed that a transgression committed by a firm in their 
industry would be detected by the ACCC or reported by another competitor. A five 
point scale anchored by ‘highly likely’ and ‘highly unlikely’ was used. The 
measurement of the extent to which a firm uses a compliance programme was based 
on a scale developed by Wells (1995). Respondents were asked to rate the extent to 
which employees are not only educated and trained in aspects of marketing law but 
also follow pre-specified procedures when conducting promotional and pricing 
activities. For each of these items, respondents were asked to rate how likely they 
would be to use different components of a compliance programme on a five point 
scale anchored by ‘extremely likely’ and ‘extremely unlikely’.  
 
The measurement of knowledge was based on scales developed by Peterson (2001a), 
whereby respondents were provided with a legal scenario and asked to rate the 
legality of that scenario on a five point scale anchored by ‘highly illegal’ and ‘highly 
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legal’. The number of correct responses was then totalled to generate a ‘knowledge 
score’. (See Appendix 2 for an example of the instrument that formed the basis of this 
survey). 
 
 
5.6. Questionnaire Design 
 
This section describes the wording and layout of the survey instrument used to collect 
the information described in the previous section. 
 
5.6.1. Wording and Order of Questions 
 
Vocabulary that was simple, direct, and could be easily understood by all respondents 
was used in the questionnaire (Malhotra, 1999). The instructions were clearly outlined 
at the beginning of each section and whenever the manner for answering questions 
changed. The questions were also kept as short as possible, without making them too 
ambiguous, in order to ensure the respondent completed the questionnaire. 
 
Both Malhotra (1999) and Aaker et al (2004) suggest that the first questions are 
“crucial in gaining the confidence and co-operation of the respondents” (Malhotra, 
1999, p. 309). These questions should be “simple, interesting and non-threatening” 
(Malhotra, 1999, p. 309). Thus, the first section of the survey contained the questions 
about respondents’ perceptions of the legislation, the extent to which they consulted 
lawyers, and the compliance procedures they had in place. These questions were 
considered less sensitive and more straightforward to answer. From here, the natural 
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progression was to test respondents’ actual knowledge of marketing law. It was 
decided to separate Parts four and five of the Trade Practices Act (1974) into separate 
sections, so respondents were focussing on only one aspect of the Trade Practices Act 
(1974) at a time. Because of the more sensitive nature of these questions, the 
scenarios and vignettes regarding potential future behaviour were placed at the end of 
the section of the relevant part of act. Questions regarding firm and industry 
characteristics were posed in the final section, since these questions are generally 
considered to be more sensitive. This way, respondents were less likely to be 
alienated, since they were involved in the project at that point and had developed trust 
and confidence in the study (Malhotra, 1999; Aaker et al, 2004). 
  
5.6.2. Layout 
 
The questionnaire was presented in double sided A5 booklet form. Not only did this 
approach give the instrument a professional look, it was intended to give the 
impression the survey was shorter than it actually was. Results from previous research 
on the influence of questionnaire length on response rates have been mixed; however, 
Heberlein and Baumgartner (1978), Yu and Cooper (1983), and Yammarino et al 
(1991) all found that shorter length can increase response rates. Based on these 
findings, and given that business respondents are likely to be time-sensitive, every 
effort was made to keep the task as short as possible. The final length was 15 pages. 
Size 12 font was used for the questions and size 8.5 font was used for the response 
options. These font sizes were chosen both for their compactness and readability. 
Readability is important, since the advantages of brevity can be lost if the survey is 
difficult to read. The questionnaire was divided into four sections and questions were 
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numbered. Instructions were made clear and concise and included at the beginning of 
each section or wherever a change in answering method was required. The majority of 
answers required a simple circle or a tick. A cover letter was provided, giving a brief 
outline of the research in a way designed to ensure respondents understood the 
purpose of the survey and the methods used to ensure the anonymity of responses. 
The names of the researchers and their affiliation (Victoria University of Wellington) 
were also provided. The cover page included the Victoria University logo to attest to 
the legitimacy of the project (see Appendix 2). 
 
 
5.7. Ethical Approval 
 
Approval for this research was obtained from the Victoria University Human Ethics 
Committee. Anonymity meant that participants’ consent could not be obtained as it 
could lead to the identification of respondents. It was assumed that, by returning the 
survey, respondents consented to participate. As part of the cover letter respondents 
were informed as to the purpose of the research, the anonymity of responses, and the 
usage of data (See Appendix 2). 
 
 
5.8. Data Collection Procedures 
 
As mentioned previously, 234 surveys were sent to those firms that had been caught 
transgressing marketing law, while 800 surveys were sent to those that had not been 
caught, resulting in a total of 1,034 surveys being distributed. The survey instrument 
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was slightly different for each of these groups, in order for the researcher to recognise 
the difference, whilst preserving anonymity. Additionally, half the respondents were 
randomly assigned a survey that asked them to rate the likely behaviour of theirs as 
well as their competitor’s firm, while the other half received a survey that asked them 
to rate only their competitor’s behaviour. This was done in order to determine whether 
social desirability bias was an issue. 
 
To ensure statistically valid results, it is important that a good response rate be 
attained. Although mail surveys can have low returns, a response rate of 60% or more 
can be achieved (Gendall, 2000; Dennis, 2003; Finn et al, 2004; Gendall, 2005). The 
problem is that response rates are hard to predict (Aaker et al, 2004). There is also 
evidence that the response rates of small business owners are ‘notoriously low’ 
(Dennis, 2003), a particular issue given the importance of the responses of small 
businesses to this research. Dillman (1978) in his ‘total design method’ proposed a 
range of techniques, which have been trialled by other researchers, together with other 
aspects of mail surveys, in order to increase response rates. Such techniques include 
telephone notification, follow-up notices, questionnaire design, questionnaire length, 
and various forms of monetary and non-monetary incentives (Dillman, 1978; Yu and 
Cooper, 1983; Cavusgil and Elvey-Kirk, 1998; Gendall, 2000; Finn et al, 2004; 
Gendall, 2005). The results have been mixed, with some studies finding that certain 
methods work, while other studies find that they do not. One problem faced with the 
use of these techniques is the increased cost, which can negate the main benefit of 
using a mail survey in the first place (Cavusgil and Elvey-Kirk, 1998). Given the 
budgetary constraints of this research, and the added expense associated with 
conducting an international survey, it was not possible to use all the techniques 
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suggested by Dillman and others. However, various techniques for enhancing the 
response rate were still utilised in order to obtain as high a response rate as possible 
given the budgetary constraints, as discussed below. 
 
5.8.1. Anonymity 
 
Given that the subject matter could be described as sensitive, it was important that the 
research be entirely anonymous (Aaker et al, 2007). As noted previously, anonymity 
is also a means of reducing the likelihood of non-response bias. The problem with 
anonymity is that it significantly adds to the research cost, since reminders have to be 
sent out to all respondents, even if they have already answered the survey. This is 
because anonymity means the researcher is not aware of who has responded. Despite 
this problem, given the relatively sensitive subject matter, providing complete 
anonymity was deemed essential for this survey. To ensure respondents were aware 
that the survey was anonymous, it was noted in italics on the cover letter and 
underlined in bold at the top of the survey instrument. 
 
5.8.2. Incentives 
 
Monetary incentives are generally considered to be more effective than non-monetary 
incentives (Yu and Cooper, 1983; Yammarino et al, 1991; Jobber and O’Reilly, 1996), 
however, the use of non-monetary incentives has also been a popular means of 
attempting to increase response rates (Jobber and O’Reilly, 1996). Jobber and 
O’Reilly (1996) found that, for example, giving respondents a ballpoint pen increased 
response rates by 12 percentage points. Logistical and legal issues meant that it was 
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not possible to provide a monetary incentive, so respondents in this study were also 
provided with a ballpoint pen. Furthermore, respondents were given the opportunity 
to receive a summary of the completed study. In order to preserve anonymity, 
respondents were requested to e-mail the researcher separately in order to receive a 
copy of the results. 
 
5.8.3. Follow Ups 
 
Numerous studies, including Yu and Cooper (1983), Fox et al (1988), and 
Yammarino et al (1991), have found that sending reminder notices has a significant 
positive effect on response rates, particularly with institutional respondents 
(Yammarino et al, 1991). Based on this evidence, reminder postcards were sent to all 
firms that received the survey instrument. Because the survey was anonymous, the 
postcards had to be sent to all who received the initial survey, including those who 
had already completed it. To minimise annoyance, the card was also worded as a 
thank you note to those who had already responded (see Appendix 3 for an example). 
The cost of having to send out reminders internationally to every respondent meant 
that a second reminder (or third mail-out), which included a new questionnaire, could 
not be sent. 
 
5.8.4. Personalisation 
 
Since the database used for the firms that had not been caught transgressing marketing 
law included the name of the marketing manager, in these instances the cover letter 
was personally addressed. For the firms that had been caught transgressing marketing 
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law, an attempt was made to determine the name of the marketing manager from 
secondary data sources. Where a name could not be determined or there was no 
specialised marketing manager, the letter was addressed to the person responsible for 
the marketing function. 
 
5.8.5. Other Methods 
 
The cover letter attempted to appeal to each respondent’s conscience by emphasising 
that this was student research, and that their answers were considered important 
(Cavusgil and Elvey-Kirk, 1998). Additionally, a business reply envelope was 
included with all questionnaires.  
 
 
5.9. Pre-Testing 
 
Pre-testing is considered an important stage in the instrument development process 
(Hunt et al, 1982), and involves the use of a small pilot study to determine the 
effectiveness of the survey instrument. A pre-test helps determine whether the 
researcher’s expectations will be met in terms of the data collection process and the 
information gathered. The pre-test allows any deficiencies, such as poorly worded, 
loaded or double barrelled questions, to be corrected (Aaker et al, 2004). It has been 
suggested that the pre-test process should start with personal interviews, followed by 
a pilot study utilising the intended means of administration (Hunt et al, 1982). 
Therefore, a thorough pre-test of the research instrument was conducted on a small 
sample of the target population prior to it being distributed to the final sample.  
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5.9.1. Interviews 
 
The instrument was first reviewed by someone considered knowledgeable in survey 
design, who identified issues such as poor wording, the existence of double barrelled 
questions, and inadequate instructions. The survey was also reviewed by people 
knowledgeable about the Trade Practices Act (1974). These people were asked to 
identify any factual errors in the questions or available responses and to identify any 
other issues that might have been missed. This process resulted in some minor 
adjustments to the survey instrument, such as rewording questions and clarifying 
instructions.  
 
The next stage of the pre-test involved conducting interviews with managers from 
four organisations that represented the target population. Since it was expected that 
different types of firms would have unique issues, these interviews were conducted 
with managers from a large firm, two small firms, and a non-profit organisation. The 
‘debriefing approach’ was used whereby the participants were asked about their 
impressions after they had undertaken the survey (Hunt et al, 1982). Pre-test 
participants were provided with the questionnaire and allowed to look through it in 
their own time, so they would not feel pressured by having someone watch over them 
as they answered questions that could be seen as sensitive. The participants were first 
briefed on what they should look out for (i.e. areas of confusion, misleading 
questions, inadequate response options, questions they would be uncomfortable 
answering). Since a problem with this approach is that issues encountered early in the 
session can be forgotten, respondents were asked to note down any issues as they 
occurred. The researcher then discussed any problems or comments the interviewee 
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had, as well as gaining other impressions regarding the questionnaire length and how 
likely they would be to respond. Each session lasted approximately 30 minutes. This 
process again resulted in some minor adjustments to the questionnaire, mainly 
rewording questions and answer options, and further clarification of instructions. 
 
5.9.2. Mail Pre-Test 
 
Having conducted the interviews, the next phase of the pre-test was to send the survey 
to a small selection from the overall sample. The main purpose of the mail pre-test 
was to test the administration method, gain an impression of likely response rates, and 
determine whether the required information was being obtained. Hunt et al (1982) 
suggested that response rates achieved in the pre-test are indicative of those that will 
be achieved in the main survey. It was important that the pre-test sample did not use 
up a significant share of the main target population. As a result, the sample was 
limited to 80 firms, 20 that had previously been caught transgressing the Trade 
Practices Act (1974) and 60 that had not. These firms were randomly selected from 
each Australian state (relative to size) from the respective databases. The pre-test was 
conducted as if it was the main survey. A reminder card was sent out two weeks after 
the initial contact. The results of the pre-test led to some minor changes to the 
instrument, which are outlined below.  
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5.10. Pre-Test: Response Analysis 
 
The formula used to calculate the response rate was: 
 
Number of usable responses received/total sent – (non-contacts - dummy addresses - 
ineligible). 
 
Out of 80 surveys, the pre-test resulted in 17 usable responses; the response rate was 
17/80 – 6 or 23%.  
 
 
5.11. Changes Resulting From the Pre-Test 
 
One issue that arose from the pre-test was that respondents tended to rate the 
environment in which they operated as being highly competitive. This finding 
suggested that there might be a self-reporting bias, so a more objective measure of the 
number of direct competitors was introduced. Additionally, some respondents 
appeared to have misinterpreted the instructions with regards to the scenario questions 
and vignettes. These questions were reworded and the instructions clarified to ensure 
the respondents were fully aware of what was required. It also seemed that some 
respondents were not aware the survey was anonymous. As a result, the anonymity of 
their answers was further emphasised in the cover letter and survey instrument. 
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5.12. Main Survey 
 
Once the changes had been made, the main survey was sent out in the same manner as 
for the pre-test to 1034 respondents. Reminder cards were sent to all respondents two 
weeks after the main survey was sent out. Respondents were given five weeks to 
reply, at which point the survey was closed. An analysis of the respondents is 
provided in Chapter 6. 
 
 
5.13. Main Survey: Response Analysis 
 
A total of 172 useable responses were received, resulting in an overall response rate 
of 18% (see formula above): 
 
= 172/1034-66 
= 17.7% 
 
A total of 32 responses were received from firms that had been caught transgressing 
the Trade Practices Act (1974), creating a response rate of 32/225 or 14%. A total of 
140 responses were received from firms that had not previously been caught 
transgressing, creating a response rate of 140/785 or 18%. This difference in response 
rates may be because firms that had been caught transgressing marketing law were 
slightly less willing to respond to the survey or because not all surveys to firms that 
had been caught transgressing were personally addressed. The response rate is 
comparable to other research into sensitive ethical behaviour by corporate executives. 
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For example, Schlegelmilch and Robertson (1995) obtained 7-12%, Barnett and 
Valentine (2002) 12.5%, and Hoffman et al (1991) 21.5%.  The response rate was also 
likely influenced by the nature of the topic, since ethical and legal behaviour can be a 
sensitive issue. Many respondents were likely to have been unwilling to reveal their 
legal or ethical behaviour or to provide information that could potentially be 
incriminating (Trevino, 1986; Randall and Gibson, 1990).  
 
 
5.14. Non-Response Bias and Missing Data 
 
A relatively low response rate leads to the potential for non-response bias, when 
respondents who respond to the survey are in some way different to those who do not. 
When non-response bias occurs, it cannot be said that the results apply to the 
population (Gendall, 2005). While the best way of reducing the likelihood of such 
bias is to reduce non-response itself (i.e. obtain a high response rate), this can be 
expensive. Therefore, it may be more economical to estimate the non-response bias 
and accept a lower response rate (Armstrong and Overton, 1977).  As has already 
been outlined, cost issues meant that for this research it was not possible to utilise 
some tactics for increasing response rates. 
 
One way to measure non-response bias is to use the time trends extrapolations method. 
Under this method it is assumed that those who respond later are similar to non-
respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977).  Based on this, an analysis was 
conducted using the 41 variables to be used in the final analyses to test for differences 
between early and late respondents. Early responses were considered to be those 
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received within the first week after the survey was sent out and late responses those 
received from five days after the reminder notice was sent out. The results of the t-
tests showed no significant differences (at the 0.05 level) between the mean responses 
of the early and late respondents for all 41 variables (See Appendix 4 for the full 
results). This lack of a significant difference provides an indication that the sample 
might not suffer from non-response bias. It must be noted, however, that late 
respondents are only used to approximate non-respondents; they are not the same. It 
cannot, therefore, be fully concluded that the sample does not suffer from non-
response bias. Other methods, such as directly asking non-respondents why they did 
not respond, could not be used due to the anonymous nature of the survey. 
 
Missing data are defined as items with no response. The amount of missing data 
contained in the useable sample were largely minimal (ranging from 1% to 7 %). 
Where missing data occurred they were handled using pairwise deletion, which 
“attempts to use all available data by discarding cases on an analysis-by-analysis 
basis” (Peugh and Enders, 2004, p. 528). Newsome (1996) found pairwise deletion to 
be more effective than other techniques, such as listwise deletion, mean substitution, 
and imputation procedures.  
 
 
5.15. Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has outlined the methodological procedures that were used to gather the 
primary data. The primary data collection phase consisted of a survey that 
investigated the factors that might influence a firm having previously been caught 
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transgressing marketing law, the consequences to a firm of transgression detection, 
and potential illegal future marketing behaviour. This was achieved through a mail 
survey of marketing managers of Australian firms that had been caught by the ACCC 
for breaches of the Trade Practices Act (1974) and firms that had not. A range of 
techniques, including reminder notices, anonymity, incentives, and personalisation 
were used to try and improve the response rate. A pre-test was initially conducted, 
involving interviews with experts and members of the target market as well as a pilot 
test on a small sample. Based on this, some minor changes were made to the survey 
instrument. The main survey was then sent to 1034 respondents, with an 18% 
response rate being obtained.  The next chapter outlines the results of the research 
described in this chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Quantitative Analysis: Survey Results 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the results of the quantitative survey already outlined in 
Chapter 4. The first part of this chapter provides basic descriptive statistics of the 
results obtained in the survey and describes the characteristics of the respondents. 
Secondly, the results of the hypotheses associated with the factors that have impacted 
on previously detected transgressions of marketing law are reported. Thirdly, the 
dynamic nature of the model is investigated by reporting the results of the hypotheses 
associated with behaviour after a firm has been caught transgressing, and the 
hypotheses associated with the factors that influence behavioural intent. Finally, the 
results of further exploratory analysis conducted to separate unintentional and 
intentional illegal firm behaviour are reported.  
 
 
6.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section provides details of the survey results, in terms of the firm and industry 
characteristics of the respondents. 
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6.2.1. Firm Size and Performance 
 
Table 6.1 illustrates the size of the firms that responded to the survey, in terms of the 
number of full time employees. The options provided in the survey were condensed to 
three categories: small, medium, and large.   
 
Table 6.1: Firm Size (Number of Employees) of Respondents  
 
Firm Size Frequency Percent  
 Small (1-20) 30 17.4 
  Medium (21-100) 77 44.8 
  Large (101+) 57 33.1 
  Total 164 95.3 
Missing  8 4.7 
Total 172 100.0 
 
The majority of respondents tended to be medium- to large-sized firms. The greatest 
number of responses came from medium-sized firms (21 to 100 employees) with 
44.8%.  
 
Table 6.2 illustrates the profitability and market-share of the firms that responded to 
the survey:  
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Table 6.2: Performance Levels (Profitability and Market-share) of Respondents 
 
Profitability Frequency Percent  
 Much Less 9 5.2 
  Slightly Less 30 17.4 
  About the Same 55 32.0 
  Slightly More 32 18.6 
  Much More 17 9.9 
  Don’t Know 20 11.6 
  Total 163 94.8 
Missing  9 5.2 
Total 172 100.0 
Market-share Frequency Percent 
 Least 4 2.3 
  Below Average 20 11.6 
  Average 41 23.8 
  Above Average 69 40.1 
  Market Leader 28 16.3 
  Total 162 94.2 
Missing  10 5.8 
Total 172 100.0 
 
In terms of profitability, 32% of respondents rated their profitability as being about 
the same as their competitors, 22.6% rated their profitability as being less than their 
competitors, and 28.5% rated it as being more than their competitors. In terms of 
market-share, however, the results are skewed towards higher levels of dominance. 
Over half, or 56.4%, of respondents rated their market-share as being greater than 
average, while only 13.9% rated it as below average. The remaining 23% rated it as 
about average. 
 
6.2.2. Use of Compliance Programmes and Risk of Detection 
 
When asked about the extent to which employees within the firm were made aware of 
marketing regulations during a given year, 45.9% said that it was either somewhat 
unlikely or extremely unlikely, 14.5% said that it was neither likely nor unlikely, 
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while the remaining 34.3% said that it was either somewhat likely or extremely likely 
(see Table 6.3). 
 
Table 6.3: Compliance (The Likelihood of Employees being Made Aware of the 
Trade Practices Act) 
 
Made Aware of TPA Frequency Percent 
 
Extremely Unlikely 36 20.9 
  
Somewhat Unlikely 43 25.0 
  
Neither Likely or 
Unlikely 25 14.5 
  
Somewhat Likely 29 16.9 
  
Extremely Likely 30 17.4 
  
Total 163 94.8 
Missing  9 5.2 
Total 172 100.0 
 
A similar pattern of results exists for the extent to which employees were provided 
with guidelines on the legal aspects of promotional and pricing activities. These 
results demonstrate a tendency towards respondents either not having a compliance 
programme, or a less comprehensive or less consistent programme (see Table 6.4). 
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Table 6.4: Compliance (The Likelihood of Employees Being Provided With 
Guidelines Regarding the Trade Practices Act) 
 
Promotion Guidelines Frequency Percent 
 Extremely Unlikely 46 26.7 
  Somewhat Unlikely 32 18.6 
  Neither Likely or 
Unlikely 24 14.0 
  Somewhat Likely 28 16.3 
  Extremely Likely 33 19.2 
  Total 163 94.8 
Missing  9 5.2 
Total 172 100.0 
Pricing Guidelines Frequency Percent 
 Extremely Unlikely 41 23.8 
  Somewhat Unlikely 27 15.7 
  Neither Likely or 
Unlikely 21 12.2 
  Somewhat Likely 38 22.1 
  Extremely Likely 36 20.9 
  Total 163 94.8 
Missing  9 5.2 
Total 172 100.0 
 
In terms of the perceived risk that a transgression would be detected, respondents 
believed there to be a slightly above average concern that a transgression within their 
industry would be detected. As illustrated in Table 6.5, 26.8% of respondents believed 
that it was either unlikely or highly unlikely that the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) would detect a transgression, while 32.6% believed 
that it was possible, and 37.2% believed it was either likely or highly likely. In terms 
of the likelihood that a competitor would report a transgression, 33.7% of respondents 
believed that it was either highly unlikely or unlikely, 29.7% believed it was possible, 
while 31.4% believed that it was either likely or highly likely (see Table 6.5).  
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Table 6.5: Respondents’ Perceptions of the Risk of Detection (by ACCC and 
Competitor) 
 
 Risk of Detection (ACCC) Frequency Percent 
 Highly Unlikely 13 7.6 
  Unlikely 33 19.2 
  Possible 56 32.6 
  Likely 39 22.7 
  Highly Likely 25 14.5 
  Total 166 96.5 
Missing  6 3.5 
Total 172 100.0 
Risk of Detection (Competitor) Frequency Percent 
 Highly Unlikely 23 13.4 
  Unlikely 35 20.3 
  Possible 51 29.7 
  Likely 36 20.9 
  Highly Likely 18 10.5 
  Total 163 94.8 
Missing  9 5.2 
Total 172 100.0 
 
This shows that respondents are slightly more concerned about being caught 
transgressing marketing law directly by the ACCC, rather than being reported by a 
competitor. 
 
6.2.3. Industry Details 
 
a) Industry Sector 
 
Table 6.6 illustrates the industry sectors represented. Manufacturers and service 
providers accounted for 23.8% and 21.5% of respondents respectively. The small 
number of responses from transport operators and construction firms meant that these 
variables were combined with services and manufacturers respectively for the analysis. 
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Table 6.6: Respondents by Industry Sector 
 
Industry Sector Frequency Percent 
 
Retail 23 13.4 
  
Manufacturer 41 23.8 
  
Construction 12 7.0 
  
Transport 6 3.5 
  
Services 37 21.5 
  
Importer/Wholesaler 18 10.5 
  
Other 27 15.7 
  
Total 164 95.3 
Missing  8 4.7 
Total 172 100.0 
 
b) Competition 
 
Two measures of competition were used: 1) perceptions of the level of competition, 
and 2) the number of direct competitors. The results are illustrated in Table 6.7.  
 
Table 6.7: Competition in the Respondents’ Industry (Level and Number)  
 
Level of Competition Frequency Percent 
 Extremely Uncompetitive 5 2.9 
  Uncompetitive 6 3.5 
  Average 27 15.7 
  Competitive 57 33.1 
  Extremely Competitive 68 39.5 
  Total 163 94.8 
Missing  9 5.2 
Total 172 100.0 
Number of Competitors Frequency Percent 
 None 1 0.6 
  1 to 5 55 32.0 
  6 to 10 37 21.5 
  11 to 20 37 21.5 
  21 to 50 13 7.6 
  51+ 18 10.5 
  Total 161 93.6 
Missing  11 6.4 
Total 172 100.0 
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In terms of the level of competition, respondents tended to claim that they operate in 
highly competitive industries. The results show that nearly 40% of respondents rated 
their industry as being extremely competitive, while only 2.9% rated it as being 
extremely uncompetitive. As noted previously, it was posited that there may be a self-
report bias, so respondents were also asked to indicate the number of direct 
competitors they had. Here the results are slightly different, 54.1% claimed to have 
fewer than 11 competitors, 21.5% claimed to have 11 to 20 competitors, and 18.1% 
claimed to have 21+ competitors. 
 
c) Perceived Incidents of Industry Transgression 
 
Respondents tended to consider that transgressions were uncommon within their 
industry. This is shown by the fact that 46.5% believed that transgressions occur 
either rarely or never, although only 1.7% believed that they never occur. Only 15.7% 
believed that transgressions occur often or extremely often (see Table 6.8). 
 
Table 6.8: Respondents’ Perception of Incidents of Industry Transgression 
  
Industry Transgression Frequency Percent 
 Never 3 1.7 
  Rarely 77 44.8 
  Sometimes 55 32.0 
  Often 25 14.5 
  Extremely Often 2 1.2 
  Total 162 94.2 
Missing  10 5.8 
Total 172 100.0 
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6.2.4. Knowledge of Marketing Law 
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the distribution of results for legal knowledge: 
 
Figure 6.1: Overall Knowledge of the Trade Practices Act 
 
 
 
The overall average number of correctly-answered scenarios in the survey was 11.6 
out of 20 or 58%. This is slightly lower than the average scores reported by Peterson 
(2001a). When separated into misleading advertising and anti-competitive conduct, 
the average score for misleading advertising was 7.1 out of 13 or 55%, and for anti-
competitive conduct 4.5 out of 7 or 64%. This contradicts the North American 
findings of Bowal and Wanke (1998) and Peterson, (2001a), who found knowledge of 
antitrust issues in particular to be worse. 
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6.3. Antecedents of Previous Transgressions 
 
This section describes the results from the analysis of differences, in terms of 
conditions of motive, opportunity, and control, between firms that have been detected 
and sanctioned by the courts or the ACCC for previous transgressions of marketing 
law (Parts four and five of the Trade Practices Act 1974) and those that have not. 
These results highlight the factors that led to firms being caught transgressing 
marketing law in the past. The first part of this section outlines the logistic regression 
techniques used to analyse the data, before describing the results for each condition: 
motive, opportunity and control. 
 
6.3.1. Multinomial Logistic Regression 
 
Since the dependent variable (whether a firm has previously been caught 
transgressing marketing law) was discrete and binary (that is there were only two 
possible outcomes with no ranking) rather than continuous, a binary choice model 
was required (Greene, 2003). When the dependent variable is categorical and the 
independent variables are a mixture of categorical (factors) and continuous 
(covariates), a multinomial logistic model is the best means of data analysis (SPSS, 
2006), as such models have been successfully applied to discrete choice processes in 
fields such as econometrics, transportation, and marketing (Abe, 1999). 
 
 The dependent variable (whether a firm has been caught transgressing marketing law 
or not) was assumed to be dynamic, and falling on a continuum. Therefore, this 
variable took the form of an index function model (Greene, 2003). A transgression 
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can range from not occurring, to being very minor, to being very major. The 
assumptions were made that regulatory agencies only act when they deem a 
transgression to have been of significant severity and that, while, in some cases, firms 
that transgress above that level of severity will not be caught, most are. The degree of 
transgression can be represented as y. The point at which a transgression is deemed to 
be severe enough is y*. Where the severity of the transgression is below y* then the 
transgression is deemed to be minor and effectively not to have occurred. 
 
Therefore: if y < y*, then transgression = 0, if y≥ y*, then transgression =1. 
                  
Thus, 0 represented a firm that had not previously been caught transgressing 
marketing law (or where the severity of transgression was minimal) and 1 represented 
a firm that had previously been caught transgressing marketing law (where the 
transgression was above the threshold of severity). While the observed variable, being 
caught transgressing marketing law or not, was coded as a dichotomous variable, the 
underlying construct being measured was assumed to be continuous. 
 
The independent variables (firm size, the number of competitors, and industry sector) 
were all treated as fixed factors. Profitability, market-share, level of competition, 
perceived risk of detection, existence and comprehensiveness of a compliance 
programme (compliance programme), and perceived incidents of industry 
transgression were treated as covariates in the multinomial logistic model, since the 
differences between response options were considered to be meaningful. All variables 
used to represent conditions of motive, opportunity, and control were included in the 
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same regression equation.  Results are shown in Table 6.9, with the findings for 
motive, opportunity, and control each described in more detail below.  
 
Table 6.9: Parameter Estimates for Having Previously Been Caught 
Transgressing Marketing Law 
  
Factor Estimate Std. Error 
Intercept 1.413 3.164 
Motive 
  
Profitability -0.385 0.306 
Market-share -0.210 0.364 
Number of Competitors (0-5) -1.615 1.251 
Number of Competitors (6-10) -4.882** 1.540 
Number of Competitors (11-20) -0.634 1.171 
Number of Competitors (21-50) -22.302 0.000 
Number of Competitors (51+)  0(a) . 
Level of Competition -1.303** 0.493 
Opportunity   
Firm Size (Small) 
 1.303 0.787 
Firm Size (Medium) 
-2.399** 0.897 
Firm Size (Large) 
 0(a) . 
Industry Sector (Retail) 
-1.125 1.016 
Industry Sector (Service) -0.393 0.860 
Industry Sector (Importer/Wholesaler)  0.250 1.137 
Industry Sector (Manufacturer) 
 0(b)  
Perception of Incidents of Industry Transgression -0.055 0.475 
Control   
Perceived Risk of Detection (ACCC) 
 0.222 0.411 
Perceived Risk of Detection (Competitor) 
 0.847* 0.334 
Compliance Programme 
 0.426** 0.136 
(a) This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant. 
* = p <0.05, ** = p <0.01 
 
6.3.2. Motive 
 
As seen in Figure 6.2, the three motives hypothesised to impact on having previously 
been caught transgressing marketing law were: profitability, market-share, and 
competition. The actual results are shown in Table 6.9. 
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Figure 6.2: Relationships between Motive and Having Previously Been Caught 
Transgressing Marketing Law 
 
 
 
It was hypothesised that firms facing greater pressure from poor profitability would be 
more likely to have been caught transgressing marketing law than more profitable 
firms. However, the results show no relationship between profitability and having 
previously been caught transgressing marketing law. This suggests that firms with 
lower profitability relative to their competitors are not more likely to have previously 
been caught transgressing marketing law and, thus, H1a is rejected. Similarly, it was 
hypothesised that firms with lower market-share would have a greater motive to 
transgress marketing law than firms with higher market-share. The results, however, 
show that there is no relationship between market-share and having previously been 
caught transgressing marketing law. As a result, H1b is rejected. Lastly, firms facing 
increased competitive pressures were hypothesised to be more likely to have 
previously been caught transgressing marketing law than firms facing less competitive 
environments. The effects of the level of competition and the number of competitors 
within an industry were both investigated. The results show that the level of 
competition does have an impact on having previously been caught transgressing 
marketing law. In terms of the number of competitors, firms with 6-10 competitors 
are less likely than firms with 51+ competitors to have been caught transgressing 
marketing law. However, for both measures, the relationship is in the opposite 
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+ 
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direction to that which had been hypothesised. It was hypothesised that firms facing 
more intense competition with a greater number of competitors would be less likely to 
have been caught transgressing the law, whereas, in fact, the opposite is the case. 
Firms that have fewer competitors and face less intense competition are more likely to 
have been caught transgressing marketing law. Therefore, while a relationship does 
exist between having previously been caught transgressing marketing law and 
competition, H1c is not fully supported, due to the direction of the relationship. The 
possible reasons for this will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
6.3.3. Opportunity 
 
As seen in Figure 6.3, firm size, industry sector, and perceived incidents of industry 
transgression were hypothesised to be factors that created an opportunity for a 
previous transgression of marketing law to have occurred (and been detected). The 
results are illustrated in Table 6.9. 
 
Figure 6.3: Relationships between Opportunity and Having Previously Been 
Caught Transgressing Marketing Law 
 
 
 
It was hypothesised that larger firms would be more likely to have been caught 
transgressing marketing law than smaller firms. The results show a relationship exists 
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between firm size and having previously been caught transgressing marketing law. 
Further analysis of the results reveals that only medium sized firms are less likely than 
large firms to have been previously caught transgressing marketing law. There is no 
significant difference between large firms and small firms and medium and small 
firms. This result provides partial support for H2a. 
 
It was also hypothesised that certain industry sectors are more prone to having been 
caught transgressing marketing law than others. The results, however, show that no 
such differences exist, meaning H2b is rejected. Lastly, it was hypothesised that the 
greater the extent to which respondents believed other firms were transgressing 
marketing law within their industry, the more likely they were to have been caught 
transgressing themselves. The results show no relationship to exist, meaning H2c is 
rejected. 
 
6.3.4. Control 
 
It has generally been proposed in the literature that firms with higher risk perceptions 
of transgression detection and those with more comprehensive compliance 
programmes are less likely to have been caught transgressing the law. However, as 
outlined in Chapter 3, it was expected that, in this instance, due to time-ordering 
effects, the result would be the opposite (see Figure 6.4). As seen in Table 6.9, this 
hypothesis is supported since the results show a significant relationship between the 
control variables (perceived risk and compliance) and having previously been caught 
transgressing marketing law. These results show that firms that believe the risk of 
detection is higher, and firms with more comprehensive compliance programmes, are 
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more likely to have previously been caught transgressing marketing law than firms 
with lower perceptions of risk and less comprehensive or no compliance programmes.  
In terms of risk, it must be noted that a relationship only exists for the risk of a 
competitor reporting a transgression rather than it being directly detected by the 
ACCC. Based on these findings, H3a is partially accepted and H3b is fully accepted. 
As noted earlier, perceptions of risk and the use of compliance programmes can be 
influenced by time-ordering effects. These results suggest that risk and compliance 
may be consequences of having previously been caught transgressing marketing law. 
This is further expanded in Section 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4: Relationships between Control and Having Previously Been Caught 
Transgressing Marketing Law 
 
 
 
6.3.5. Summary of Previous Transgression results 
 
Table 6.10 outlines the results of the hypotheses pertaining to previously detected 
transgressions of marketing law. All hypotheses associated with conditions of motive 
are rejected. Although a relationship was found to exist between competition and 
having previously been caught transgressing marketing law, it is in the opposite 
direction to that hypothesised. Firm size is the only opportunity variable to have an 
impact on having previously been caught transgressing marketing law. Both control 
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variables (risk and compliance) were found to have an impact on having previously 
been caught transgressing marketing law, which is most likely explained by issues of 
time-ordering. 
 
Table 6.10: Summary of the Findings Related to Having Previously Been Caught 
Transgressing Marketing Law 
 
Hypothesis Factor Accept/Reject 
Motive     
H1a Profitability Reject 
H1b Market-share Reject 
H1c Competition Wrong Sign 
Opportunity     
H2a Firm Size Accept 
H2b Industry Sector Reject 
H2c Perception of Incidents of Industry Transgression Reject 
Control     
H3a Compliance Programme Accept 
H3b Perceived Risk of Detection Accept 
 
 
6.4. Changes in Behaviour after a Transgression is Detected 
 
Figure 6.5: Relationships between Having Previously Been Caught 
Transgressing Marketing law, Risk, and Compliance 
 
 
 
As seen in Figure 6.5, it was hypothesised that firms that had been previously caught 
transgressing marketing law would be more likely to have a more comprehensive 
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Compliance 
Programme (Accept) 
+ 
+ 
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compliance programme and perceive the risk of future detection as higher than those 
firms that had not been caught. Table 6.11 illustrates the results. 
 
Table 6.11: The Results of the Relationships between Having Previously Been 
Caught Transgressing Marketing law, Risk, and Compliance 
 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable F Statistic 
Caught Transgressing Perceived Risk of Detection 12.798** 
Caught Transgressing Compliance Programme 25.933** 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable T Statistic 
Risk of Detection Compliance Programme   8.229** 
*= p <0.05, ** = p <0.01 
 
As noted in the previous section, the direction of the relationship provides further 
support to the notion that risk and compliance are consequences of a transgression 
being detected. To further test this hypothesis, the impacts of having previously been 
caught transgressing marketing law on a firm’s perceptions of the risk of detection 
and the existence and comprehensiveness of a compliance programme were tested. 
Since both the dependent variables (risk of future detection and the existence and 
comprehensiveness of a compliance programme) were continuous and the 
independent variable (whether a firm has been caught transgressing marketing law) 
was dichotomous, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed (Malhotra, 
1999).  
 
In terms of the risk of detection, the mean score on the one to five scale (with one 
representing ‘low risk’ and five representing ‘high risk’) for firms that had been 
previously caught transgressing marketing law was 3.8, whereas, for firms that had 
not been caught previously transgressing, the mean score was three. This difference is 
significant at the 0.05 level (see Table 6.11), suggesting that firms that have 
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previously been caught transgressing marketing law perceive the risk of detection to 
be greater than those that have not, thus supporting H4a.  
 
Regarding the existence and comprehensiveness of a compliance programme, the 
mean score on a one to fifteen scale for firms that had been previously caught 
transgressing marketing law was 11.6 (with one representing ‘no system of 
compliance’ and 15 representing a ‘comprehensive system of compliance’), while the 
mean score for firms that had not been caught was eight. This difference is significant 
at the 0.05 level (see Table 6.11), suggesting that firms that have been caught 
transgressing marketing law have more comprehensive systems of compliance than 
firms that have not been caught. Therefore, H4b is accepted. 
 
In addition to the direct link between having previously been caught transgressing 
marketing law and the existence and comprehensiveness of a compliance programme, 
it was also hypothesised that perceptions of the risk of detection would also influence 
the extent to which a firm used a compliance programme (see Figure 6.6). 
 
Figure 6.6: Relationship between Risk and Compliance 
 
 
 
Linear regression was used to test the relationship between the two continuous 
variables. As seen in Table 6.11, the results indicate a direct positive relationship 
between risk and compliance. This suggests that, as a firm’s perception of the risk of 
Perceived Risk of 
Future Detection 
Compliance  
Programme (Accept) 
+ 
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detection increases, the more comprehensive a firm’s compliance programme will be, 
meaning that H5 is accepted. Table 6.12 summarises the findings outlined in this 
section in terms of acceptance of hypotheses. 
  
Table 6.12: Summary of the Findings between Having Previously Been Caught 
Transgressing Marketing Law, Risk, and Compliance 
 
Hypothesis 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable Accept/Reject 
H4a 
Caught 
Transgressing 
Perceived Risk of 
Detection Accept 
H4b 
Caught 
Transgressing 
Compliance 
Programme Accept 
H5 
Perceived Risk of 
Detection 
Compliance 
Programme Accept 
 
 
6.5. Impact of Motive, Opportunity, and Control on Future Behaviour 
 
To this point, the analysis has focussed on the factors that led firms to transgress 
marketing law in the past and the resulting changes in firms’ perceptions of risk and 
the existence and comprehensiveness of compliance programmes that resulted from 
the transgression detection. The final facet of this analysis was to determine the 
factors that might influence behavioural intent and how previous transgression 
detection might affect some of these relationships. The three main questions were: 
 
1. How much do Australian firms vary in their (mean) intent to transgress 
marketing law? 
2. Do the effects of motive, opportunity, and control, lead to different levels of 
behavioural intent? 
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3. How do firms that have previously been caught transgressing marketing law 
compare in terms of (mean) intent and in terms of the strength of the 
relationship between risk, compliance, and behavioural intent? 
The use of hierarchical linear models, using the mixed procedure in SPSS was 
deemed the best approach to answer these questions. A brief review of mixed models 
is provided in the section below. 
 
6.5.1. Mixed Models 
 
As outlined in Chapter 3, some of the hypotheses deal with nested variables.  These 
which occur when “processes occurring at a higher level of analysis are influencing 
characteristics at a lower level” (Luke, 2004, p. 1), that is, when individual 
respondents are influenced by the contexts within which they operate (Luke, 2004).  
For this research, interest centred on the effect that the higher level context of a firm 
having previously been caught transgressing marketing law would have on the 
individual lower level relationships between conditions of control and behavioural 
intent. This analysis, therefore, required a multilevel approach. Multilevel modelling 
techniques (also known as hierarchical linear models) have become an increasingly 
popular means of analysing nested data (Peugh and Enders, 2005). 
 
In addition, this research also recognised the importance of both aggregate and 
individual level analyses.  In most cases, models are either estimated at the aggregate 
level or separately for each individual. Both aggregate and individual level models, 
however, are subject to a number of limitations. The problem with aggregate models 
is that the restriction on differences in response across individuals is too severe. 
 189 
 
 
 
Conversely, individual level models allow individuals arbitrarily to vary in their 
preferences and, by estimating regression individually for each respondent, the 
estimates can become unstable. In addition, individual level estimates also tend to 
have large standard errors, which suggest high uncertainty (Elrod and Winer, 1982; 
Elrod and Haubl, 1998). 
 
In recognition of the limitations associated with both individual and aggregate level 
approaches, there has been a trend towards mixed models that combine the accuracy 
of aggregate models with the flexibility of individual level models: “The Linear 
Mixed Models procedure expands the general linear model so that the data are 
permitted to exhibit correlated and non-constant variability. The mixed linear model, 
therefore, provides the flexibility of modelling not only the means of the data but their 
variances and covariances as well” (SPSS, 2006, p. 34).  Such models are also 
capable of handling hierarchical structures with nested data. Thus, the mixed 
procedure in SPSS was deemed an appropriate analytical tool, since it performs 
multilevel analysis while also showing aggregate and individual level effects. 
 
In a mixed model, responses are considered to represent the sum of both fixed and 
random effects. If an effect is considered to influence the mean of the population, it is 
fixed. If, however, the effect is associated with a ‘sampling procedure’ then it is 
random. In a mixed model, random effects only influence the covariance within the 
data. Accordingly, the aggregate or mean effect across all firms for the impact of 
conditions of motive, opportunity, and control on behavioural intent can be 
determined, as well as how individual firms differ in their responses around that mean. 
In most research, it is the fixed effects that are of primary interest and which will 
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determine whether the hypotheses are supported or rejected. However, it is important 
to adjust for the covariant structure of the data, which is an important advantage of the 
mixed procedure (SPSS, 2005).  
 
6.5.2. Mixed Model Results: Hypothesis Testing 
 
This section describes the aggregate results from the testing of hypothesised 
relationships between motive, opportunity, control, and behavioural intent. While all 
variables were tested in the same model, the results are described separately. The first 
part of this section looks at the impact of motive and opportunity on behavioural 
intent, before investigating the impact of the control variables and the effect having 
previously been caught transgressing marketing law has on these relationships. Lastly, 
the proposed relationships between risk, compliance or knowledge, and behavioural 
intent are investigated.  
 
Table 6.13: Model Fit Statistics 
 
Akaike's Information 
Criterion (AIC) 16122.129 
Hurvich and Tsai's 
Criterion (AICC) 16122.148 
Bozdogan's Criterion 
(CAIC) 16166.454 
Schwarz's Bayesian 
Criterion (BIC) 16160.454 
 
Table 6.13 shows the model fit statistics using Akaike’s Information Criterion, 
Hurvich and Tsais’s Criterion, Bozdogan’s Criterion and Schwarz’s Bayesian 
Criterion. The parameter estimates are outlined in Table 6.14. 
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Table 6.14: Parameter Estimates for Behavioural Intent 
 
Factor Estimate Std. Error 
Motive     
Profitability -0.079 0.054 
Market-share  0.269** 0.72 
Number of Competitors ( 0-5) -0.287 0.241 
Number of Competitors ( 6-10) 0.005 0.257 
Number of Competitors ( 11-20) -0.473 0.258 
Number of Competitors (21-50) -0.389 0.311 
Number of Competitors ( 51+) 0 (a) 0 
Level of Competition -0.116 0.081 
Opportunity      
Firm Size (Small) -0.273 0.229 
Firm Size (Medium) 0.279 0.169 
Firm Size (Large) 0 (a) 0 
Industry Sector (Retail) -0.094 0.238 
Industry Sector (Service) -0.605** 0.195 
Industry Sector (Importer/Wholesaler)  0.776** 0.229 
Industry Sector (Manufacturer) 0 (a) 0 
Perception of Incidents of Industry 
Transgression 0.13 0.1 
Control     
Small Fine -0.392** 0.093 
Large Fine -1.414** 0.117 
Publicity -0.771** 0.119 
Reward  0.426** 0.08 
Risk of Detection (ACCC) -0.117 0.089 
Risk of Detection (Competitor) 0.067 0.075 
Compliance -0.109** 0.025 
Compliance * Caught Transgressing  0.195** 0.072 
Risk of Detection (ACCC) * Caught 
Transgressing -0.573* 0.234 
Knowledge  0.101** 0.005 
(a) This Parameter is set to zero because it is redundant 
* = p <0.05, ** = p <0.01 
 
a) Impact of Motive on Behavioural Intent 
 
Similar to the hypotheses pertaining to previous transgressions, it was expected that 
lower profitability, lower market-share, and higher levels of competition would create 
pressure and motive for engaging in future illegal marketing behaviour (see Figure 
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6.7), with Table 6.14 outlining the results. As was the case with having previously 
been caught transgressing marketing law, no relationship exists between profitability 
and behavioural intent. Therefore, H6a is rejected. In terms of market-share, however, 
unlike having previously been caught transgressing marketing law, a relationship 
exists with behavioural intent, although the relationship is in the opposite direction to 
that which was hypothesised. This suggests that firms with higher market-share are 
more likely to engage in illegal marketing behaviour than those with lower market-
share, and higher market-share might, in fact, represent an opportunity to transgress 
the law. H6b is thus rejected due to the direction of the relationship.  
 
Figure 6.7: Relationships between Motive and Behavioural Intent 
 
 
 
Two measures were used to rate industry competition: 1) level of competition, and 2) 
number of direct competitors. In terms of both measures, no relationship was found to 
exist with behavioural intent. Based on these findings, H6c is rejected. 
 
b) Impact of Opportunity on Behavioural Intent 
 
Figure 6.8 illustrates the proposed relationships between conditions of opportunity 
and behavioural intent, with the results shown in Table 6.14. 
 Motive 
 
• Lower Profitability  (Reject) 
• Lower Market-share (Wrong 
sign)  
• Higher Competition (Reject) 
Behavioural 
Intent 
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Figure 6.8: Relationships between Opportunity and Behavioural Intent  
 
 
 
 Larger firms were hypothesised to be more likely to engage in future illegal 
marketing behaviour than smaller firms. While size of the firm has some impact on 
having previously been caught transgressing marketing law, it has no impact on 
behavioural intent. Thus, H7a is rejected.  
 
Some relationships were found to exist between industry sector and behavioural intent. 
Importers and wholesalers are more likely than manufacturers to consider engaging in 
illegal marketing behaviour, whilst firms in the service industry are less likely to 
consider engaging in such behaviour than manufacturers. There is no difference 
between manufacturers and retailers or firms in the ‘other’ category. Based on these 
findings, H7b is partially accepted. However, no relationship was found to exist 
between perceived incidents of industry transgression and behavioural intent. 
Therefore, H7c is rejected. 
 
c) Impact of Control (Perceived Risk and Compliance) on Behavioural Intent 
 
It is evident from the standardized coefficients in Table 6.14 that the control variables 
account for the greatest average variance in behavioural intent. The existence of a 
Opportunity 
 
• Larger Firm Size (Reject) 
• Industry Sector (Partial Accept) 
• Higher Perception of Incidents of 
Industry Transgression (Reject) 
Behavioural 
Intent 
+ 
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large fine accounts for the greatest share, followed by publicity and reward. All the 
control variables, with the exception of perceived risk, account for the top five factors 
impacting on behavioural intent.  
 
Two analyses were conducted within the mixed model to determine the impact of 
perceptions of risk and the existence and comprehensiveness of a compliance 
programme on behavioural intent. The first analysis was to ascertain the direct effects 
that risk and compliance have on behavioural intent (see Figure 6.9).  
 
Figure 6.9: Relationships between Risk, Compliance, and Behavioural Intent 
 
 
 
The second analysis was to ascertain how having previously been caught 
transgressing marketing law influences the relationship between risk, compliance, and 
behavioural intent (see Figure 6.10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compliance Programme 
(Accept) 
Perceived Risk of Future 
Detection (Reject) 
Behavioural 
Intent 
- 
- 
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Figure 6.10: Interaction Relationships 
 
 
 
As seen in Table 6.14, in terms of direct effects, no relationship exists between 
perceived risk and behavioural intent, meaning that H8b is rejected. However, the 
relationship between the interaction of having previously been caught transgressing 
marketing law and the perceived risk of future detection is significant (at the 0.05 
level). Thus, for firms that have previously been caught transgressing marketing law, 
where the perceived risk of detection is higher, behavioural intent is lower. As a result 
of this finding, H9 is accepted.  
 
As seen in Table 6.14, in terms of the direct relationship between the existence and 
comprehensiveness of a compliance programme and behavioural intent, a negative 
relationship was found to exist. This suggests that, overall, behavioural intent is lower 
in firms with more extensive compliance programmes, meaning that H8a is accepted.  
When looking at the interaction between having previously been caught transgressing 
marketing law and compliance on behavioural intent, a relationship was also found to 
exist (see Table 6.14). In this situation, however, the relationship is positive, as 
opposed to the negative relationship seen with the direct effect. This suggests that, for 
firms that have previously been caught transgressing marketing law, behavioural 
intent is higher where there is a more comprehensive compliance programme in place. 
Compliance Programme * Previously Caught 
Transgressing (Wrong Sign) 
Perceived Risk of Future Detection * 
Previously Caught Transgressing (Accept)  
Behavioural 
Intent 
- 
- 
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It is likely that such firms only develop a compliance programme because it is a 
requirement of any sanction they have received, and, as such, may have little impact 
on actual behaviour, especially if such firms are predisposed towards transgressing 
and not concerned the risk of future detection. H10 is thus rejected, due to the 
direction of the relationship. 
 
d) Impact of Control (Fine, Publicity, and Reward) on Behavioural Intent 
 
As seen in Figure 6.11, the potential of receiving a fine or adverse publicity were 
hypothesised to reduce intent to engage in future illegal marketing behaviour, while 
potential rewards were hypothesised to increase the likelihood of such behaviour. 
 
Figure 6.11: Relationships between Fine, Publicity, Reward, and Behavioural 
Intent 
 
 
 
Because the size of the fine contained three possible categories (none, low, and high), 
it was coded as two dichotomous dummy variables, with 0, 1 representing a high fine, 
1, 0 representing a low fine, and 0, 0 representing no fine. As a result, size was 
represented in the model by two variables: ‘small fine’ and ‘large fine’. Since revenue 
and publicity only had two categories (low and high), they were each coded as 
Control (Deterrence) 
• Fine (-) 
• Publicity (-) 
• Reward (+) 
(All Accept) 
Behavioural 
Intent 
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dummy variables, with 0 representing no publicity or low revenue and 1 representing 
adverse publicity or high revenue.  
 
As expected, the existence of a small fine, the existence of a large fine, and the level 
of publicity all have a negative impact on behavioural intent. Higher fines and the 
possibility of adverse publicity reduce intent to engage in future illegal marketing 
behaviour (see Table 6.14). Therefore, both H8c and H8d are accepted. According to 
the standardised co-efficient, the existence of a large fine accounts for a greater 
change in levels of behavioural intent than publicity. Likewise, as expected, a positive 
relationship exists between potential rewards and behavioural intent. This shows that 
future illegal behaviour is seen as more attractive when the likely rewards are greater, 
which supports H8e. 
 
e) Impact of Knowledge 
 
Because two of the scenarios used to measure knowledge depicted legal behaviour 
and two of the scenarios depicted illegal behaviour (See Appendix 1), the results were 
coded on a one to five scale based on the extent to which the respondent correctly 
assessed the scenario’s legality, with five representing ‘knowledgeable’ and one 
representing ‘no knowledge’. For example, a respondent would receive a five for 
knowledge if they identified an illegal scenario as being ‘obviously illegal’ or a legal 
scenario as being ‘obviously legal’. This was repeated for the four scenarios. Each 
response was coded as one if it corresponded to a legal scenario and negative one if it 
corresponded to an illegal scenario. These were then multiplied by the knowledge 
score, so that respondents would receive an overall score ranging from negative five 
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to five. A score of negative five designated that the respondent knew an illegal 
scenario was illegal and a score of five designated knowing that a legal scenario was 
legal. This allowed for the impact of knowledge to be investigated for both legal and 
illegal scenarios simultaneously.  
 
The results show a positive relationship between knowledge and behavioural intent 
(see Table 6.14). This suggests that, in situations where knowledge of the legality of 
an illegal scenario is higher, the likelihood of engaging in that behaviour is lower. 
Likewise, in situations where knowledge of a legal scenario is higher, the likelihood 
of engaging in that behaviour is higher. This supports H11 and suggests that 
unintentional illegality is more likely to occur in situations where legal knowledge is 
poorer. 
 
f) Summary of Behavioural Intent Results 
 
Table 6.15 illustrates the hypotheses that were accepted or rejected. No hypotheses 
pertaining to conditions of motive were fully supported. While a relationship existed 
between market-share and behavioural intent, it is in the opposite direction to that 
proposed. In terms of conditions of opportunity, industry sector was found to have an 
impact on behavioural intent. However, there was no relationship found to exist with 
firm size or perceived industry transgression. All hypotheses in relation to the control 
variables were supported, with the exception of perceived risk of detection, although a 
relationship does exist when the risk of detection is combined with having previously 
been caught transgressing marketing law. Knowledge of the law also has an impact on 
behavioural intent. 
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Table 6.15: Summary of the Findings Related to Behavioural Intent 
 
Hypothesis Factor Accept/Reject 
  Motive   
H6a Profitability Reject 
H6b Market-share Opposite Sign 
H6c Competition Reject 
  Opportunity   
H7a Firm Size Reject 
H7b Industry Sector Partial Accept 
H7c Perception of Incidents of Industry Transgression Reject 
  Control   
H8a Compliance Accept 
H8b Perceived Risk of Detection Reject 
H8c Fine Accept 
H8d Publicity Accept 
H8e Reward Accept 
H9 Perceived Risk of Detection * Caught Transgressing Accept 
H10 Compliance Programme * Caught Transgressing Opposite Sign 
H11 Knowledge Accept 
 
 
6.6. The Relationship between Compliance, Risk, Knowledge, and Behavioural 
Intent 
 
As seen in Figure 6.12, it was hypothesised that knowledge of the law would be 
greater in the firms with more comprehensive compliance programmes and where 
perceptions of the risk of a transgression being detected by regulatory agencies are 
higher: 
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Figure 6.12: Relationships between Compliance, Risk, Knowledge, and 
Behavioural Intent 
 
 
 
The results obtained are outlined in Table 6.16: 
 
Table 6.16: Parameter Estimates for the Relationships between Risk, 
Compliance, Knowledge, and Behavioural Intent 
 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Estimate Std. Error 
Perceived Risk of Detection Knowledge 0.513* 0.201 
Compliance Programme 
(Overall) Knowledge 0.060 0.053 
Compliance Programme 
(Employee Education) Knowledge 0.444* 0.212 
* = p <0.05, ** = p <0.01 
 
To investigate the relationship between the two continuous variables of compliance 
and knowledge, a multiple linear regression was employed. No relationship was found 
between overall compliance and knowledge; however, a positive relationship was 
found to exist between compliance and knowledge in terms of employee education 
(one aspect of a compliance programme). This suggests that firms that have more 
comprehensive compliance programmes (in terms of employee knowledge) have 
greater knowledge of marketing law than those with less comprehensive programmes, 
meaning H12 is partially supported. Linear regression was also used to analyse the 
relationship between perceived risk of detection and knowledge of marketing law, and 
Compliance 
Programme (Partial 
Accept) 
Perceived Risk of 
Detection 
(Accept) Increased 
knowledge (Accept) Behavioural Intent 
+ 
+ 
- 
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a positive relationship was found to exist. This suggests that, when firms perceive the 
risk of detection to be high, their knowledge of the law is greater, supporting H13. 
Previous findings (H11) have shown that increased knowledge reduces intent to 
engage in future illegal marketing behaviour. The results also suggest that, in addition 
to the direct impact of compliance programmes on future behaviour, they may also 
have an indirect impact through knowledge. This suggests that knowledge of the law 
may act as a mediating variable between perceived risk or compliance and 
behavioural intent. Table 6.17 summarises these findings. 
  
Table 6.17: Summary of the Findings for the Relationships between Risk, 
Compliance, Knowledge, and Behavioural Intent 
 
Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable Accept/Reject 
H11 Knowledge Behavioural Intent Accept 
H12 Compliance Programme  Knowledge Partial Accept 
H13 Perceived Risk of Detection Knowledge Accept 
 
 
6.7. Social Desirability Bias 
 
As noted earlier, there is a danger that respondents might tend to under-report their 
intent to engage in socially undesirable behaviour, in relation to others (Chung and 
Monroe, 2003). To account for this, some respondents were asked to rate the likely 
intent to transgress of both of their own firms’ and their competitors. Responses were 
coded as dummy variables, with those relating to how the respondent would behave 
coded as 0 and those relating to their competitor as 1. This was included as part of the 
mixed model, which resulted in a positive relationship (t=9.977, p<0.01). This finding 
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suggests that respondents believe their competitors are more likely to transgress than 
they themselves, possibly indicating the existence of social desirability bias.  
 
 
6.8. Covariance and Social Desirability Bias 
 
To this point the analysis has been conducted at the aggregate level, that is the mean 
effect across all firms. It is now prudent to consider the covariance around those 
means at the firm level for the manipulated variables: punishment (fine/publicity), 
reward, and whether a respondent was answering from their own perspective or their 
competitors. This covariance also has an impact on the aggregate model.  By 
analysing variance components, the contribution of the random effects on the total 
variance in the dependent variable can be determined (SPSS, 2006).  
 
In the past, one problem with hierarchical models was that they could only be used in 
perfectly balanced designs when estimating variance and covariance components. For 
a design to be balanced, each unit requires exactly the same sample size and an 
identical distribution of predictors. Fortunately, the mixed procedure is capable of 
handling unbalanced designs by using maximum likelihood procedures (Raudenbush 
and Bryk, 2002). Assuming normality, the likelihood function is maximised, based on 
a set of parameters that include both fixed and variance components. 
 
Table 6.18 illustrates the results for covariance from the mixed procedure. There is a 
significant variation in the results (at the 0.05 level) between firms for all variables: 
small fine, large fine, publicity, reward, and whether respondents were answering as 
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themselves or their competitors. The greatest proportion of variation between 
respondents (36%) is accounted for by respondent perspective (i.e., whether 
answering for their own firm or their competitor (social desirability)). The potential of 
a large fine also accounts for a large (26%) proportion of the variance. The potential 
for negative publicity accounts for 19% of the variance, with the potential of a small 
fine or reward accounting for 12% and 11% of the variance, respectively. When 
removing the error accounted for by social desirability (36%), the results show that 
large fine accounts for 38% of the variance, negative publicity accounts for 28% of 
the variance, with the potential for a small fine or reward accounting for 18%, and 
16% of the variance, respectively. 
 
Table 6.18: Estimates of Covariance Parameters for the Mixed Model  
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 
Residual 1.688 0.039 
Small Fine  Variance 0.611** 0.104 
Large Fine Variance 1.301** 0.202 
Publicity  Variance 0.973** 0.181 
Reward  Variance 0.537** 0.090 
Own Firm/Competitor  Variance 1.670** 0.247 
**= p<0.01 
 
In this section the results pertaining to future firm behaviour have been analysed. In 
this, and the previous section, the analysis has included both intentional and 
unintentional illegality. In the next section the issue of intentional illegality only is 
explored and how this differs from the overall results. 
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6.9. Exploratory Analysis: Intentional versus Non-intentional Transgression 
 
Unlike previous studies in this area, both intentional and unintentional illegal 
behaviour were included in the analysis. This could explain some differences between 
the results obtained here and those from previous research that focussed only on 
behaviour that the firm knew or should have known was illegal (Baucus, 1994). 
Recognising this, further analysis was conducted to explore how the results might 
differ when only intentional behaviour was investigated, suggesting that, in some 
instances, firms transgress the law due to a lack of knowledge. The purpose of this 
exploratory analysis was to determine how the results might differ if this 
‘unintentional behaviour’ is separated out.  
 
In order to investigate this aspect, most of the same procedures were used as before. 
The dependent variable ‘behavioural intent’ was measured using only the two illegal 
scenarios in the survey instrument. This means that the dependent variable could now 
be termed as intent to transgress. All respondents that failed to determine the illegality 
of these scenarios were removed from the analysis (i.e. were deemed to be 
unknowledgable). This meant that the responses being analysed were only for those 
respondents that correctly recognised the illegality of an illegal scenario. As a result, 
those firms that intended to engage in that particular behaviour could be classed as 
doing so intentionally. In addition, since all respondents were deemed to be 
knowledgeable, the independent variable ‘knowledge’ was removed from the model. 
All other independent variables remained the same.  
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While this analysis does not explain any specific hypotheses, it was included to gain a 
better understanding of the overall transgression process by separating out intentional 
and unintentional transgressions and to help explain why some hypotheses were 
accepted or rejected.  
 
The model fit is illustrated in Table 6.19; the results are illustrated in Table 6.20 and 
are described in detail below:  
 
Table 6.19: Exploratory Analysis Model Fit 
 
Akaike's Information 
Criterion (AIC) 4308.129 
Hurvich and Tsai's 
Criterion (AICC) 4308.191 
Bozdogan's Criterion 
(CAIC) 4345.447 
Schwarz's Bayesian 
Criterion (BIC) 4339.447 
. 
Table 6.20: Parameter Estimates for the Exploratory Analysis 
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 
Motive     
Profitability  0.071 0.060 
Market-Share  0.345** 0.083 
Number of Competitors (0-5) -0.550* 2.800 
Number of Competitors (6-10)) -0.978** 0.273 
Number of Competitors (11-20) -0.514 0.271 
Number of Competitors (21-50) -0.733 0.348 
Number of Competitors (50+) 0(a) 0 
Level of Competition -0.039 0.101 
Opportunity     
Firm Size (Small) -0.127 0.263 
Firm Size (medium) -0.622** 0.201 
Firm Size (Large) 0(a) 0 
Perception of Incidents of Industry 
Transgression  0.497 0.121 
Industry Sector (Retail) -0.098 0.336 
Industry Sector (Service) -0.801** 0.237 
Industry Sector (Importer/Wholesaler)  0.830** 0.255 
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Parameter Estimate Std. Error 
Industry Sector (other)  0.221 0.232 
Industry Sector (Manufacturer) 0(a) 0 
Control     
Small Fine -0.221* 0.112 
Large Fine -1.355** 0.142 
Publicity -0.745** 0.134 
Reward  0.535** 0.091 
Perceived Risk of Detection (ACCC) -0.718** 0.209 
Compliance Programme  0.063 0.066 
Caught Transgressing * Perceived Risk 
of Detection  0.329 0.209 
Caught Transgressing * Compliance 
Programme -0.126 0.070 
(a) This Parameter is set to zero because it is redundant 
**= p<.01, *= P<.05 
 
6.9.1. Motive 
 
Consistent with the primary analysis, profitability and level of competition have no 
impact on intent to transgress. Also consistent with the primary analysis, market-share 
has a positive relationship with intent to transgress. While the level of competition has 
no impact on intent to transgress, differences exist according to the number of 
competitors. Firms with either 21 to 50 or 6-10 competitors are less likely than firms 
with 51+ competitors to consider an illegal action. This suggests that H6c may apply 
in certain situations, although, as with the analysis on previous transgression detection, 
it is in the opposite direction to that proposed. 
 
6.9.2. Opportunity   
 
While firm size had no impact on the likelihood that a future transgression might 
occur in the primary analysis, a relationship exists for those respondents that are 
knowledgeable of the law. Medium sized firms are less likely to transgress than large 
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firms. No significant difference was found to exist between small and large firms and 
small and medium firms, however. These results are similar to those from the analysis 
of firm size’s impact on whether a firm had been previously caught transgressing 
marketing law. This suggests that H7a may be supported in certain circumstances and 
that the relationship between size and transgression may have been negated by 
including firms that unintentionally transgress the law in the analysis. A relationship 
was also found between perceived industry transgressions and intent to transgress. 
Such a relationship did not exist in the primary analysis, suggesting that perceptions 
of industry behaviour can influence transgressions that are intentional, and that H7c 
may be supported in certain circumstances. In terms of industry sector, a similar result 
exists as in the primary analysis.  
 
6.9.3. Control 
 
As with the primary analysis, the potential for receiving a fine and/or negative 
publicity reduces intent to transgress in the future, while greater reward increases the 
likelihood. Unlike the primary analysis, however, the perceived risk of detection was 
found to reduce intent to transgress. This suggests that risk of detection is only 
relevant to intentional behaviour, and that H8b may be accepted under certain 
circumstances. Unlike the primary analysis, there is no direct relationship between the 
existence and comprehensiveness of a compliance programme and intent to transgress. 
Lastly, there is no relationship for either of the interaction effects. 
 
As with the primary analysis, a social desirability bias appears to exist. A difference 
for intentional behaviour was found between the likelihood respondents would engage 
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in a particular activity themselves and their perception of the likelihood their 
competitors would engage in the same behaviour. 
 
6.9.4. Analysis of Covariance and Social Desirability Bias 
 
Table 6.21 illustrates the covariance results obtained from the mixed procedure for 
firms that are knowledgeable of the law. As with the primary analysis, there is a 
significant variation in the results for all variables (small fine, large fine, publicity, 
reward, and whether respondents were answering for their own firm or their 
competitors). The greatest proportion of variation between respondents (36%) is 
accounted for by whether they are answering as themselves or their competitors. The 
potential of a large fine accounts for the second largest variance with 25%. The 
potential for negative publicity accounts for 17% of the variance, with the potential of 
a small fine or reward accounting for 13% and 9% of the variance, respectively. When 
the error accounted for by social desirability is removed, results show that the 
potential of a large fine accounts for 39% of the variance. The potential for negative 
publicity accounts for 26% of the variance, with the potential of a small fine or reward 
accounting for 20% and 14% of the variance, respectively.   
 
Table 6.21: Estimates of Covariance Parameters for the Exploratory Analysis 
 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error 
Residual 0.518 0.026 
Small Fine  Variance 0.950** 0.161 
Large Fine Variance 1.822** 0.294 
Publicity  Variance 1.220** 0.241 
Reward  Variance 0.656** 0.116 
Your Firm/Competitor  Variance 2.579** 0.392 
**= p<.001 
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6.10. Conclusion 
 
This chapter described the analysis of results from the primary data collection phase. 
The results show that, for previously detected transgressions of marketing law, the 
motive variable control, the opportunity variable firm size, and the control variables 
of risk and compliance all had an impact. However, the relationship between 
competition and having previously been caught transgressing was in the opposite 
direction to that hypothesised. Perceived risk and compliance appear to be 
consequences of having previously been caught, which, in turn, influences whether 
future illegal behaviour will occur. In terms of perceived risk, a relationship only 
exists for firms that have previously been caught transgressing marketing law. 
Compliance programmes may also influence future behaviour, since greater 
knowledge reduces behavioural intent. Potential sanctions and rewards also influence 
behavioural intent, as do market-share and industry sector. The analysis took account 
of the potential for social desirability bias, and for the first time in this field of 
research, investigated the difference between intentional and non-intentional 
transgression.  Firm size, industry behaviour, and perceptions of the risk of detection 
only appear to have an effect on future behaviour for ‘intentional’ behaviour. The next 
chapter provides an in-depth discussion of these results. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion  
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an in-depth discussion of the results described in the previous 
chapter. The first part discusses firm re-offending and some of the implications of the 
secondary analysis from Chapter 4. The second part discusses the findings that relate 
to the first component of the model, encompassing the impact of motive, opportunity, 
and control variables on previously detected marketing law transgressions. In addition, 
the findings regarding changes in perceived risk and the existence and 
comprehensiveness of a compliance programme that result from the detection of a 
previous transgression are also discussed. The third part discusses the results 
pertaining to the relationships between motive, opportunity, control, and behavioural 
intent. Finally, the differences between intentional future behaviour and unintentional 
future behaviour found in the exploratory analysis are explored. 
 
 
7.2. Firm Re-offending 
 
It is clear from the secondary analysis that multiple transgressions do occur. Some 
Australian firms have transgressed marketing law on more than one occasion, with an 
11% likelihood that a firm will re-offend within eight years of its initial transgression 
having been detected. It is particularly interesting to note that the highest rate of re-
offending occurred within the first year after the initial detection of a marketing law 
 211 
 
 
 
transgression and, in the majority of cases, the second offence occurred within five 
years. One possible reason for the short time period between transgressions is that the 
punishment meted out for the initial transgression was of little consequence or did not 
outweigh the rewards that resulted from that act (Smith et al, 2007). An additional 
explanation may be that, when a firm receives a warning or conviction, it is 
subsequently monitored more closely by regulatory agencies. Increased monitoring 
increases the risk that other transgressions will be detected. If a firm is found to have 
committed multiple transgressions it will most likely face more serious consequences. 
For example, firms that did not change their behaviour after providing a written 
undertaking to do so were then taken to court. Transgression reports demonstrate that 
a number of firms were prosecuted because they did not change their behaviour as a 
result of providing a written undertaking or settlement agreement (ACCC, 2007). In 
other cases, it can be speculated that subsequent transgressions were not linked to the 
initial occurrence. For example, they may have occurred in separate divisions of the 
firm or been the result of different circumstances.  
 
The results of the hazard analysis demonstrate that the greater the number of previous 
transgressions in which a firm has been involved, the greater the likelihood of re-
offending. Firms with a history of offending often become committed to repeated 
transgressions. Such firms may be less concerned about the consequences of their 
actions, or have found that the negative consequences are not a sufficient deterrent to 
counteract the benefits gained (Bromiley and Marcus, 1989). A history of repeated 
transgressions may also indicate a corporate culture that encourages illegal behaviour. 
In firms with such a culture, the risk of re-offending is likely to be considerably 
higher (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Finney and Lesieur, 1982; Baucus and Near, 1991). 
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7.3. The Impact of Motive, Opportunity, and Control on Previous 
Transgressions 
 
In this section the results pertaining to the impact of motive, opportunity, and control 
on previous detected transgressions of marketing law are discussed. 
 
7.3.1. Motive 
 
Of the motive variables tested, only level of competition had an impact on previous 
transgression detection, albeit in the opposite direction to that which had been 
hypothesised. This suggests that firms with fewer direct competitors operating in less 
competitive environments were more likely to have been caught transgressing 
marketing law than those with more competitors in highly competitive environments. 
While most previous research has found a positive relationship between competition 
and previous transgression (Baucus and Near, 1991; Hoffman et al, 1991), the 
findings of this research corroborate those studies which suggested that firm 
behaviour tends to be more ethical/legal in the face of increased competition 
(Kriesberg, 1976; Szwajkowski, 1985; Schneider and Johnson, 1992; Baucus, 1994). 
Schneider and Johnson (1992), for example, found that some firms believed extra 
competition ‘weeded out’ marginal operators that relied on questionable practices to 
do business. It has also been suggested that greater competition creates financial 
pressure, which can make transgressors more vulnerable to sanctions (Hoffman et al, 
1991; Kennedy and Lawton, 1993). It is apparent from the database of Trade Practices 
Act (1974) transgressions that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) has a strong focus on reducing anti-competitive conduct, such as monopoly 
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and cartel behaviour (ACCC, 2007). It can, therefore, be argued that a number of 
firms might have been caught transgressing due to the fact that they operated in 
industries with little competition. This finding also supports Kriesberg’s (1976) 
proposition that the increased bargaining power enjoyed by firms with less 
competition creates an opportunity for questionable behaviour to occur. Firms that 
face less competitive pressure experience fewer restrictions and, as a result, might feel 
less inhibited from engaging in illegal behaviour. Lastly, it has been suggested that, in 
industries with little competition, the opportunity for collusion could be greater 
(Szwajkowski, 1985). These results suggest that less competition could instead be 
considered as an opportunity for transgressing marketing law, rather than a motive. 
This was proposed by Baucus (1994), based on the reasoning that intense competition 
does not create pressure, but rather an opportunity, which can lead to transgression.  
 
Somewhat surprisingly, neither the performance measures of profitability nor market-
share had any impact on whether a firm had previously been caught transgressing 
marketing law. This finding provides further evidence that profit pressure is not, as 
suggested by McCagy (1976), the most compelling factor behind deviance in 
industry. Moreover, these results support the more (relatively) recent findings by 
Simpson (1986), Baucus and Near (1991), Hill et al (1992), and McKendall and 
Wagner (1997), that profitability is not a major determinant of illegal corporate 
behaviour. On the contrary, as Baucus and Near (1991) noted, pressure and need may 
not be the primary reason for illegal behaviour, as had been the predominant view in 
the literature. Baucus and Near (1991) proposed that less pressure might actually 
increase the likelihood of transgression, as evidenced by the negative relationship 
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found in this research between competition and detection of previous transgressions 
of marketing law.  
 
7.3.2. Opportunity  
 
As expected, large firms (101+ employees) were more likely than medium sized firms 
(21 to 100 employees) to have had previously been caught transgressing marketing 
law. This result supports the findings of Cochran and Nigh (1987), Dalton and Kesner 
(1988), Baucus and Near (1991), and McKendall et al (1999), who have previously 
demonstrated a positive relationship between firm size and transgression. A number 
of reasons have been advanced as to why such a relationship might exist. One is that, 
in larger firms, there are simply more people who could potentially engage in illegal 
behaviour. Another is that the added complexity of large firms provides a greater 
opportunity for communication and co-ordination breakdowns (Baucus and Near, 
1991). Control mechanisms might also not be able to keep pace with firm growth, 
thus creating an opportunity to transgress the law in the absence of any rules to 
control these behaviours (Baucus and Near, 1991). Larger firms might also be better 
placed to absorb the impact of any sanctions they might receive after the detection of 
a transgression. Furthermore, such firms may be more willing to risk the view that a 
transgression would not be detected, or to accept the risk of detection if they suspect 
the punishment will be inconsequential, especially if the likely rewards are 
favourable. Finally, it is also possible that, simply because larger firms are more 
visible, they tend to be more targeted by regulatory agencies (Clinard and Yeager, 
1980). Larger firms might, therefore, be over-represented in the list of firms caught 
transgressing marketing laws. Given finite resources, regulatory agencies are more 
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likely to a focus on easier, more visible targets (Baucus and Near, 1991; McKendall et 
al, 1999). Interestingly, the relationship with transgression only exists in large and 
medium sized firms. It could be argued that this is because small firms may transgress 
the law in order to better compete with large firms (Vitell and Festervand, 1987). It is 
also possible that small firms transgress the law more unintentionally as a result of 
poor legal knowledge (Peterson, 2001a). 
 
Consistent with the findings of the secondary data analysis, no relationship was found 
between industry sector and previous detection of marketing law transgression. This 
supports the previous findings of Laczniak and Inderrieden (1987) and Akaah and 
Riordan (1989), who suggested that transgressions may transcend industry sector. 
Alternatively, this result may simply be due to the fact that the industry categories 
provided in this study were quite broad and encompassed a wide range of firms with 
quite different characteristics. Neither was any relationship found between perceived 
industry transgression as common practice and previous detection of marketing law 
transgression. This finding suggests that industry culture has no effect on 
transgression. The results of the secondary data analysis, however, suggest that the 
likelihood of future transgressions increases with the number of previous 
transgression detections. In some firms, a pattern of transgression may develop, which 
becomes part of the firm’s corporate culture (Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Finney and 
Lesieur, 1982; Baucus and Near, 1991). These findings, therefore, suggest that, while 
industry culture might not have influenced transgressions, corporate culture may have 
played an important role. 
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7.3.3. Control Variables and Changes in Behaviour after a Transgression is 
Detected 
 
The results show that, while the control variables (risk of detection and the existence 
and comprehensiveness of a compliance programme) have an impact on whether a 
firm has been caught transgressing marketing law, the direction of the relationship is 
opposite to that generally proposed in the literature. These findings may be due to 
time-ordering effects, which can occur in cross-sectional studies (McKendall and 
Wagner, 1997), when internal or external conditions change in the time between when 
a transgression has occurred and the research is conducted. McKendall and Wagner 
(1997) found temporal issues to have no effect on their results; however; in this 
research, temporal effects do appear to have an impact. The results show that a firm’s 
perceived risk of detection increases and compliance programmes are introduced, as a 
direct result of a previous transgression having been detected. The cross-sectional 
nature of the survey used in this research meant that it was conducted after certain 
firms had been caught transgressing. Therefore, their perception of the likelihood of a 
future transgression being detected is potentially much higher than prior to the initial 
detection. A similar situation may also exist with compliance programmes. After a 
transgression has been detected, a firm may decide to introduce a compliance 
programme to ensure no further transgressions occur. Alternatively, a firm may be 
required to introduce such a programme as a result of the sanctions imposed by the 
courts or regulatory agencies (Le Clair et al, 1997; ACCC, 2007). These findings 
provide further evidence that transgression of the law is a dynamic process, involving 
both antecedents and consequences (Finney and Lesieur, 1982). In this case, having 
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previous transgressions detected by regulatory agencies changes a firm’s subsequent 
behaviour, which may, in turn, affect the likelihood of future transgressions occurring. 
 
In order to better test the dynamic process, further analysis was undertaken to 
determine the impact that previous detection of marketing law transgressions might 
have on a firm’s perceived risk of detection and the existence and comprehensiveness 
of a compliance programme. The results show a significant positive relationship, 
which provides further evidence that both increased perceptions of risk and the 
existence and comprehensiveness of compliance programmes are consequences of 
having previously been caught transgressing marketing law, as well as, or instead of, 
being antecedents. This supports the proposition of Finney and Lesieur (1982) that the 
detection of previous transgressions results in changes to firms’ behaviour. 
 
 
7.4. Future Behaviour 
 
In addition to illustrating the factors that influence whether a firm has previously been 
caught transgressing marketing law, the results also suggest the factors that might 
influence the likelihood of a firm engaging in future illegal marketing behaviour. As 
with other research in the business ethics field, this study measured intent rather than 
actual behaviour (Weber and Gillespie, 1998).  The inclusion of behavioural intent in 
the model allowed for several variables such as fines, publicity, and rewards to be 
manipulated.  Variables such as knowledge could also be controlled for, without the 
influence of time-ordering effects. Where matching data were available, it was 
expected that the results would be consistent with the results examining the factors 
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influencing previous detection of marketing law transgression. While the findings are 
similar, there are some noticeable differences, as discussed below.  
 
7.4.1. Knowledge 
 
As expected, knowledge of the law has an impact on behavioural intent. The more 
that firms correctly assessed the illegality of a scenario, the less likely they would be 
to engage in the behaviour described in that scenario. This finding suggests that many 
firms are unlikely to knowingly engage in illegal behaviour (or are unwilling to admit 
it). When assessing a legal scenario, the more that firms correctly assessed the legality 
of the scenario, the more likely they would be to engage in the behaviour described in 
that scenario. This is logical since, if an action is perceived as legal, there would be no 
legal barriers against engaging in the behaviour. The main issue would be whether 
that action provided a commercial benefit to the firm.  
 
The results provide a strong indication that greater knowledge of the law can reduce 
the likelihood of future transgressions occurring. If lesser knowledge increases the 
likelihood of transgression, then the issue of unintentional transgression, as suggested 
by Baucus (1994), is an important one. Firms that wrongly perceive an action to be 
legal and, as a result, engage in that activity, place themselves at risk of having the 
transgression detected and punished. Lack of intent is not a defence under the Trade 
Practices Act (1974). A number of firms also appeared highly risk averse. These were 
firms that rated a legal scenario as being legal yet still had no intention of engaging in 
the described behaviour. It is likely that, for some firms, the described behaviours are 
not appropriate for their circumstances, regardless of legality. Many firms, however, 
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could be missing out on the opportunity to engage in activities that could improve 
their performance, simply by virtue of lack of knowledge or confidence in their 
knowledge of the law (Cohen, 1996). 
 
7.4.2. Future Transgressions and Control 
 
A major objective of the analysis on future behaviour was to determine the effect that 
controls (risk of detection, sanctions, potential rewards, and compliance programmes) 
have on behavioural intent. The results demonstrate that the possibility of receiving a 
fine reduces intent to engage in future illegal marketing behaviour. The potential for a 
large fine had the greatest impact on behavioural intent of all the variables tested. The 
sanctions also need not be court-imposed fines, since the potential for adverse 
publicity also reduces behavioural intent. Baucus and Baucus (1997) found that, over 
the course of five years, firms that had been convicted of illegal behaviour had a 
lower return on assets, lower sales growth, and lower income, partly as a result of the 
negative impact that the detection of the transgression had on stakeholders. For some 
firms, negative publicity may be considered worse than a one-off fine, since it has the 
potential to create longer term harm, such as lost sales (Baucus and Baucus, 1997). 
The results of this study, however, suggest that, all things being equal, financial 
penalties are a greater deterrent than the possibility of adverse publicity. It can be 
speculated that this may be because the fine specified in the survey was a dollar value 
so the firm had a specific idea of the resultant harm, whereas the concept of adverse 
publicity is more ambiguous, making it harder to fully comprehend the implications.  
The results show that there is no direct relationship between the perceived risk of 
detection and behavioural intent. A relationship does, however, exist between these 
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variables for firms that have previously been caught transgressing marketing law. 
Thus, firms that have been previously caught perceive a higher likelihood that future 
transgressions will be detected, and, therefore, are less likely to transgress marketing 
law again. This result supports previous research that suggests that perceived risk of 
detection is a major deterrent to illegal firm behaviour (Laczniak and Inderrieden, 
1987; Fritzsche, 1988; Dabholkar and Kellaris, 1992; Cherry and Fraedrich, 2002). 
The reason this relationship only applies to firms that have previously been caught 
transgressing marketing law may be because previous transgression detection is 
required for a firm to fully comprehend the risk associated with illegal activity. This 
finding suggests that, as hypothesised in the model, having previously been caught 
transgressing marketing law does have an impact on perceptions of risk, which in turn 
influences future behaviour (Finney and Lesieur, 1982).  
 
Furthermore, the results suggest that potential sanctions combined with the risk of 
detection can be effective deterrents to illegal marketing behaviour. These findings 
support the concept behind deterrence theory, which states that the greater the severity 
and certainty of punishment, the less likely a crime will occur (Cole, 1989). It is, 
therefore, important that firms become knowledgeable of the likelihood of detection 
and the potential consequences of their illegal actions.  The only problem with more 
severe sanctions is that they may deter some firms from engaging in legitimate 
marketing behaviour or lead them to introduce unnecessary precautions, for fear of 
transgressing the law (Cohen, 1996).  
 
While sanctions act as a disincentive, the results also show that the potential rewards 
from an illegal act might provide an incentive. This finding helps confirm that the 
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potential rewards resulting from a transgression need to be included in any analysis of 
the propensity of a firm to engage in illegal behaviour (Bromiley and Marcus, 1989). 
Interpretation of the results suggests that it is likely that the decision to intentionally 
transgress marketing law results from weighing up all three factors: the risk of 
detection, potential sanctions, and rewards. In situations where the likely rewards are 
reasonably low, a firm may be less inclined to run the risk of detection and 
punishment. If the rewards are greater, then the firm may be more willing to engage in 
that particular illegal activity, even if the risk of detection and punishment is the same 
(Bromiley and Marcus, 1989).  
 
In addition to external controls, the impact of internal controls was also investigated. 
The results show that firms with more comprehensive compliance programmes are 
less likely to intend to engage in future illegal marketing behaviour. This result 
conflicts with previous research, which showed that compliance programmes often 
have no effect on firms’ behaviour (McKendall et al, 2002). However, in Australia, 
when compliance programmes deal with issues of marketing law, such systems do 
appear to have an impact on reducing intent to engage in illegal marketing behaviour 
(Cohen, 1996). The fact that a compliance programme has been introduced in the first 
instance may be because the firm is risk-averse. If a firm were to introduce a 
programme of its own accord, then it is likely to be concerned about the possibility of 
transgressions occurring and, as a result, will be more cautious with its marketing 
activities. If a firm has introduced a programme for these reasons then it is more likely 
that it will make the effort to ensure that the compliance programme is successful and 
does, in fact, have an effect on actual firm behaviour (Soutar et al, 1994). 
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The primary purpose of a compliance programme is to increase legal knowledge 
amongst employees. This greater knowledge should, in turn, reduce the likelihood of 
transgressions occurring. The results of this study suggest that compliance 
programmes do have the desired effect, which links with the relationship found to 
exist between knowledge and behavioural intent. This relationship illustrates that, 
when legal knowledge was greater, the respondent was more likely to correctly know 
that a scenario is illegal, and therefore, was less likely to engage in that activity, at 
least unintentionally. This suggests that, in addition to a direct effect, compliance 
programmes also have an indirect effect on behavioural intent, through increasing 
knowledge of the law. 
 
The interaction between the existence and comprehensiveness of compliance 
programmes and having previously been caught transgressing shows quite different 
results to those outlined previously. For firms that have previously been caught 
transgressing marketing law, the relationship with behavioural intent becomes 
positive. This means that intent to transgress is greatest for firms that have both 
implemented more comprehensive compliance programmes and previously been 
caught transgressing marketing law. This finding implies that firms may have 
introduced compliance programmes solely as a requirement of the sanctions that they 
received, or as a publicity exercise (Kohut and Corriher, 1994; Soutar et al, 1994; 
LeClair et al, 1997). Where firms have introduced compliance programmes for these 
reasons, their main concern is likely to be one of risk and reward, and therefore 
compliance programmes will have little effect on their behaviour. When a compliance 
programme is introduced unwillingly, there is likely to be much less commitment to 
ensure the programme is effective than when a programme is voluntarily introduced. 
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In the former situation, the firm may be more concerned with showing regulatory 
agencies that the programme exists, making it more of a public relations exercise 
(Kohut and Corriher, 1994; Soutar et al, 1994).  
 
If a firm plans to intentionally transgress the law, the existence of a compliance 
programme is unlikely to stop this occurring. This was confirmed when the analysis 
was limited to actions that respondents correctly recognised as illegal, with no 
relationship found between the existence and comprehensiveness of a compliance 
programme and behavioural intent. Where a firm has previously been caught 
transgressing marketing law and has indicated it intends to do so again in the future, 
there is a strong likelihood that a culture of illegality exists within that firm (Baucus 
and Near, 1991). It can be speculated that one likely reason for the existence of the 
relationship between compliance and behavioural intent was that the concept of 
knowledge was included in the analysis. There is, therefore, a need for care when 
advocating the use of compliance programmes, since they may not be effective in all 
situations, especially where intent to transgress the law exists and there is a past 
history of transgression. 
 
7.4.3. Motive 
 
The impact of motive and opportunity on behavioural intent was also investigated. 
With regards to motive, no relationship was found to exist between profitability and 
behavioural intent, which is consistent with the results from the analysis of firms that 
had previously been caught transgressing marketing law. This provides further 
evidence that lower profitability is not always a motive for illegal behaviour (Baucus 
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and Near, 1991). Unlike the relationship with firms that have previously been caught 
transgressing marketing law, market-share does have an impact on behavioural intent, 
although, interestingly, the result was in the opposite direction to that hypothesised. 
This suggests that firms with a higher market-share are more likely (rather than less 
likely as was hypothesised) to engage in illegal marketing behaviour. It is possible 
that, instead of lower market-share creating pressure to improve performance, the 
dominant position created by higher market-share might leads firms to think that they 
can engage in illegal behaviour and not get caught (Szwajkowski, 1985). It can be 
argued that firms with higher market-share might also be less concerned about the 
consequences associated with any sanctions they might receive, since they are in a 
better position to absorb them financially. This finding suggests that higher market-
share might, in fact, create an opportunity for future transgressions of marketing law, 
in a similar manner to the way competition might create an opportunity in the 
situation of previously detected transgressions.  
 
Surprisingly, given that this relationship was found to exist with having previously 
been caught transgressing marketing law, no relationship was found to exist between 
competition and behavioural intent.  One of the reasons why competition has no effect 
(and why market-share has no relationship with having previously been caught 
transgressing marketing law, yet competition does) might be that competition is 
highly correlated with market-share, i.e. firms with higher market-share tend to have 
fewer competitors. It could, thus, be speculated that the issue is one of market power 
or market concentration. The impact of competition on behavioural intent may not be 
related to the actual number of competitors (Szwajkowski, 1985). Even if they have a 
large number of competitors, it is possible that firms with higher market-share do not 
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consider many of their competitors a threat, given their dominant position in the 
market (Szwajkowski, 1985). These findings further support the proposition that 
pressure does not lead to illegal behaviour (Baucus, 1994). Instead, it appears that less 
pressure creates greater opportunities for illegality to occur. 
 
7.4.4. Opportunity 
 
The results showed that firm size has no impact on behavioural intent. This is an 
interesting result given that a relationship was found to exist between firm size and 
previously having been caught transgressing marketing law. This finding may be due 
to the inclusion in the model of actions resulting from a lack of knowledge of the law, 
since size does influence future behaviour when it is intentional. When the firms with 
poor knowledge of the law are removed from the model, medium sized firms are less 
likely to intend to transgress marketing law than large firms. However, no relationship 
was found to exist between small and large firms, which is consistent with the result 
for previously detected transgressions. These findings suggest that firm size only has 
an impact on behavioural intent when the respondent is knowledgeable about the legal 
status of a particular action. For such firms, any resulting transgression could be 
classed as intentional.  It is not surprising that firm size has an impact on intentional 
illegality, given that previous research has shown smaller firms to be less 
knowledgeable of the law (Peterson, 2001a), with such firms being more likely to be 
involved in an unintentional transgression. These results can be interpreted as partially 
explaining why size has no impact on behavioural intent for the main analysis, since 
both intentional and unintentional transgressions are working against each other. 
Larger firms may be more likely to engage in intentional transgressions because they 
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are better able to absorb the negative consequences as well as to calculate and assess 
the risks versus the rewards (Baucus and Near, 1991; McKendall et al, 2002).  
 
The impact of firm size on the dynamic transgression process is also supported by the 
findings of the secondary data analysis. The analysis revealed that public firms are 
more at risk of re-offending than private firms. Generally, in Australia, public firms 
are larger than private ones, with the dataset in this research including public firms 
which represent some of the largest, most powerful firms in Australia. From this it can 
be inferred that larger firms are more at risk of re-offending. Such firms are less likely 
to be affected by the negative consequences that result from the detection of a 
transgression and are, thus, more likely to take a chance that the transgression will not 
be detected (McKendall et al, 2002). As suggested earlier, larger firms are also much 
more complex, with greater numbers of employees and various subunits, all of whom 
can potentially engage in illegal marketing behaviour (Baucus, 1994; McKendall et al, 
1999). This complexity increases the potential for transgressions to occur.  In many 
cases, these transgressions may not be linked, but will still cause the rate of re-
offending to increase. The totality of these results suggests that, in certain 
circumstances, firm size can have an impact on behavioural intent.  
 
The perception that transgression is common industry practice was not found to 
impact on behavioural intent in the main analysis. A relationship was found to exist, 
however, where the sample was limited to firms that were knowledgeable of the law. 
This suggests that the relationship between a firm’s perceptions of its own and 
competitors’ behaviour only applies in situations where the respondent is 
knowledgeable of the law. It can be argued that this is because these perceptions are 
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more related to issues of intentional rather than unintentional transgression. It is 
possible that a firm might observe other firms successfully engaging in a particular 
activity and copy that behaviour, without realising it is illegal. It is more likely, 
however, to be a conscious decision to engage in an illegal act based on competitors’ 
behaviour. If a firm’s competitors are performing successfully as a result of illegal 
activities, then it may become increasingly difficult for a firm to only choose legal 
behaviours, since they could be placed at a significant competitive disadvantage. 
These firms could then engage in what becomes increasingly seen as standard 
industry practice (Baucus and Near, 1991). One problem is a tendency to believe that 
questionable behaviour is more common than it actually is. Illegal behaviour could 
then occur based on this misconception (Halbesleben et al, 2005).  
 
Finally, unlike with previously being caught transgressing marketing law, some 
differences were found to exist in the relationship between different industry sectors 
and behavioural intent. Firms in the service industry are less likely to intend to engage 
in future illegal marketing behaviour than manufacturers (the base case). Conversely, 
importers and wholesalers are more likely to intend to engage in future illegal 
marketing behaviour than manufacturers. No differences were found to exist between 
retailers and firms classified as ‘other’ than manufacturers. Interpretation of the 
results suggests that firms that do not deal directly with consumers i.e. manufacturers, 
and importers/wholesalers are more likely to transgress marketing law. One of the 
objectives of the Trade Practices Act (1974) is to protect consumers, which is 
particularly the case with the misleading advertising and product quality provisions. 
In most cases where a consumer makes a complaint, it usually relates to a retailer or a 
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service provider (i.e. the party they dealt with), rather than the manufacturer or the 
importer/wholesaler.  
 
 
7.5. Modified Model of Transgressing Marketing Law 
 
Given that the primary focus of this research was to develop and test a model of the 
process for the transgression of marketing law, in the light of the study, a modified 
model is provided in Figure 7.1. This model was solely based on the results discussed 
above and those hypotheses supported by the analysis. 
 
The model works as follows. Firms might have been caught transgressing marketing 
law as a result of conditions of motive and opportunity. The only motive to have an 
impact is competition. While the model shows competition as a motive, the results 
suggest that it should instead be considered as an opportunity variable (Kriesberg, 
1976; Baucus, 1994). This is because firms facing less competition are more likely to 
have been caught transgressing marketing law. Larger firm size also creates 
opportunity for transgressions to occur. In the modified model, the variables of risk, 
compliance, and knowledge have been removed, due to the predicted bias created by 
time-ordering effects (McKendall and Wagner, 1997), as shown in Figure 7.1 below: 
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Figure 7.1: Modified Dynamic Model of Transgressing Marketing Law 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 also shows that once a transgression has been detected by regulatory 
agencies, a firm’s perceptions of the risk associated with the likelihood of a 
transgression being detected increases. Perceptions of risk will then influence 
behavioural intent. The greater the perceived risk, the less likely a transgression will 
occur. For firms that have previously been caught transgressing marketing law, their 
altered (higher) perceptions of risk make them less likely to transgress the law in the 
future than those firms that have not previously been caught transgressing. Future 
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behaviour is also influenced by a firm’s perceptions of the likely sanctions and 
rewards associated with the risk of detection. Where the likely punishment is greater 
than the reward, intent to transgress will be lower. Conversely, when the potential 
rewards are higher, intent will also be higher. 
 
Perceptions of risk do not necessarily have a direct impact on behavioural intent, 
however. Perceptions of risk can also influence the extent to which a firm has a 
compliance programme. This might particularly be the case for firms that have 
inadvertently transgressed the law and want to ensure that it does not happen again. It 
could also simply be that, having analysed the risk of future detection, a firm decides 
that the perceived risk makes future transgressions a less viable option and decides to 
introduce a compliance programme. Alternatively, a compliance programme may be 
introduced as a direct result of the detection of a previous transgression. This is a 
common requirement of the sanctions handed down by the courts or an undertaking 
from the ACCC. A compliance programme, however, is not effective for firms that 
have previously been caught transgressing marketing law. For these firms, a 
compliance programme may simply be a public relations exercise, which has little or 
no impact on behaviour. For such firms, it can be argued that intent whether to engage 
in future illegal marketing behaviour is premised more on perceptions of risk and 
reward. 
 
A major aim of compliance programmes is to increase legal knowledge throughout 
the firm. In theory, intent to transgress marketing law should, therefore, be reduced. 
Less knowledge makes a firm more likely to transgress the law unintentionally, 
simply because it is unaware that what it is doing is illegal. In many cases, a 
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compliance programme will indirectly reduce future illegal marketing behaviour by 
first increasing knowledge of marketing law within the firm.  
 
Nevertheless, while the absence of control plays an important part in determining 
whether illegal marketing behaviour will occur, other conditions of motive and 
opportunity also have an impact. Higher market-share increases the likelihood that 
illegal marketing behaviour will occur. While this is included as a motive in this 
study’s model, it is more likely that market-share may actually be an opportunity 
variable (Kriesberg, 1976; Baucus, 1994). Inclusion in a particular industry sector also 
can have an impact on future behaviour. Larger firm size and higher perceptions of 
industry transgression as common practice create an opportunity for future 
transgressions to occur; however, this only occurs when respondents are correctly 
aware of the legality of the actions.  
 
 
7.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter some of the implications of the results described in Chapter 6 have 
been discussed. Based on this, an updated model of marketing law transgressions was 
developed, which demonstrates the factors that influenced previous transgression and 
intent to engage in future transgressions. These included conditions of motive, 
opportunity and control. The model also links previous and future behaviour, in 
particular, the use of a compliance programme and perceptions of risk were variables 
change subsequent to a previous transgression and influence the chance of future 
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transgressions occurring. In the next chapter, the implications of these results for 
managers, regulatory agencies and the wider community are discussed. 
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Chapter 8: Implications for Managers and Regulatory Agencies 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the potential implications of the research for managers, the 
regulatory agencies that are entrusted with enforcing the laws that apply to marketing, 
such as the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), and the 
wider community. Understanding the factors that influence illegal marketing 
behaviour can reduce its occurrence, which will benefit consumers and firms that 
operate within the law (Smith et al, 2007). It is only through the actions of managers 
and regulatory agencies, however, that this can occur. The first section of this chapter 
outlines the implications of the results for marketing managers, while the second 
section outlines the implications for regulatory agencies. The final section examines 
the implications for the wider community and for consumers. 
 
 
8.2. Implications for Marketing Managers 
 
The results show that a number of firms have poor knowledge of the Trade Practices 
Act (1974). On average, 40% of respondents were unaware of the legal status of the 
marketing activities described in the scenarios. Marketers cannot be expected to be 
knowledgeable in every aspect of marketing law; however, it is important that they 
have a basic level of understanding in order to ensure that the law is not inadvertently 
transgressed (Petty, 1997). The results show that greater knowledge of the law 
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reduces behavioural intent of an illegal nature. Managers, therefore, need to find ways 
to improve legal knowledge throughout the firm. 
 
 There are a number of ways that knowledge can be improved.  In situations where the 
manager is unsure of the legal status of a particular activity, it would be wise to gain 
legal advice. Some firms require that legal experts check all advertisements before 
they are released. Legal vetting seems rare, however, since only 10% of respondents 
claimed that they consulted lawyers on a regular basis regarding their marketing 
activities. Hence, it would be prudent for firms always to obtain legal advice 
regarding advertising campaigns, price promotions, free offers, and other activities to 
ensure they are compliant with the Trade Practices Act (1974). 
 
Compliance programmes seem to be another effective means of increasing legal 
knowledge within the firm. The implementation of such programmes need not be 
expensive and can include employee education, training or checklists. These 
procedures can ensure that promotions are neither misleading nor pricing strategies 
anti-competitive (Wells, 1995). The ACCC provides a range of information on 
compliance programmes and is a resource that managers should be willing to consult. 
The existence of a compliance programme might also have a mitigating effect on any 
sanctions handed down to a transgressor. The courts are less likely to impose harsh 
sanctions if they believe an effort has been made to reduce the likelihood of 
transgressions occurring (Le Clair et al, 1997).  
 
It is not enough, however, to simply have a compliance programme. The programme 
must actually have an impact on firm behaviour, and be supported by top 
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management. Previous research has demonstrated that management commitment 
plays an important role in compliance programme effectiveness (Alam, 1993; Kohut 
and Corriher, 1994; Soutar et al, 1994; Lee and Yoshihara, 1997). Moreover, 
managers who are committed to ethical and legal behaviour are more likely to make 
the investment needed to ensure that programmes are properly implemented (Weaver 
et al, 1999b). It is also important that top management sets an example to the rest of 
the firm. For this to occur there needs to be constant communication within the firm 
regarding the legal and ethical standards required. This can include both formal and 
informal procedures (McKendall et al, 2002). 
 
The negative relationship found to exist between fines or adverse publicity and 
behavioural intent suggests that the threat of sanctions can have an impact on future 
behaviour. While the sanctions investigated were those implemented by external 
agencies, the same could also apply to sanctions originating within the firm. As an 
important component of a culture of compliance, a compliance programme should 
clearly state that it will be systematically enforced and any transgressions detected, 
investigated and punished. In addition, the potential sanctions for non-compliance 
need to be clearly articulated (McKendall et al, 2002). A note of caution is that the 
results of this study suggest that compliance programmes may not be effective in 
firms where there is, or has previously been, deliberate intent to transgress the law. In 
such firms, there is less likely to be management support for the programme, 
especially if it was introduced unwillingly. In such cases, a programme is more likely 
to be a public relations exercise, without serious commitment to ensuring successful 
implementation and outcomes (Soutar et al, 1994). 
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The results show that larger firms with over 500 employees, higher market-share and 
lower levels of competition are most likely to transgress marketing law. Managers 
from firms exhibiting these characteristics should be the most concerned about the 
potential for transgressions occurring. Managers need to be proactive in finding ways 
to eliminate the possibility of transgressions, by improving employee education and 
introducing compliance programmes. If these are not achieved, then regulatory 
agencies may look towards greater policing of the regulatory environment (Baucus 
and Near, 1991). In large firms where it is easier for illegal behaviour to be hidden, 
control mechanisms such as compliance programmes become increasingly important, 
since they can outline the legal standards expected of employees. In firms 
experiencing rapid growth, it is important that control mechanisms keep pace, 
preventing gaps from arising. By anticipating the potential for transgression based on 
conditions of motive and opportunity, attempts can be made to develop a climate of 
legal and ethical marketing. In this way, the likelihood of both intentional and 
unintentional transgressions can be reduced (McKendall and Wagner, 1997). 
 
 
8.3. Implications for Regulatory Agencies 
 
The results give regulatory agencies (such as the ACCC) a suggestion of the types of 
firms that are most at risk of transgressing marketing law. This provides a strong 
indication as to where their educational and enforcement activities would be best 
directed. Given that regulatory agencies have limited resources, it is important that 
enforcement actions are focussed on the sorts of firms most at risk of transgressing the 
law. The results obtained in this research suggest that regulatory agencies would be 
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well advised to focus on larger firms, with higher market-share, that operate within 
less competitive environments. 
 
The results also show that external controls (sanctions and the risk of detection) can 
influence behavioural intent. Given that firms are less inclined to engage in illegal 
behaviour when they consider the risk of detection to be higher, it is important that 
regulatory agencies, such as the ACCC, maintain a visible presence in the market-
place. Regulatory agencies should be especially visible to those firms most at risk of 
transgressing, as outlined above. Managers need to be made aware that, if a 
transgression occurs, then it will most likely be detected and punished. This can be 
achieved through more convictions, and by ensuring that cases receive a high media 
profile, especially when the law has been intentionally transgressed. If such firms are 
made an example of, and face significant punitive measures, then other firms may be 
less inclined to intentionally transgress. The publicity generated might also raise the 
issue of legal knowledge amongst firms where knowledge is poor, and also provide 
incentives to introduce procedures, such as compliance programmes, to guard against 
unintentional transgressions. The primary concern with this approach is that it 
requires considerably higher levels of funding. It can also lead to increased 
‘intrusiveness’ from regulatory agencies, which may negatively impact on business 
efficiency, especially on firms that are acting legally (Robinson and Darley, 2003). It 
may be easier to simply increase the punishments handed down to transgressors. 
However, as deterrence theory posits, and previous research has demonstrated, it is 
the combination of perceived risk and punishment that has the most significant 
deterrence effect (Cohen, 1996). Without adequate policing, the size of the 
punishment is inconsequential.  
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Given that the results suggest larger sanctions have a greater impact on behavioural 
intent, it is important that firms are made aware of the potential costs they will face if 
a transgression is detected. Sanctions are not as effective if they are outweighed by 
the potential rewards (Bromiley and Marcus, 1989; Smith et al, 1997). The results 
show that, when the anticipated rewards are greater, behavioural intent is also greater. 
It is, therefore, important, that fines or other sanctions outweigh the size of rewards. A 
system whereby the size of the fine is linked to the size of potential rewards gained 
from an illegal act may provide an effective deterrent (Kriesberg, 1976). It is also 
important that the size of the fine be linked to the profitability of the firm. If a fine is 
to have a deterrence effect, then it is important that it has the potential to financially 
hurt the transgressor (Kriesberg, 1976). If fines are too low, then firms will simply 
take a chance that a transgression will not be detected. Even if a transgression is 
detected, it may simply be seen a minor cost of doing business. This is an issue for the 
government and the court system to consider, since it is the government that 
prescribes the available remedies under the Trade Practices Act (1974), and the courts 
that determine the punishments that transgressors receive. 
 
 The results show, however, that court imposed fines are not the only deterrent, since 
adverse publicity also has a negative impact on behavioural intent. This relationship 
suggests that regulatory agencies should attempt to generate publicity surrounding the 
actions they take against firms. Finney and Lesieur (1982) suggested that many firms 
transgress due to the public ignorance of their illegal activities. This ignorance means 
that firms do not experience any negative reactions in the marketplace (e.g. lost sales 
and lower profits).  Having details of their transgressions published in the news media 
is something that all firms would want to avoid, and, for many, may be of more 
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concern than any financial penalties. Negative publicity has the potential to be the 
biggest deterrent, since it can lead to longer term effects than isolated fines (Baucus 
and Baucus, 1997). It needs to be recognised, however, that this research found the 
impact of fines on behavioural intent to be greater than negative publicity. This 
finding suggests that, of the variables tested, fines have the potential to be the most 
significant deterrent, provided that they are of sufficient magnitude.   
 
The hazard analysis suggests that current sanctions do not always have the desired 
effect, due to the occurrence of repeated transgressions. Although logic suggests that 
firms that have been convicted by the courts should be less inclined to engage in 
repeat transgressions than firms that provided an out of court undertaking, no 
evidence of this was found in the analysis. This suggests that regulatory agencies 
might save resources, simply by letting firms off with a warning rather than taking 
expensive court action. It can be contended that, since the more serious offenders get 
taken to court, such firms are likely to be less concerned with the consequences of the 
transgression and, thus, just as likely to re-offend as if they had simply been given a 
warning. Court fines and penalties also need to be more severe in order to make a 
court case a more significant disincentive against further illegal activity.  
 
The results suggest that regulatory agencies should continue to promote the use of 
compliance programmes, particularly in firms with little legal knowledge that are 
most at risk of transgressing marketing law. The implementation of compliance 
programmes should also continue to be a requirement of any sanction handed down, 
particularly for firms where a transgression was unintentional. In situations when a 
transgression was intentional, compliance programmes appear to be less effective than 
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potential sanctions and risk of detection in reducing intent to transgress. Every effort 
needs to be made to ensure that compliance programmes actually have an effect on 
behaviour, perhaps through continued monitoring. The results support Baucus’ (1994) 
proposition that not all transgressions are the result of an intentional act. There is 
evidence to suggest that some firms transgressed because they mistakenly believed 
that what they were doing was legal. As a result, it is important for regulatory 
agencies to educate firms about the legal restrictions that are placed on marketing 
activities. Education should also be focussed on those firms deemed most at risk of 
transgressing. 
 
While education is important, it is enforcement of the law that appears to have a 
greater impact on firm behaviour. Since transgression is a dynamic process, its 
detection leads to changes in firm behaviour, which can subsequently impact on 
future illegal behaviour. When regulatory agencies detect a transgression, firms’ 
perceptions of risk should increase and the attractiveness of future transgressions 
should, accordingly, decrease. The ideal situation would be to stop transgressions 
from occurring in the first instance. The reality is, however, that transgressions occur 
and, if not detected, will most likely continue to occur. If a transgression is detected, 
then the risk of future detection and the possibility of fines and negative publicity 
should, at the very least, raise doubt within the firm as to the benefits of further 
transgressions (Smith et al, 2007).  For firms that unintentionally transgress, detection 
should provide the necessary incentive to improve their legal knowledge. Regulatory 
agencies need to make every effort to ensure that the first transgression is the last 
transgression by recognising the dynamic nature of the transgression process. 
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8.4. Implications for the Wider Community 
 
Consumers are the major beneficiaries of reduced marketing law transgressions, since 
protecting consumers is an important objective of the Trade Practices Act (1974), in 
response to the imbalance of power in the customer-supplier relationship (Smith, 
1995). Provisions against misleading advertising mean consumers are less likely to be 
misled into buying goods or services due to deceptive advertising. Consumers also 
pay lower prices and have access to a wider range of goods and services as a result of 
provisions preventing anti-competitive conduct. It would also be prudent for 
consumers to develop an understanding of their rights, to reduce the likelihood of 
firms getting away with transgressions (Larsen et al, 2002). It is particularly important 
that, in situations where consumers suspect the law has been transgressed, they report 
it to the ACCC. As outlined previously, detection is vital in ensuring that repeat 
offending does not occur and that appropriate sanctions can be applied.  
 
It is not just consumers that are negatively affected by transgressions of marketing 
law, since legitimate firms that do not break the law are placed at a competitive 
disadvantage in relation to those that do. As with consumers, it may be in the 
competitor’s interest to report a suspected transgression. This may already be the case, 
since firms that have previously transgressed marketing law are more likely to believe 
their competitors would report them for a breach of the Trade Practices Act (1974), 
which may be the reason these firms were caught in the first place. As with 
consumers, however, competitors can only report the existence of a transgression if 
they are aware that the law has been transgressed. This provides further incentive for 
firms to improve their legal knowledge. 
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8.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the implications of the results for managers, regulatory 
agencies, and the wider community. For managers, it is important that they develop at 
least a basic knowledge of the law. They also need to take steps to reduce the 
likelihood that transgressions will occur. A compliance programme is one way that 
this can be achieved, since the results show that such programmes can reduce the 
intent to behave illegally. This is particularly important for firms that meet the 
characteristics of those most ‘at risk’. Regulatory agencies should also look to focus 
their enforcement activities on these ‘at risk’ firms. Their enforcement activities and 
any sanctions handed down to transgressors may reduce the likelihood that future 
transgressions will occur. Finally, consumers and legitimate competitors can 
significantly benefit from fewer transgressions, and should look to assist regulatory 
agencies in their enforcement activities. 
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Chapter 9: Limitations and Future Research 
 
 
9.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the limitations of this study, along with potential avenues for 
future research, suggesting areas that academic researchers may wish to consider 
when conducting research into illegal corporate behaviour.  
 
 
9.2. Limitations and Suggested Avenues for Future Research 
 
The issue of time-ordering has been a recurring theme throughout this research. Time- 
ordering occurs when conditions within the firm and its environment might have 
changed in the time between the transgressions occurring and the survey being 
administered. While it was recognised that the risk of detection and the use of 
compliance programmes are subject to such effects, it was assumed that performance, 
competition, firm size, and industry sector remained constant (McKendall and 
Wagner, 1997). However, in some instances, it is conceivable that these variables do 
not remain constant. For example, a firm might have increased in size as a result of a 
merger or acquisition or decreased in size through divesture. 
 
The use of longitudinal research would provide a means of overcoming these issues of 
time-ordering when conducting future research in this area. Such research can only be 
conducted when historical public data is available, such as was attempted by Baucus 
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and Near (1991). Since this research focussed on a wide range of Australian firms, not 
just those publicly listed, such information was not readily available.  The hazard 
model analysis was an attempt to address these issues; however, the lack of available 
data made it difficult to investigate the effects of a more comprehensive range of 
factors. This lack of data meant it was necessary to gather the required information 
through a survey instrument, which required the research to be cross-sectional.  
Where such data are available, valuable knowledge could be gained as to what factors 
might have influenced illegal behaviour and any changes that might have occurred 
subsequent to transgression detection. In particular, the use of hazard models in such 
research can be a valuable research tool. The main problem with historical data is that 
it cannot be used to measure future intent. This could be overcome by selecting 
certain firms and analysing their behaviour over a period of time, although the main 
difficulties with this approach would be the time needed to undertake such research, 
in addition to the ability to gain access to the required information. 
 
Another limitation of this research is that it was not possible to fully test the 
conceptual model. The measure of previous transgressions only included firms that 
had had transgressions detected and sanctioned. It was beyond the means of this 
research to investigate the effects that undetected transgressions have on illegal 
behaviour. This means that the extent of illegality may have been underreported, 
potentially increasing the conservatism of the analysis and conclusions (McKendall 
and Wagner, 1997). Clinard and Yeager (1980) have suggested that illegality may be 
underreported by as much as 33%. Further bias may also have occurred if firms 
deemed not to have transgressed marketing law actually had, but had not been 
detected. Further research addressing how undetected transgressions might potentially 
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influence the model would be most valuable in attempting to overcome these 
limitations. It would be difficult to achieve this, however, since it would require in-
depth discussions with those involved, and managers are not likely to want to discuss 
illegal behaviour that has gone undetected. Nevertheless, more in-depth, qualitative 
research could be used to try and gain a deeper understanding of the results and some 
of the reasons why transgressions have occurred. While it might be difficult to obtain, 
valuable insights could be gained from talking to managers in firms that have been 
caught transgressing the law, by discussing their motivations and reasons for illegal 
behaviour, as well as any specific changes in behaviour that may have resulted from 
that experience. 
 
A potential limitation of the analyses conducted on future behaviour is that, when 
conducting scenario-based research, it only measures the respondent’s intent to 
engage in a certain action rather than actual behaviour. Since intent has been shown to 
be positively related to behaviour (Ajzen, 1988), this research provides a strong 
indication of how firms would likely behave. It is important, however, not to confuse 
intent with action. Other research has suggested that intent is not always a determinant 
of behaviour (Sutton, 1998; Armitage and Conner, 2001). The development of a 
method that measures actual decisions (rather than self-reporting) would be most 
valuable in future research into illegal decision-making (Morris et al, 1995; Vitell and 
Ho, 1997).  
 
The response rate obtained is another potential limitation of this research. Although 
18% is comparable with other studies looking at sensitive behaviour (e.g. Hoffman et 
al, 1991; Schlegelmilch and Robertson, 1995; Barnett and Valentine, 2002), there are 
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still concerns over the existence of non-response bias and whether the results can be 
generalised to the wider population (Gendall, 2005). The time-trends extrapolation 
method suggested that the results did not suffer from non-response bias (Armstrong 
and Overton, 1977); however, late respondents only approximate non-respondents, so 
it cannot be stated for certain that non-response bias was not an issue. The best way to 
overcome this limitation in future research would be to increase the response rate. 
Therefore, given budgetary constraints, it is advisable for such research to utilise as 
many techniques as possible to improve response rates, the use of pre-notification and 
extra contacts are two ways this could be achieved (Gendall, 2000). Conducting 
longitudinal research using secondary data would also overcome the problem with 
non-response error, as there is no survey involved. 
 
The issue of social desirability bias has already been raised and found to exist in this 
research. It is important that future research in this area recognises the potential for 
social desirability bias and looks to minimise, if not eliminate, the impact it might 
have on results. A greater understanding of these biases can tell researchers much 
about how individuals perceive their own behaviour in relation to others, which may 
have an important influence on decisions to engage in illegal behaviour. 
 
Both space limitations and the potential for respondent fatigue meant that only limited 
combinations of fine, reward, and publicity could be analysed. Further research could 
look at this issue in more detail, by including a wider range of potential sanctions and 
rewards in the model. While this research attempted to include a range of the 
important factors that might have led (in the past) or might lead (in the future) a firm 
to transgress marketing law, a large number of additional antecedents might also exist. 
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For example, this research did not include the characteristics of individuals, such as 
demographics and moral beliefs. Such variables could feasibly be introduced into the 
model. Discussions with the ACCC also raised the possible influence of external 
shocks or events (such as the introduction of new technologies). One such example is 
the introduction of mobile phones, which may have led to transgressions by phone 
companies. The impact that such events have on illegal behaviour could be an 
important avenue for future research. The role of unintentional illegality in the 
transgression process could also be further explored. It would be interesting to gain a 
more comprehensive understanding of the factors that might influence legal 
knowledge. 
 
Another potential limitation of this research has been the assumption that it is the firm 
that is considered to have transgressed the law, rather than the individual. While it 
was acknowledged that individuals within the firm actually commit the crime, it was 
assumed they do so on behalf of the firm (Kriesberg, 1976). In some instances, it is 
possible that an individual within the firm transgressed solely for his or her own 
benefit. Future research could look to isolate this type of transgression and consider 
how the factors may differ between individuals and firms. The ability to imprison 
individuals who transgress, for example, may lead to different perceptions of risk and 
reward. 
 
This model has only been tested in Australia. Future research could look to other 
cultural and legal environments. For example, the regulatory environments in the 
United States and Europe have many similarities to Australia, yet there are distinct 
differences. Also, corporate culture within different countries can vary. It would be 
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interesting to see the effect these differences might have on the results obtained. 
While the model was tested within a marketing law context, it would be equally 
applicable in a range of other commercial law contexts, such as environmental law 
and tax law. Future research could look to replicate this study across a range of other 
legal environments.  
 
Future research could also look at the combined impact of transgressions of all 
commercial laws (including marketing law). It is possible that decisions based on 
previous transgressions of non-marketing laws could impact future marketing law 
transgressions and vice versa. Instead of focussing on specific laws, it might be 
pertinent to consider the wider transgression environment. This model could also be 
tested in non-commercial law situations. For example, future research could look at 
the impact of risk and reward on repeat offending by ‘ordinary’ criminals. In fact, 
since this model is effectively a decision-making model, it could even be applied to 
non-legal decision-making contexts. For example, it could be used to investigate 
repeat decision-making in any risk/reward context. Researchers could then observe 
behavioural change resulting from previous decisions. 
 
 
9.3. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the limitations of the study and avenues for future research have been 
discussed. Some of the limitations include time-ordering concerns, measurement 
issues, use of intent, social desirability bias, and the focus on firms rather than 
individual transgressors. Future research could investigate greater use of secondary 
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data, the use of longitudinal research designs, the inclusion of research designs that 
measure actual behaviour, and testing the model in different legal and business 
contexts. The next chapter will provide some final overall conclusions. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions 
 
 
10.1. Introduction 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, this research set out to empirically answer the question: 
What are the antecedents and consequences of transgressing marketing law? More 
specifically, this involved determining the factors that led to previous transgressions 
of marketing law, the resultant changes in firm behaviour as a result of transgressions 
having been detected by regulatory agencies, and how these changes, amongst other 
factors, influence intent to engage in future transgressions? This research drew upon 
literature from a range of disciplines, including marketing, management, business 
ethics, and sociology. A framework based on the theory of motive, opportunity, and 
control was then developed and tested, which involved two phases. First, an analysis 
of secondary data sources was conducted in order to investigate the phenomenon of 
repeat transgression. Secondly, primary data, from Australian public and privately-
own firms, were collected using a survey instrument.  
 
It was determined that the reasons for transgressing marketing law in the first instance 
primarily related to firm size and the intensity of industry competition. If a 
transgression had been detected, then firms appeared subsequently to introduce 
compliance programmes and increase their perceptions of the risk of future detection. 
These factors may then reduce intent to engage in future illegal marketing behaviour. 
In addition, other controls such as potential fines and adverse publicity also reduce 
this likelihood. Future transgressions also seem more likely to occur in firms with 
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higher market-share, in firms with poorer legal knowledge, and in firms operating in 
certain industry sectors, such as manufacturers and importers/wholesalers. Further 
analysis also suggested that larger firms and firms with higher perceptions of industry 
transgression as a normal business practice have greater intent to engage in intentional 
illegal marketing behaviour. The results obtained in this research reveal a dynamic 
process, whereby the detection of a previous transgression influences the likelihood 
that future transgressions will occur.  
 
The remainder of this chapter provides an overview of the conclusions drawn from 
this research, relating to the objectives outlined in Chapter 1. Each objective is 
discussed separately, before a final overview of the main contributions of this 
research is provided. 
 
 
10.2. Previous transgressions 
 
Objective 1: To determine the factors that led firms to transgress marketing law in the 
first instance. 
 
A range of motive, opportunity, and control variables were tested to identify the 
factors that might have led to the occurrence of a previously-detected transgression of 
marketing law. The only variables found to have an impact are industry sector, 
competition, and firm size, although the impact of competition was found to be in the 
opposite direction to that which was hypothesised. Firms facing less intense 
competition and those that have fewer competitors are, therefore, more likely to have 
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been caught transgressing marketing law. Firm size was also found to create an 
opportunity for previous transgressions to have occurred. In particular, large firms 
were more likely to have been caught transgressing marketing law than medium sized 
firms. Lastly, while the control variables (perceived risk of detection and the existence 
and comprehensiveness of compliance programmes) had an impact on transgression, 
the relationship is in the opposite direction to that normally proposed in the extant 
literature. It was argued that this is due to the existence of time-ordering effects, 
which suggests that increased perceptions of risk and the existence and 
comprehensiveness of compliance programmes might be consequences of having 
previously been caught transgressing marketing law in addition to, or instead of, being 
antecedents. 
 
 
10.3. Consequences 
 
Objective 2: To determine what impact transgression detection and punishment by 
regulatory agencies has on firm behaviour. 
 
Firms that had previously been caught transgressing marketing law were found to 
have higher perceptions of the risk of future detection than those that had not been 
caught. In addition, such firms were more likely to have implemented more 
comprehensive compliance programmes. The use of compliance programmes was 
also influenced by risk perceptions, where firms with higher perceptions of the risk of 
detection are more likely to have implemented more comprehensive compliance 
programmes.  
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10.4. Future Transgressions 
 
Objective 3: To determine the factors that impact on a firms intent to transgress the 
law in the future. 
 
Motive, opportunity, and control variables were also tested to determine their impact 
on future behaviour. With regard to motives, firms with higher market-share exhibit a 
greater intent to transgress marketing law in the future. This relationship, however, is 
in the opposite direction to that which had been hypothesised. This finding, combined 
with the fact that no relationship was found to exist between profit and transgression 
(both previous and future), suggests that pressure may not be a major reason for 
transgressions to occur. Industry sector was the only opportunity variable found to 
have an impact on future behaviour, although firm size and perceived industry 
transgression were found to have an impact on intentional behaviour only. Control 
variables were also found to have a significant impact on future behaviour, with the 
external control variables (fines, negative publicity, and the perceived risk of 
detection) all reducing intent to engage in future illegal marketing behaviour. In 
addition, the rewards that could be realised from future illegal marketing behaviour 
were found to have an impact, with higher potential rewards increasing intent to 
engage in future illegal marketing behaviour. The internal control variable (existence 
and comprehensiveness of a compliance programme) was also found to have an 
impact on intent to engage in future illegal marketing behaviour, with firms with more 
comprehensive compliance programmes being less likely to consider future marketing 
law transgressions. 
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For firms that had previously been caught transgressing marketing law, risk of 
detection has a greater impact on intent to transgress than for firms that had not 
previously been caught transgressing. Firms that had previously been caught 
transgressing and firms that had a more extensive compliance programme are actually 
more likely to consider engaging in illegal marketing behaviour than those that had 
not. 
 
Objective 4: To determine the impact that knowledge of marketing law has on the 
likelihood of a firm transgressing the law in the future. 
 
Firms that correctly identified a legal scenario as being legal were more inclined to 
engage in that activity, while firms that correctly identified an illegal scenario as 
being illegal were less inclined to engage in that activity. Overall, it can be concluded 
that firms with greater knowledge of the law are less likely to transgress, implying 
that firms with poorer knowledge are at risk of inadvertently transgressing the law. 
Both the existence and comprehensiveness of compliance programmes and the 
perceived risk of detection impacted on legal knowledge. Where firms have 
implemented more comprehensive compliance programmes and have higher 
perceptions of the risk of detection, knowledge of the law is greater. This suggests 
that these variables could be effective in increasing knowledge and, hence, reducing 
the likelihood of future transgressions occurring. 
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10.5. Final Conclusions 
 
Drawing upon the literature from a range of disciplines, this research has informed the 
development of a comprehensive and dynamic model of illegal corporate behaviour. 
This model has expanded on previous static models of illegal corporate behaviour by 
combining previous transgressions with intent to engage in future transgressions. This 
has been the first attempt to empirically test a model of illegal corporate behaviour in 
a marketing context, within the Australian environment. From a methodological 
perspective, this has also been the first research to use hazard models in the study of 
illegal corporate behaviour. The results provide evidence that transgressing marketing 
law is a dynamic process and suggest the factors that influence this process. In 
particular, the importance of control systems, such as compliance programmes, risk 
perceptions and sanctions in the transgression process is apparent. These results 
provide a number of implications for academics, managers, and regulatory agencies in 
their quest to reduce instances of marketing law transgression. Reducing such 
transgressions of marketing law will be of benefit to both consumers and law abiding 
firms. It is, therefore, important that this area continues to be the subject of future 
research. 
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Appendix 1: Source of Data for each Hypothesis 
 
 
This appendix outlines the specific data source that was used to test each hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis Dependent Variable Data Source Independent Variable Data Source 
H1a Previous Transgression Secondary Profitability Instrument: q30 
H1b Previous Transgression Secondary Market-share Instrument: q31 
H1c Previous Transgression Secondary Competition Instrument: q32, q33 
H2a Previous Transgression Secondary Firm Size Instrument: q34 
H2b Previous Transgression Secondary Industry Sector 
Instrument: q38, 
Hazard Analysis 
H2c Previous Transgression Secondary 
Perceived Incidents of 
Industry Transgression Instrument: q8 
H3a Previous Transgression Secondary 
Use of a Compliance 
Programme 
Instrument: q9, q10, 
q11 
H3b Previous Transgression Secondary 
Perceived Risk of 
Detection Instrument: q5, q7 
H4a 
Perceived Risk of 
Detection 
Instrument: 
q5-q7 Previous Transgression Secondary 
H4b 
Use of a Compliance 
Programme 
Instrument: 
q9-q11 Previous Transgression Secondary 
H5 Risk of Detection 
Instrument: 
q5-q7 
Use of a Compliance 
Programme Instrument: q9-q11 
H6a 
Likelihood of Future 
Transgression 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 Profitability Instrument: q30 
H6b Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 Market-share Instrument:q31 
H6c Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 Competition Instrument: q32-q33 
H7a Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 Firm Size Instrument: q34 
H7b Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 Industry Sector Instrument: q38 
H7c Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 
Perceived Incidents of 
Industry Transgression Instrument: q8 
H7d Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 
Number of previous 
Transgressions Hazard Analysis 
H8a Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 
Use of a Compliance 
Programme Instrument: q9-q11 
H8b Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 
Perceived Risk of 
Detection Instrument: q5-q7 
H8c Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 Size of fine 
Instrument Vignettes: 
q21-q22, q28-q29 
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H8d Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 Publicity 
Instrument Vignettes: 
q21-q22, q28-q29 
H8e Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 Rewards 
Instrument Vignettes: 
q21-q22, q28-q29 
H9 Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 
Perceived Risk of 
Detection*Previous 
Transgression 
Secondary, 
Instrument: q5-q7 
H10 Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 
Use of a Compliance 
Programme * Previous 
Transgression 
Secondary, 
Instrument: q9-q11 
H11 Behavioural Intent 
Instrument: 
q21-q22, q28-
q29 Knowledge Instrument: q12-q29 
H12 Knowledge 
Instrument: 
q12-q29 
Use of a Compliance 
Programme Instrument: q9-q11 
H13 Knowledge 
Instrument: 
q12-q29 
Perceived Risk of 
Detection Instrument: q5-q7 
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Appendix 2: Survey Instrument 
 
 
 
Dear  
 
 
I am a postgraduate student completing my PhD in marketing at Victoria University, 
Wellington, New Zealand. As part of this degree I am undertaking a research project that 
looks at the awareness and understanding of marketing related law by firms in Australia. 
Specifically, I am interested in parts IV and V of the Trade Practices Act (TPA). This 
survey aims to determine the extent to which firms in Australia are aware of their 
obligations under the law, the impact the TPA has on firm behaviour, and what factors 
may influence this. I have already conducted a similar study in New Zealand and am 
looking to extend it into Australia.  
 
My supervisors, Dr Michel Rod, Dr Ashish Sinha, and I would be extremely grateful if 
you could take the time to fill out the enclosed questionnaire. I realise that your time is 
very important, however the survey should only take 15 minutes to complete and the 
answers you provide will go a long way towards the success of this project and my 
degree. 
 
All answers are strictly anonymous. There is no way that I nor anyone else, could link 
responses to individual respondents at any stage. Data will only be presented in aggregate 
form and the information gathered will only be used for the purpose of my thesis and 
potential publication in marketing journals. As added security, all data will be stored in a 
locked box and be password protected. Only my supervisors and I will have access to it. 
 
I would be grateful if you could return the enclosed questionnaire in the provided freepost 
envelope at your earliest convenience. 
 
I would be more than happy to discuss any questions you may have on this project and 
can be contacted on 0011 64 4 463 9784 or at aaron.gazley@vuw.ac.nz or. Alternately, 
you could contact my supervisors: Dr Michel Rod (Michel.Rod@vuw.ac.nz), 0011 64 4 
463 5152, or Dr Ashish Sinha (Ashish.Sinha@vuw.ac.nz), 0011 64 4 463 6953. Thank 
you for your cooperation, your support is greatly appreciated. 
 
 
Yours Sincerely 
 
 
 
Aaron Gazley 
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Marketing Law Survey 
 
Even if you do not think this is an area where you are knowledgeable please try and 
answer the questions anyway. We are interested in everyone’s viewpoint, regardless of 
legal expertise. Your responses are strictly anonymous and cannot be linked back to you. 
 
Section 1: The Trade Practices Act and Your Firm  
 
 
Please circle the number that best matches your answer 
 
 
1. How important do you consider an understanding of the Trade Practices Act to be 
for your firm? 
 
Very 
Important       
Not 
important 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
2. Does your company have a legal department or section? (tick correct box) 
 
Yes          (please go to q3)   No           (please go to q4) 
 
 
3. How often is the legal department or section consulted regarding your marketing 
activities? 
 
Regularly Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
4. How often does your company consult an external lawyer regarding your marketing 
activities? 
 
Regularly Often Sometimes  Rarely Never 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
5. How likely do you believe that a breach of the Trade Practices Act within your 
industry would be investigated by the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC)? 
 
Highly Likely Likely Possible Unlikely Highly Unlikely 
1 2 3 4 5 
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6. How would you rate the chances of investigation by the ACCC relative to 5 years 
ago? 
 
Much more 
Likely More Likely About the same More Unlikely Much less Likely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
7. How likely is it that a competitor would report a breach of the Trade Practices Act 
by another firm within your industry, to the ACCC? 
 
Highly Likely    Highly Unlikely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
8. How often do you believe that other firms within your industry breach the Trade 
Practices Act? 
 
Extremely 
Often Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
9. How likely are your employees to have been made aware of aspects of the Trade 
Practices Act at work:  
 
a) This year? 
 
Extremely 
Likely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Neither 
Likely or 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
1  2 3 4 5 
                                                                                         
b) 5 years ago? 
 
Extremely 
Likely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Neither 
Likely or 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
Unlikely Unsure 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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10. How likely are employees to have been provided with guidelines (printed or 
otherwise) for reference, regarding the legality of your promotional activities?  
 
a) This year? 
 
Extremely 
Likely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Neither 
Likely or 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
b) 5 years ago? 
 
Extremely 
Likely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Neither 
Likely or 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
Unlikely Unsure 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
11.   How likely are employees to have been provided with guidelines (printed or 
otherwise) for reference, regarding the legality of your pricing activities?  
 
a) This year:  
 
Extremely 
Likely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Neither 
Likely or 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
b) 5 years ago: 
 
Extremely 
Likely 
Somewhat 
Likely 
Neither 
Likely or 
Unlikely 
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Extremely 
Unlikely Unsure 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
Section 2: Understanding of Part V of the Trade Practices Act (TPA) 
 
Questions 12 - 29, please give your assessment of the legality of each scenario, by 
circling the number that best matches your view. 
 
 
12. A local bakery uses the slogan ‘Best Food in Town’, even though there is no    
evidence to support this claim. 
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
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13. A brand of apple and cranberry juice contains the words ‘Product of Australia’ on 
the label. The apple juice is sourced from Australia; however, the cranberry juice, 
which accounts for 5% of the total volume of the juice, is sourced in New Zealand.  
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
14. A seller of mobile phones offers free weekend calls, but does not mention that calls to 
other mobile phones are excluded from the offer. 
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
15. A retailer claims a sale, with 10% off all items, after having raised prices by 10% 
four months earlier. 
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
16. A bicycle retailer offers a two for one deal, such that: 
 
For every bike of a certain brand that is bought, a second bike is provided ‘free of 
charge’.  
However, the retailer increases the price of the original bike above what it was before 
the offer. 
Despite this, the cost is still considerably less than that of both bikes combined. 
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
17. The seller signs a contract with a buyer agreeing that the requirement for a product 
to be of merchantable quality, under part IV of the TPA does not apply to that 
particular transaction. 
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
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18. A week before the ‘20% off annual sale,’ a decision is made to raise prices by 
20%. 
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
19. Please rate the legality of these statements, as prominently displayed in a store: 
 
a) ‘No refund’ 
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
b)  ‘No refunds if the customer changes their mind’ 
      
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
20. Please rate the likelihood of the seller being liable under the TPA in the 
following circumstances: 
 
a) A customer returns a $1,000 watch with a major defect after 1 year; however, the 
store’s warranty has expired. 
 
Highly Likely Likely Gray Area Unlikely Highly Unlikely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
b) A business purchases a common household sofa for use in its reception area.  
 
Highly Likely Likely Gray Area Unlikely Highly Unlikely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
21. In a television advertisement a seller visually and verbally promotes a price that is 
exclusive of GST. The words ‘price exclusive of GST’ appears in the fine print.  
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Based on your answer to question 21, what do you consider to be the probability you 
would engage in the action described under the following circumstances? 
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a) The likely gain from that action is an increase in revenue of 2% of annual revenue 
and the potential fine is less than $1,000 with the possibility of adverse media 
publicity if this action is in fact illegal.  
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
b) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
upwards of $50,000 with the possibility of adverse media publicity if this action is in 
fact illegal. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
c) The likely gain from that action is 2% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
upwards of $50,000, with no possibility of adverse media publicity if this action is in 
fact illegal.  
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
d) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
less than $1,000, with no possibility of adverse media attention if this action is in fact 
illegal. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Based on your answer to question 21, what do you consider to be the probability your 
competitors would engage in the action described under the following circumstances? 
 
e) The likely gain from that action is an increase in revenue of 2% of annual revenue 
and the potential fine is less than $1,000 with the possibility of adverse media 
publicity if this action is in fact illegal.  
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
f) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
upwards of $50,000 with the possibility of adverse media publicity if this action is in 
fact illegal. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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g) The likely gain from that action is 2% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
upwards of $50,000, with no possibility of adverse media publicity if this action is in 
fact illegal.  
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                                                                               
h) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
less than $1,000, with no possibility of adverse media attention if this action is in fact 
illegal. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
22. A vehicle manufacturer has a new car on the market. In their promotional material 
the car is described as ‘stylish’ and ‘great looking’. However reviews on the car 
describe it as ‘plain’ and ‘ordinary’. 
 
Based on your answer to question 22, what do you consider to be the probability you 
would engage in the action described under the following circumstances? 
 
a) The likely gain from that action is an increase in revenue of 2% of annual revenue 
and the potential fine is less than $1,000 with the possibility of adverse media 
publicity if this action is in fact illegal.  
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
b) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
upwards of $50,000 with the possibility of adverse media publicity if this action is in 
fact illegal. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
c) The likely gain from that action is 2% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
upwards of $50,000, with no possibility of adverse media publicity if this action is in 
fact illegal.  
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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d) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
less than $1,000, with no possibility of adverse media attention if this action is in fact 
illegal. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Based on your answer to question 22, what do you consider to be the probability your 
competitors would engage in the action described under the following circumstances? 
 
e) The likely gain from that action is an increase in revenue of 2% of annual revenue 
and the potential fine is less than $1,000 with the possibility of adverse media 
publicity if this action is in fact illegal.  
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
f) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
upwards of $50,000 with the possibility of adverse media publicity if this action is in 
fact illegal. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
g) The likely gain from that action is 2% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
upwards of $50,000, with no possibility of adverse media publicity if this action is in 
fact illegal.  
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                                                                           
h) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
less than $1,000, with no possibility of adverse media attention if this action is in fact 
illegal. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Section 3: Understanding of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act  
 
23. Joe’s supplier provides a recommended retail price of $99.95 on a certain product. 
The supplier says that if Joe sells the item for less than that amount, then the supplier 
will not deal with him in the future. How would you characterise the supplier’s 
behaviour? 
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
24. The owners of all the motels in a small town get together at a conference and 
discuss the profitability of their businesses, but no action comes from the meeting. 
How would you characterise the owners’ behaviour?  
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
25. A motor vehicle dealer, as a condition of gaining certain discounts, requires 
intending buyers to take out a loan from a nominated lender. How would you 
characterise this behaviour? 
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
26. A new company enters an established market. In an attempt to counter the threat 
the established player, who holds a substantial degree of market power, reduces their 
prices below cost. How would you characterise this behaviour? 
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
27. Competitors agree to divide up the Sydney market so that each company operates 
in a particular suburban area. How would you characterise this behaviour? 
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
28. At a conference, a group of competitors meet over lunch. Due to a substantial 
downturn in business, they verbally agree not to run any special promotions.  
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Based on your answer to question 28, what do you consider to be the probability you 
would engage in the action described under the following circumstances? 
 
a) The likely gain from that action is an increase in revenue of 2% of annual revenue 
and the potential fine is less than $1,000 with the possibility of adverse media 
publicity if this action is in fact illegal.  
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
b) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
upwards of $50,000 with the possibility of adverse media publicity if this action is in 
fact illegal. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
c) The likely gain from that action is 2% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
upwards of $50,000, with no possibility of adverse media publicity if this action is in 
fact illegal.  
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                                                                            
d) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
less than $1,000, with no possibility of adverse media attention if this action is in fact 
illegal. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Based on your answer to question 28, what do you consider to be the probability your 
competitors would engage in the action described under the following circumstances? 
 
e) The likely gain from that action is an increase in revenue of 2% of annual revenue 
and the potential fine is less than $1,000 with the possibility of adverse media 
publicity if this action is in fact illegal.  
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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f) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
upwards of $50,000 with the possibility of adverse media publicity if this action is in 
fact illegal. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
g) The likely gain from that action is 2% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
upwards of $50,000, with no possibility of adverse media publicity if this action is in 
fact illegal.  
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                                                                                
h) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and the potential fine is 
less than $1,000, with no possibility of adverse media attention if this action is in fact 
illegal. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
29. A competitor lowers their price on a product by 10%. Having noticed this you 
lower your price, so that it matches your competitor’s new price. A week later, the 
competitor lowers the price by a further 10%; once again you match this price. 
 
Obviously Legal Possibly Legal Gray Area Possibly Illegal Obviously Illegal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Based on your answer to question 29, what do you consider to be the probability that 
you would engage in the action described under the following circumstances? 
 
a) The likely gain from that action is 2% of annual revenue and (if this action is illegal) 
the potential fine was less than $1,000 and that action could result in adverse media 
publicity. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
b) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and (if this action is 
illegal) the potential fine is greater than $50,000 and that action could result in 
adverse media publicity. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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c) The likely gain from that action is 2% of annual revenue and (if this action is illegal) 
the potential fine is greater than $50,000, with no adverse media publicity. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                                                             
d) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and (if this action is 
illegal) the potential fine is less than $1,000, with no adverse media publicity. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Based on your answer to question 29, what do you consider to be the probability that 
your competitors would engage in the action described under the following 
circumstances? 
 
e) The likely gain from that action is 2% of annual revenue and (if this action is illegal) 
the potential fine was less than $1,000 and that action could result in adverse media 
publicity. 
 
High      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
f) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and (if this action is 
illegal) the potential fine is greater than $50,000 and that action could result in 
adverse media publicity. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
g) The likely gain from that action is 2% of annual revenue and (if this action is 
illegal) the potential fine is greater than $50,000, with no adverse media publicity. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
                                                                
h) The likely gain from that action is 15% of annual revenue and (if this action is 
illegal) the potential fine is less than $1,000, with no adverse media publicity. 
 
Likely      Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 283 
 
 
 
Section 4: Background Information on your Business and Industry 
 
 
30. Please rate your profitability, in comparison with your main competitor.  
 
Much More 
Slightly 
More 
About the 
Same  Slightly Less Much Less Unsure 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
31. Relative to your competitors, where do you consider your company to be in terms 
of market-share? 
 
Market 
Leader 
 
Above 
Average 
Average 
 
Below 
Average Least 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
32. How many competitors do you have? 
 
None 1 to 5 6 to 10 10 to 20 20 to 50 50+ 
           
 
 
33. How would you rate the level of competition within your industry? 
 
Extremely 
Competitive 
   
Extremely 
Uncompetitive 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
   
34. How many people (full-time equivalent) does your company (within Australia) 
currently employ? (Tick most appropriate box) 
 
1 to 5 6 to 20 21 to 50 51 to 100 101-500 501+ 
           
 
 
35. For how many years has your company been operating in Australia? (Tick most 
appropriate box) 
 
0 to 4 5 to 9 10 to 14 15-19 20+ 
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36. How many years have you worked for the company? (Tick the most appropriate 
box) 
 
0 to 4 5 to 9 10 to 14 15-19 20+ 
     
 
 
37. Have you taken a business law course (outside the firm)? 
 
    Yes                 No  
 
 
38. What is your firm’s primary industry? (tick the most appropriate option) 
 
Retail                         ___ 
Manufacturing           ___ 
Construction              ___ 
Transport                   ___ 
Service                      ___ 
Importer/Wholesaler ___ 
Other                         ___ 
 
Thank you for your assistance. It is most appreciated 
 
If you would like a summary report of the findings of the research, please contact me 
at aaron.gazley@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
Please return in the enclosed freepost envelope as soon as it is convenient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 285 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Reminder Postcard 
 
 
 
 
I recently asked for your help in filling out my questionnaire on the Trade Practices Act in 
Australia. If you have already returned it, thank you, your help is most appreciated. If you 
have not yet had the opportunity to complete the questionnaire I would like to take this 
opportunity to tell you that I would still very much  like to receive your response, as your 
answers will make an important contribution to the success of this study. I confirm that all 
answers are anonymous and cannot be linked to you in any way. If you did not receive a copy 
of the questionnaire, or have any questions about the study, please do not hesitate to contact 
me. I look forward to your response. 
 
Yours Sincerely 
Aaron Gazley 
 
 
School of Marketing and International Business, Victoria University, PO Box 600, 
Wellington, New Zealand, aaron.gazley@vuw.ac.nz 
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Appendix 4: Non-Response Bias Analysis 
 
 
Paired Samples Test  
 
Variables Mean Std. Error Mean t  sig  
Pair 1 Imptce - Imptce1 -0.17647 0.22353 -0.789 0.434 
Pair 2 Lawcons - Lawcons1 0.04082 0.19113 0.214 0.832 
Pair 3 acccinv- Acccinv1 0.03922 0.21136 0.186 0.854 
Pair 4 Comprpt- Comprept1 0.12245 0.25023 0.489 0.627 
Pair 5 oftenbre- Oftenbre1 -0.125 0.16744 -0.747 0.459 
Pair 6 AwareTPA - AwareTPA1 -0.12245 0.28217 -0.434 0.666 
Pair 7 Glspro- Glspro1 0.04167 0.2679 0.156 0.877 
Pair 8 Glspri- Glspri1 0.10417 0.31262 0.333 0.74 
Pair 9 Q21illegal - Q21legal1 -0.18 0.25183 -0.715 0.478 
Pair 10 Q21yll - Q21yll1 0.55319 0.44681 1.238 0.222 
Pair 11 Q21yhh – Q21yhh1 0.5 0.38164 1.31 0.197 
Pair 12 Q21ylh - Q21ylh1 -0.15556 0.33628 -0.463 0.646 
Pair 13 Q21yhl - Q21yhl1 0.71739 0.48719 1.473 0.148 
Pair 14 Q21ylpub - Q21ylpub1 0.08696 0.37407 0.232 0.817 
Pair 15 Q21yhnopub – Q21yhnopub1 0.65217 0.49755 1.311 0.197 
Pair 16 Q22legal – Q22legal1 -0.26531 0.20779 -1.277 0.208 
Pair 17 Q22yll - Q22yll1 0.41304 0.54602 0.756 0.453 
Pair 18 Q22yhh – Q22yhh1 0.26667 0.48969 0.545 0.589 
Pair 19 Q22ylh - Q22ylh1 -0.08889 0.40555 -0.219 0.828 
Pair 20 Q22yhl - Q22yhl1 0.46667 0.52953 0.881 0.383 
Pair 21 Q22ylpub - Q22ylpub1 0.33333 0.43577 0.765 0.448 
Pair 22 Q22yhnopub – Q22yhnopub1 0.62222 0.5544 1.122 0.268 
Pair 23 Q28illegal- Q28illegal1 -0.14286 0.27199 -0.525 0.602 
Pair 24 Q28yll – Q28yll1 -0.06977 0.37708 -0.185 0.854 
Pair 25 Q28yhh - Q28yhh1 -0.11628 0.2943 -0.395 0.695 
Pair 26 Q28ylh – Q28ylh1 -0.39535 0.25591 -1.545 0.13 
Pair 27 Q28yhl - Q28yil1 0.11628 0.43416 0.268 0.79 
Pair 28 Q28ylpub – Q28ylpub1 0.13953 0.34516 0.404 0.688 
Pair 29 Q28yhnopub - Q28yhnopub1 0.54762 0.487 1.124 0.267 
Pair 30 Q29legal – Q29legal1 -0.04167 0.22667 -0.184 0.855 
Pair 31 Q29yll - Q29yll1 -0.11628 0.51897 -0.224 0.824 
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Pair 32 Q29yhh – Q29hh1 -0.25581 0.49593 -0.516 0.609 
Pair 33 Q29ylh - Q29ylh1 -0.81395 0.46974 -1.733 0.09 
Pair 34 Q29yhl – Q29yhl1 -0.02326 0.4986 -0.047 0.963 
Pair 35 Q29ylpub - Q29ylpub1 -0.02326 0.46528 -0.05 0.96 
Pair 36 Q29yhnopub – Q29yhnopub1 0.30233 0.52463 0.576 0.568 
Pair 37 Totaware - totaware1 0.36735 0.52545 0.699 0.488 
Pair 38 Profit - Profit1 -0.08163 0.27485 -0.297 0.768 
Pair 39 Mktshare - Mktshare1 -0.22917 0.19121 -1.199 0.237 
Pair 40 levelcomp - levelcomp1 0.20408 0.19557 1.044 0.302 
Pair 41 size - size1 -0.06122 0.24984 -0.245 0.807 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
